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Within the past decades, the explosive combination of multimedia signal process-
ing, communications and networking technologies has facilitated the sharing of digital
multimedia data and enabled pervasive digital media distribution over all kinds of net-
works. People involved in the sharing and distribution of multimedia contents form mul-
timedia social networks in which users share and exchange multimedia content, as well
as other resources. Users in a multimedia social network have different objectives and
influence each other’s decision and performance. It is of ample importance to understand
how users interact with and respond to each other and analyze the impact of human fac-
tors on multimedia systems. This thesis illustrates various aspects of issues and problems
in multimedia social networks via two case studies of human behavior in multimedia
fingerprinting and peer-to-peer live streaming.
Since media security and content protection is a major issue in current multime-
dia systems, this thesis first studies the user dynamics of multimedia fingerprinting social
networks. We investigate the side information which improves the traitor-tracing per-
formance and provide the optimal strategies for both users (fingerprint detector and the
colluders) in the multimedia fingerprinting social network. Furthermore, before a collu-
sion being successfully mounted, the colluders must be stimulated to cooperate with each
other and all colluders have to agree on the attack strategy. Therefore, not all types of
collusion are possible. We reduce the possible collusion set by analyzing the incentives
and bargaining behavior among colluders. We show that the optimal strategies designed
based on human behavior can provide more information to the fingerprint detector and
effectively improve the collusion resistance.
The second part of this thesis focuses on understanding modelling and analyzing
user dynamics for users in various types of peer-to-peer live streaming social networks.
We stimulate user cooperation by designing the optimal, cheat-proof, and attack-resistant
strategies for peer-to-peer live streaming social networks over Internet as well as wireless
networks. Also, as more and more smart-phone users subscribe to the live-streaming
service, a reasonable market price has to be set to prevent the users from reselling the live
video. We start from analyzing the equilibrium between the users who want to resell the
video and the potential buyers to provide the optimal price for the content owner.
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A social network is a structure of nodes (including individuals and organizations) that
are connected with each other via certain types of relations, for examples, values, friend-
ship, conflict, financial exchange, trade, etc. People have been studying methodologies to
formulate the relationships between members at all scales, from interpersonal to interna-
tional, and social network analysis has become a popular topic in sociology, economics,
information science and many other disciplines.
In a multimedia social network community, a group of users form a dynamically
changing network infrastructure to share and exchange data, often multimedia content, as
well as other resources [1]. In the past decades, we have witnessed the emergence of large-
scale multimedia social network communities, for instance, Napster, flickr and YouTube,
and the Internet traffic has shifted dramatically from HTML text pages to multimedia file
sharing [2]. These multimedia social networks have millions of users worldwide, and a
crucial issue there is to understand the user dynamics that influence human’s behavior.
As an example, a study showed that in a campus network, peer-to-peer file sharing can
consume 43% of the overall bandwidth, which is about three times of the WWW traffic
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[3]. This poses new challenges to the efficient, scalable and robust sharing of multimedia
over large and heterogeneous networks.
By participating in multimedia social networks, users receive rewards by being able
to access extra resources from their peers, and they also contribute their own resources.
Users aim to maximize their own payoff by participating in multimedia social networks,
and different users have different (and often conflicting) objectives and full cooperation
cannot be enforced since users will try all their means to increase their own profit. For
example, in a peer-to-peer file-sharing system, users pool together the resources and co-
operate with each other to provide an inexpensive, highly scalable and robust platform
for distributed data sharing [4, 5]. However, due to the voluntary participation nature in
many multimedia social networks and the limited resources available to each user, users’
full cooperation cannot be guaranteed unless there exist powerful central authorities who
mandate and enforce user cooperation. A recent study of Napster and Gnutella showed
that many users are free riders and 25% of the users in Gnutella share no files at all [6].
Thus, as demonstrated in Figure 1.1, an important issue in multimedia social networks is
to understand the optimal strategies that users will play when negotiating with each other
and achieve fairness. Game theory [7,8] provides a fundamental tool to study the fairness
dynamics among users, and the Nash Equilibrium analysis gives the optial strategies from
which no user has incentives to deviate.
The above discussion focuses on analyzing the behavior of rational users who are
willing to contribute their own resources if cooperation with others can help improve
their payoff. They are honest when exchanging information and negotiating with other





Figure 1.1: User dynamics in social networks.
no contribution of their own. If necessary, these selfish users might even cheat during
the negotiation process in order to maximize their own payoff, as shown in Figure 1.1.
Furthermore, there might exist malicious users, whose goal is to attack and sabotage the
system. For example, in peer-to-peer file-sharing systems, they tamper the media files
with the intention of making the content useless (the so-called “pollution” attack) [3].
They can also launch the Denial of Service (DoS) attack to exhaust other users’ resources
and make the system unavailable [9]. It is possible that a few malicious users collude with
each other to effectively attack the system, for example, the flooding Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack in peer-to-peer file-sharing systems. Therefore, cheat free and
attack resistance are fundamental requirements in order to achieve user cooperation and
provide reliable services in multimedia social networks.
To model and analyze human dynamics in multimedia social networks when there
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exist selfish and malicious users, the first step is to study the strategies that selfish collud-
ers can use to cheat and those that malicious users adopt to attack the system. The next
issue is to implement monitoring mechanisms to detect and identify misbehaving users,
as illustrated in Figure 1.1. A challenging issue here is that the monitoring mechanisms
should be able to distinguish “intentional” misbehavior (for example, intentional manipu-
lation of multimedia content) from “innocent” ones (for example, transmission error and
packet loss in erroneous and congested networks). The above investigation will facilitate
the design of cheat-proof and attack-resistant strategies, which make non-cooperation
non-profitable, thus unattractive to selfish users, and minimize the damage to the system
caused by malicious users.
In a nutshell, multimedia social networks involve a large number of users of dif-
ferent types with different objectives, and before multimedia social network communities
become successful, they must provide a predictable and satisfactory level of service. It
is of ample importance to understand how users interact with and respond to each other
and analyze the impact of human factors on multimedia systems. Such an understanding
provides fundamental guidelines to better design of multimedia systems and network-
ing, and to offer more secure and personalized services. All these are essential factors
to maximize the overall system performance and minimize the damage caused by ma-
licious users. In addition, for different multimedia social networks, different structures
will result in different mechanisms to monitor user behavior and achieve cheat proof and
attack resistance. The goals of this thesis are to illustrate why human behavior factors are
important and emerging issues strongly related to signal processing, and to demonstrate
that signal processing can be effectively used to model, analyze and perform behavior
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forensics for multimedia social networks.
1.2 Dissertation Outline and Contributions
From the discussion above, behavior modelling for multimedia social networks is a new
paradigm that provides guidelines for both the system designer and the users in multime-
dia systems. This thesis develops and analyzes methodologies to model the user behav-
ior dynamics and investigate the optimal strategies for multimedia fingerprinting social
networks and peer-to-peer live streaming social networks over Internet and wireless net-
works. We envision that insights from a wide range of disciplines, such as game theory,
networking, and economics, will help improve the understanding of human dynamics and
its impact on signal processing and ultimately lead to systems with more secure, efficient
and personalized services. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
1.2.1 Equilibriums of Multimedia Fingerprinting Social Networks
with Side Information (Chapter 2)
Multimedia fingerprinting is an emerging technology that offers proactive post-delivery
protection of multimedia content [10–14]. It labels each distributed copy with the corre-
sponding user’s identification information, called fingerprint, which can be used to track
the distribution of multimedia data and to identify the source of illicit copies. Multiuser
collusion is a cost-effective attack against multimedia fingerprinting, where a group of
attackers work collectively to remove or attenuate the embedded fingerprints [15, 16].
In multimedia fingerprinting, colluders and the fingerprint detector form a multi-
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media social network: colluders who apply multiuser collusion attempt to remove the
identifying fingerprints in their copies, and the digital rights enforcer detects the embed-
ded fingerprints in the suspicious copy to capture colluders. It is obvious that the colluders
and the fingerprint detector influence each other’s performance and decision: given a col-
luded copy, the detector always wants to adjust his/her detection strategy to achieve the
best possible traitor-tracing performance. Meanwhile, during collusion, the colluders try
the best to minimize their risk based on the available information about the detection
procedure. There are many collusion strategies that the colluders can use to remove the
identifying fingerprints. Also, the detector can apply different detection strategies to iden-
tify the colluders. Thus, the dynamics between the colluders and the fingerprint detector
is complicated.
Side information is the information other than the colluded multimedia content that
can help increase the probability of detection. We propose a game-theoretical framework
to model and analyze the complex dynamics between the colluders and fingerprint de-
tector. In this thesis, we model the colluder-detector behavior dynamics as a two-stage
game, where the fingerprint detector tries to maximize the detection performance while
the colluders adjust the collusion parameters to minimize their risk under the fairness
constraint. We first study the impact of side information in multimedia fingerprinting and
show that the statistical means of the detection statistics can help the fingerprint detector
significantly improve the collusion resistance. We then investigate how to probe the side
information and model the dynamics between the fingerprint detector and the colluders
as a two-stage extensive game with perfect information. We find the equilibrium of the
colluder-detector game using backward induction and show that the min-max solution is
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a Nash equilibrium, which gives no incentive for everyone in the multimedia fingerprint
social network to deviate. This thesis demonstrates that the proposed side information
can help improve the system performance, and the self-probing fingerprint detector has
almost the same performance as the optimal correlation-based detector. Also, we provide
the solutions to how to reach optimal collusion strategy and the corresponding detection,
thus lead to a better collusion resistance [17].
1.2.2 Behavior Analysis in Colluder Social Networks (Chapter 3)
During collusion, a group of attackers collectively and effectively attack multimedia fin-
gerprinting system and use multimedia content illegally. Before the collusion being suc-
cessful, the colluders have to make agreement on how to distribute the risk and reward
by redistributing the colluded multimedia signal. Hence, the colluders in a multimedia
fingerprinting system also form a social network.
To have a better understanding of the attackers’ behavior during collusion to achieve
fairness, we first model the dynamics among colluders as a non-cooperative game, pro-
pose a general model of utility functions and study four different bargaining solution of
this game. Our framework considers both the colluders’ risk of being detected by the
digital rights enforcer and the reward received from illegal usage of multimedia content.
Moreover, the market value of the redistributed multimedia content is time sensitive. The
earlier the colluded copy being released, the more the people who are willing to pay for
it. Thus the colluders have to reach agreement on how to distribute reward and the prob-
ability being detected among themselves as soon as possible. We further incorporate the
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time-sensitiveness of the colluders’ reward, and study the time-restricted bargaining equi-
librium. We also investigate how do the colluders select fellow attackers to maximize
colluders’ payoffs. We provide the solution to the equilibrium that all the colluders have
no inventive to disagree in order to maximize their own payoff.
Our analysis shows that colluding with more attackers does not always increase
an attacker’s utility, and attackers may not always want to cooperate with each other.
We first examine the necessary conditions for attackers to collude together, and study
how they select the collusion parameters such that cooperation benefits all colluders. We
then study how the number of colluders affects each attacker’s utility, and investigate
the optimum strategy that an attacker should use to select fellow attackers in order to
maximize his or her own payoff [18].
1.2.3 Incentive Cooperation Strategies for Peer-to-Peer Live Multi-
media Streaming Social Networks (Chapter 4)
With recent advance in networking, multimedia signal processing, and communication
technologies, we witness the emergence of large-scale multimedia social networks, where
millions of users form a distributed and dynamically changing infrastructure to share
media content. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) live streaming using the mesh-pull architecture [19]
is one of the biggest multimedia social networks on the Internet and has enjoyed many
successful deployments to date, for example, CoolStreaming, pplive and SopCast [20–
27]. Users in a P2P live-streaming system watch live broadcasting TV programs over
networks simultaneously. The system relies on voluntary contributions of resources from
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individual users to achieve high scalability and robustness and to provide satisfactory
performance.
In peer-to-peer live-streaming social networks, users cooperate with each other to
provide a distributed, highly scalable and robust platform for live streaming applications.
A an essential issue to be resolved first is to stimulate user cooperation. In addition, users
in P2P live streaming systems are strategic and rational, in that they are likely to ma-
nipulate any incentive system (for example, by cheating) to maximize their payoff. As
such, in large-scale social networks, users influence each other’s decisions and perfor-
mance, and there exist complicated dynamics among users. It is of ample importance to
investigate user behavior and analyze the impact of human factors on multimedia social
networks. We propose a game-theoretic framework to model user behavior and designs
incentive-based strategies to stimulate user cooperation in peer-to-peer live streaming. We
first analyze the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto optimality of 2-person game and then
extend to multiuser case. We also take into consideration selfish users’ cheating behavior
and malicious users’ attacking behavior. Both our analytical and simulation results show
that the proposed strategies can effectively stimulate user cooperation, achieve cheat free,
attack resistance and help to provide reliable services [28, 29].
1.2.4 Cooperation Stimulation Strategies for Peer-To-Peer Wireless
Live Video-Sharing Social Networks (Chapter 5)
Recent development on wireless local area network (WLAN) enable users to utilize WLAN
with low cost and high quality of service [30–33]. Users watching live streaming in the
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same wireless network share the same limited bandwidth of backbone connection to the
Internet, thus they might want to cooperate with each other to obtain better video quality.
These users form a wireless live-streaming social network. Every user wishes to watch
video with high quality while paying as little as possible cost to help others. Given the un-
stable wireless channel and less user in the wireless network, the attackers can cause more
damage to the wireless live streaming social network than in the Internet phenomenon.
Therefore, the malicious-user identification mechanism has to be faster and more reliable.
This thesis focuses on providing incentives for user cooperation. We propose a
game-theoretic framework to model user behavior and to analyze the optimal strategies
for user cooperation simulation in wireless live streaming. We first analyze the Pareto op-
timality and the time-sensitive bargaining equilibrium of the two-person game. We then
extend the solution to the multiuser scenario. We also consider potential selfish users’
cheating behavior and malicious users’ attacking behavior and analyze the performance
of the proposed strategies with the existence of cheating users and malicious attackers.
We introduce the concept of trust to further bound the damage caused by malicious at-
tack. Both our analytical and simulation results show that the proposed strategies can
effectively stimulate user cooperation, achieve cheat free and attack resistance, and help
provide reliable services for wireless live streaming applications [34].
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1.2.5 Optimal Price Setting for Mobile Live Video Service (Chapter
6)
The mobile phone is becoming the most popular consumer device over all kinds of elec-
tronic products. Recently, the development of smart phones enables users to watch live
TV program by subscribing data plans from cellphone service providers. Nowadays, the
price of data plans are set only to compete with other service providers. However, due
to the high popularity and the mobility of the mobile phones, the subscribers can form a
network to re-sell the live video to the non-subscribers. Such re-selling mechanism is a
potential competitor for the service provider. The service provider has to set a reasonable
price that can prevent such re-selling behavior to protect the provider’s profit.
In this thesis, we analyze the optimal price setting for the service provider by in-
vestigating the equilibrium between the re-sellers and the non-subscribers. We model the
behavior between the re-sellers and the non-subscribers as a hybrid Stackelburg auction
game and find the optimal price for both groups of users. Such analysis can help design
a reasonable price for the less-competitor mobile live-streaming market to improve the
quality of service for end users.
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Chapter 2
Behavior Analysis in Colluder Social
Networks
During collusion, the colluders share the reward from the illegal usage of multimedia as
well as the risk of being captured by the digital rights enforcer. Before collusion rela-
tionship can be established, an agreement must be reached regarding how to distribute
the risk and the reward. Therefore, the colluders in the digital fingerprinting system also
form a social network. In the colluder social network, users collaborate with each other
to reduce their chance of being caught by the digital right enforcer and share the reward
of redistributing the colluded multimedia signal. However, each colluder prefers the col-
lusion that favors his/her payoff the most (lowest risk and highest reward), and different
colluders have different preferences. To address such a conflict, a critical issue for the
colluders is to decide how to fairly distribute the risk and the reward. It is of ample im-
portance to understand how colluders negotiate with each other to achieve fairness of the
attack.
To analyze the dynamics among the members in colluder social network, we model
the user behavior as a non-cooperative game where each colluder tries to maximize his/her
individual payoff under the fairness constraint. First, the attackers have to decide whether
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to collude with people who have the high resolution copy, or is it better to cooperate
with those who have the base layer only, and how many people should them collude
with. To minimize the risk, colluders are always willing to cooperate with each other
since it reduces all attackers’ risk, and a colluder should find as many fellow attackers as
possible. However, colluding with more attackers also means sharing with more people
the reward from illegal usage of multimedia and, therefore, colluders may not always
want to cooperate with each other. In addition, when colluders receive copies of different
resolutions, an attacker also needs to decide with whom to collude, which has been seldom
addressed in the literature.
After finding the best partners, the colluders will bargain to reach the agreement of
fairly distributing the probability of being detected and the reward of redistributing the
multimedia content. In this chapter, we consider different definitions of fairness, inves-
tigate how the colluders would like to share the risk and the reward, and study different
bargaining solutions: Nash-Bargaining, Max-Min, and Max-Sum solutions. Also, users
in the colluder social network may have different social positions, thus some users may
be willing to take higher risk and higher reward at the same time, while other users may
be more concerned about risk and want to take lower risk and lower reward. We also take
this phenomenon into consideration and study the proportional fairness collusion.
In addition, the other side of the fingerprinting system, the fingerprint detector, also
has to choose its optimal strategy according to various types of collusion. The collud-
ers will agree on the bargaining solutions if and only if the bargaining solutions are the
best strategies they can choose under the fairness criteria. Therefore, it is crucial for
both the colluders and the digital rights enforcer to investigate the optimal strategies for
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each other’s choices and reach the equilibrium for the multimedia fingerprinting social
network.
The rest of the chapter is as follows. We define the general utility functions for
the colluders and investigate under what conditions will the attackers collaborate with
each other in Section 2.1. We then analyze the fair collusion in Section 2.2, including
bargaining solutions with and without time constraint. The analysis of equilibriums for
the colluder-detector game in the multimedia fingerprinting social networks is studied in
Section 2.3 and conclusions are drawn in Section 2.4.
2.1 Game-theoretic Formulation and Incentives for Multi-
user Collusion
In this section, we will first introduce the multimedia fingerprinting system with side
information as discussed in Chapter 2, and then define the utility function of every user in
the colluder social network. Based on each colluder’s utility, we will discuss the criteria
that stimulates collusion.
2.1.1 Multimedia Fingerprinting with Side Information
To improve the detection performance, in Chapter 2 we investigated techniques for the
digital rights enforcer to explore the special characteristics of the colluded copy, probe
side information about multiuser collusion, and select the optimum detection strategy.
In the two-layer scalable multimedia fingerprinting system in Section 3.1, for user
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u(i) who receives a high resolution fingerprinted copy, let W(i)b and W
(i)
e denote u(i)’s
fingerprints that are embedded in the base layer and the enhancement layer, respectively.
Let Yb and Ye be the fingerprints extracted from the base layer and the enhancement layer
of the test copy, respectively.
In such a system, there are many different ways to determine if u(i) participates in
collusion. For example, the fingerprint detector can use Yb and Ye collectively to deter-












to measure the similarity between Y and W(i). From the analysis in Chapter 2, with
orthogonal fingerprint modulation, if the detection noise is i.i.d. Gaussian N (0,σ2n), then














, if i ∈ SCbe,
N (0,σ2n), if i 6∈ SCbe.
(2.2)
In (2.2), Nb and Ne are the lengths of the fingerprints embedded in the base layer and the
enhancement layer, respectively, and σ2w is the variance of the fingerprint W(i).
The fingerprint detector can also use the fingerprint extracted from each individual



















, if i 6∈ SCbe,
(2.3)
to calculate the similarity between the extracted fingerprint and the original fingerprint,
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Here, the subscript ‘t’ is the layer index and is either ‘b’ (the base layer) or ‘e’ (the










Comparing (2.2) and (2.3), T N(i)c , T N
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b and T N
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e have the same variance but dif-
ferent statistical means, and the one with the largest mean gives the best detection per-
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and T N(i)e provides a better performance.
2.1.2 Game Model
During collusion, every user in the colluder social network wants to minimize his/her own
risk and maximizes his/her own reward.
For colluder u(i), his/her payoff function π(i) should be composed of two terms:








In (2.4), P(i)d and L stand for colluder u
(i)’s probability and loss of being detected, and
R(i) is the reward that u(i) gets after redistributing the colluded multimedia content and
sharing with other colluders. Since the total reward that will be shared by all the colluders
by redistributing the colluded copy is proportional to the video quality. For instance, the
pirated video with DVD quality would have higher value than the video with VCD quality.
In temporal scalable video coding scenario, video quality is an increasing function of the
number of frames. Here we aim to show how do different factors during collusion affect
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the behavior of the colluders, thus we introduce a simple model that the video quality is

















Where Fc is the number of frames in the final colluded copy, and Fmax is the largest
number of frames among all the subscribers’ copies, hence Fc/Fmax illustrates higher
quality of colluded copy gives higher reward to the colluders. For instance, in our system
in Section 2.1.1, if all the colluders only received the lower quality copy, then Fc = Nb,
Fmax = Nb + Ne, Fc/Fmax = 1- Ne/(Nb + Ne) < 1, which implies the colluders cannot
get the full market value of the video. F(i) is the number of frames in u(i)’s copy; K is





illustrates colluders with higher-quality copies would have
more reward since they already paid more money to subscribe to higher resolution copies
, and γ is the factor to control how much extra reward the colluders with higher-resolution
copies should get. For example, if γ = 0, then the reward is equally distributed among
the colluders with the same quality copies, and larger γ indicates the reward distribution
favors the colluders with higher-quality copies more. Different colluders have different
evaluation of their risk. Therefore, some colluders might want to take higher risk, and




allows the colluders who take risk
would have higher reward.
In the following sections, to simplify the analysis, we assume the colluders who
receive the same quality copies agree to share the same probability of being detected as
in Section 2.1.1. Hence, the bargaining process during collusion can be modelled as the
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following game:
• Players: There are two players in the game. Colluders who receive the low-
resolution copies act as a single player in the game and they have the same utility
πb, while while colluders who have the high-resolution copies act as a single player
during the bargaining process and they have the same utility πb,e. Denote all the
colluder in SCb as scb, and all the colluders in SCb,e be scb,e in this game.
• Strategies: Based on the two-step collusion model in Chapter 2, the collusion pa-
rameter β controls the risk for both scb and scb,e. The control factors of the reward




) is declared before the game. Therefore, the players’
possible strategies are all the possible values of β.
• Cost: For each player, joining the collusion and redistribute the colluded copy incur
the probability of being detected by the fingerprint detector. Being accused by the
detector causes a consequence of cost. Thus we model the cost of each player as the
probability of being detected times its loss. The loss is the private information of
each colluders, and a reasonable setting is the loss should be bounded by a maximal
value Lmax.
• Reward: The players gain reward by redistributing the colluded copy, and the re-
ward is distributed among all the colluders. Here we assume the value of the col-
luded copy remains the same no matter how long does the collusion process take.
• Utility function: The utility function is considered as the reward minus the ex-
pected cost as in (2.4).
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Figure 2.1: π(i) when all colluders receive fingerprinted copies of high resolution. Nb =
Ne = 50000 and θ = 50. The probability of falsely accusing an innocent user is Pf a =
10−3.
2.1.3 Necessary Condition for Single-Resolution Collusion
We first discuss the situations that the attackers will collaborate with each other for multi-
user collusion. As an example, we assume that all attackers receive high resolution copies
with base layer and enhancement layer, and they generate a colluded copy of high reso-
lution, that is, K = Kbe and fc = 1. The analysis is similar for the scenario where all
fingerprinted copies have the base layer only and thus omitted. In such a scenario, since
all copies have the same resolution, there is no bargaining in collusion, and attackers sim-
ply average all copies that they have with equal weights. Based on (2.4), colluder u(i)’s
utility function can be simplified to
π















Figure 2.1 shows an example of π(i) versus the total number of colluders K. In
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Figure 2.1, the lengths of the fingerprints embedded in the base layer and the enhancement
layer are Nb = 50000 and Ne = 50000, respectively. In Figure 2.1, we use θ = 50 as an
example to illustrate colluders’ payoffs, and we observe similar trends with other values
of θ. σ2w = σ
2
n = 1 and h is selected so that the probability of falsely accusing an innocent
is 10−3. From Figure 2.1, when K < 126, π(i) < 0 due to u(i)’s large probability of being
detected. In this scenario, colluders may not want to use multimedia illegally since it is
too risky. Furthermore, from Figure 2.1, colluding with more attackers does not always






K : π(i)(K−1) < 0,π(i)(K)≥ 0
}
be the smallest K that gives u(i) a non-
negative payoff. Attackers will collude with each other if and only if there are more




(i) as the optimum K that maximizes colluder u(i)’s utility when all
attackers receive copies of the same resolution. A colluder should find a total of Kmax
attackers if possible to maximize his/her payoff. In the example in Figure 1, K0 = 126
and Kmax = 206.
2.1.3.1 Analysis of K0













































where a = h/σn and bs =
√
Nb +Neσw/σn. It is difficult to find the exact analytical
solution to (2.8) due to the existence of the Gauss tail function. To analyze K0, we use the
following polynomial approximation of Q(t) for t > 0 [35]
Q(t)≈

0.5−0.1t(4.4− t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 2.2,
0.01 for 2.2 < t ≤ 2.6,
0 for t > 2.6,
(2.9)
and find an approximated solution to (2.8). In this paper, we only consider the scenario
where a−bsx > 0, that is, P
(i)
d < 0.5 and a colluder’s chance of being detected is smaller






After rearranging both sides, (2.10) becomes a cubic equation of x
fs(x) = a0x3 +a1x2 +a2x+a3 ≈ 0,









, and a3 =−a(4.4−a)+5.(2 11)
The cubic equation fs(x) = 0 has three roots, which can be found using the Cardan’s
method [36]. Let q = (3a0a2 − a21)/(9a20) and r = (9a0a1a2 − 27a20a3 − 2a21)/(54a30).










q3 + r2. Then, the three roots of
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(2.11) are



















(s1− s2) j, (2.12)
where j in (2.12) is the imaginary unit. Therefore, K0,1 = 1/x1, K0.2 = 1/x2 and K0,3 =
1/x3 are the approximated roots of (2.7). We need to examine each of the three ap-
proximated roots to find K0. Note that K0 is a positive integer, and from Figure 2.1,
dπ(i)
dK |K=K0 > 0. Therefore, given {K0,1,K0,2,K0,3}, we find the positive real root that sat-
isfies d fs(x)dx |x=1/K > 0. We then use the selected root as an approximation of K0. That
is,






To demonstrate the process to find the approximated K0, we consider the example in
Figure 2.1 where Nb = Ne = 50000, σ2w = σ
2
n = 1, θ = 50, and Pf a = 10
−3. Plugging these
numbers into (2.11), the cubic function is fs(x) = 5000000x3 +71848.38x2−1015.41x+
0.9525, whose three roots are x1 = 0.008011, x2 =−0.023397 and x3 = 0.001016. There-
fore, K0,1 = 1/x1 = 124.82, K0,2 = 1/x2 = −42.73 and K0,3 = 1/x3 = 983.95. We first
eliminate K0,2 since it is a negative number. We then calculate the first order derivatives









−853.87. Then, we can eliminate K0,3 since d fs(x)dx
∣∣∣
x=x3
< 0, and select K̂0 = dK0,1e= 125,
which is very close to the true value K0 = 126 we found using exhaustive search in the
previous section.
When θ takes different values, Figure 2.2 plots the approximated K̂0 calculated
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using (2.13) and the true values of K0 that are found using exhaustive search. From
Figure 2.2, K0 is a decreasing function of θ. As an example, when fc = 1, K0 drops from
235 to 103 when θ increases from 10 to 100. In addition, if we compare Figure 2.2a with
2.2b, K0 takes a smaller value if colluders generate a colluded copy of low resolution. For
example, when θ = 50, K0 = 126 when fc = 1 and K0 = 100 when fc = 0.5.
Furthermore, in the example in Figure 2.2, when θ ≥ 20, K̂0 in (2.13) gives a very
good approximation of K0. In the example in Figure 2.2a, when fc = 1 and θ ≥ 20, the
approximation error is no larger than 1, that is |K̂0−K0| ≤ 1. In such cases, to improve the
accuracy, given K̂0, we can verify whether it satisfies π(i)(K̂0− 1) < 0 and π(i)(K̂0) ≥ 0.
If so, then K0 = K̂0. Otherwise, we decrease K̂0 by one if π(i)(K̂0 − 1) ≥ 0, and we
increase K̂0 by one if π(i)(K̂0) < 0. Then, we verify again whether the new K̂0 satisfies
π(i)(K̂0−1) < 0 and π(i)(K̂0)≥ 0. By doing so, we will find the exact solution of K0.
When θ < 20, there is a difference between the approximated K̂0 and the true value
of K0. In Figure 2.2a, when fc = 1 and θ < 20, the largest approximation error is 10, which
happens when θ = 10. This is because the above analysis of K̂0 uses the approximation
Q(t) ≈ 0.5− 0.1t(4.4− t), which gives a good approximation of the Gauss tail function
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 2.2. When a−bs/K is larger than 2.2, the polynomial approximation of Q(t)
cannot be used. Therefore, as the last step, we need to verify that the selected root xi in







































Figure 2.2: The approximation K̂0 in (2.13) and the true value of K0. Nb = Ne = 50000,
σ2w = σ
2
n = 1, and Pf a = 10
−3. (a): the colluded copy includes both layers with fc = 1.
(b): fc = 0.5.
2.1.3.2 Analysis of Kmax
Given Nb, Ne and θ, to find the maximal number of colluders Kmax, we solve ∂π
(i)
∂K = 0, or
equivalently, find the root of ∂π
(i)
∂x = 0, where π
(i) is in (2.6) and x = 1/K is the inverse
of K. Same as in the previous section, we use fc = 1 as an example, and the analysis for
























Due to the existence of both the Gauss tail function and the exponential function, it is
difficult to find the analytical solution to (2.14), and we use numerical methods to solve
(2.14) and find Kmax.
Figure 2.3a and 2.3b show Kmax as a function of θ when the colluded copy has high
and low resolutions, respectively. The system setup is the same as in Figure 2.2. If we
compare Figure 2.3a with 2.3b, Kmax takes a smaller value when the colluded copy has a
lower resolution. For example, in Figure 2.3, with θ = 50, Kmax = 206 when the colluded
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(a)

























Figure 2.3: Kmax versus θ. Nb = Ne = 50000, σ2w = σ
2
n = 1, and Pf a = 10
−3. (a): all
colluders receive fingerprinted copies of high resolution and fc = 1. (b): all attackers
receive the base layer only and fc = 0.5.
copy has high resolution, and Kmax = 162 when fc = 0.5.
Furthermore, Kmax is a decreasing function of θ. For example, when fc = 1, Kmax =
385 when θ = 10 and Kmax = 173 when θ = 100. This is because, when θ takes a smaller
value and when attackers emphasize more on risk minimization, they prefer to collude
with more people to lower their risk. Mathematically, it can be proved as follows. After















−1 = θ−1. (2.15)
Assume that θ1 ≥ θ2, and x1 and x2 are the solutions to (2.15) when θ = θ1 and θ = θ2,






















1. In this paper, we consider the scenario where colluders’ probability of being detected
is smaller than 0.5, that is, P(i)d = Q(a− bsx) < 0.5 and a− bsx > 0. In such a scenario,





are decreasing functions of x, thus x1 ≥ x2 and
K1max = 1/x1 ≤ K2max = 1/x2.
To summarize, when all attackers receive copies of the same resolution, they collude
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with each other if and only if the total number of colluders is larger than K0 and when
all attackers receive positive payoffs. In addition, an attacker should try to find a total of
Kmax colluders if possible to maximize his/her payoff.
2.1.4 Necessary Condition for Multi-Resolution Collusion
In this subsection, we consider the scenario where colluders receive fingerprinted copies
of different resolutions and analyze when attackers will collude with each other.
One possible outcome of the bargaining between SCb and SCbe is that they do not
reach an agreement. In such a scenario, attackers only collude with their fellow attackers
in the same subgroup, and SCb and SCbe do not cooperate with each other. Given Nb, Ne,
Kb and Kbe, if an attacker in SCb colludes with those in SCb only, his or her utility is
π
b






















In (2.16), a = h/σn and bb =
√
Nbσw/σn. Similarly, if an attacker in SCbe colludes with
those in SCbe only, his or her payoff is
π
be






















In (2.17), bs =
√
Nb +Neσw/σn.
If SCb and SCbe collaborate with each other and select the collusion parameter β,
for an attacker i ∈ SCb, his or her utility is
π
























Kb( f c)γ +Kbe
.(2.18)
Similarly, for 0 ≤ β ≤ β+, an attacker i ∈ SCbe’s payoff is
π


























Kb( f c)γ +Kbe
.(2.19)








in the feasible set S, collud-
ers are only interested in those in Sp =
{
(πb,πbe) ∈ S : πb ≥ πb = max(0,πbnc),πbe ≥ πbe = max(0,πbnc),0 ≤ β ≤ β+
}
,
where cooperation helps both SCb and SCbe increase their payoffs.
• From (2.18), Pbd,c is an increasing function of β and, therefore, π
b is a decreasing
function of β. Let β̄ be the β that makes πb equal to πb, that is, πb(β̄) = πb. Then,
the constraint πb ≥ πb is equivalent to let β ≤ β̄.
• Similarly, from (2.19), P(be)d,c is a decreasing function of β, and thus π
be is an increas-
ing function of β. Let β be the β that makes πbe equal to πbe, that is, πbe(β) = πbe.
Therefore, the constraint πbe ≥ πbe is equivalent to select β ≥ β.
• Furthermore, if we compare (2.17) and (2.19), Pbed,c = P
be
d,nc when β = 0. That is,
if colluders select β = 0, then collaborating with SCb does not help SCbe further
reduce their risk of being detected. Meanwhile, Rbec < R
be
nc and colluders in SC
be





= πbe(β). Thus, β > 0 since πbe is an increasing function of β.
From the above analysis, we can rewrite Sp as Sp =
{
(πb,πbe) ∈ S : β ≤ β ≤ min(β̄,β+)
}
.
When attackers receive fingerprinted copies of different resolutions, the two subgroups of
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colluders SCb and SCbe will collude with each other if and only if there exists at least one
β such that β ≤ β ≤ min(β̄,β+), or equivalently, when Sp is not empty.
2.1.4.1 Lower and Upper Bounds of β
To further understand under what conditions SCb and SCbe will cooperate with each other,
we will first analyze β and β̄.












where Pbd,c(β) and R
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where Pbed,c(β) and R
be




























































upper bound of β from (30)
lower bound of β from (32)


















lower bound of β from (32)
upper bound of 
β from (30)
(b)
Figure 2.4: The upper bound and lower bound of β.(a): Kbe = 120, (b): Kb = 50.
Figure 2.1.4.1 shows examples of β and β̄. Kbe = 120 in Figure 2.1.4.1a, and Kb =
50 in Figure 2.1.4.1b. From Figure 2.1.4.1(a), β̄ < β when Kb < 9, and β > β+ when
Kb > 358. Therefore, in this example where Kbe is fixed as 120, Sp 6= /0 if and only
if 9 ≤ Kb ≤ 358. Similarly, from Figure 2.1.4.1(b), β > β̄ if Kbe < 94 or Kbe > 207.
Thus, when Kb = 50 is fixed, SCbe and SCb will collude with each other if and only if
94 ≤ Kbe ≤ 207.
2.1.4.2 Analysis of Kp
From Figure 2.1.4.1, given Nb, Ne and θ, for some pairs of (Kb,Kbe), Sp may be empty




(Kb,Kbe) : Sp 6= /0
}
as the set
including all pairs of (Kb,Kbe) where Sp is not empty and where SCb and SCbe will
collude with each other.
Given Nb, Ne and θ, SCb and SCbe will collude with each other if and only if Sp 6= /0,
that is, when β ≤ β+ and β ≤ β̄. Since πbe in (2.19) is an increasing function of β, if
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Rbec ≥ πbe(β) = πbe,





















































Combining (2.26) and (2.27), we have
Kp =
{







































The shaded area in Figure 2.5 shows an example of Kp. At point ‘A’ in Figure 2.5,
when Kbe < 91, no matter which value Kb takes, Sp is always empty and attackers will not
collude with each other. Similarly, when Kbe > 226 (point ‘B’ in Figure 2.5), no matter
how many attackers are in SCb and how they select β, cooperation between SCb and SCbe
cannot improve all colluders’ payoffs. Furthermore, when Kb > 431 (point ‘C’ in Figure
2.5), SCb and SCbe will not collude with each other. To quantify the above boundary
















Figure 2.5: An example of Kp. Nb = Ne = 50000 and θ = 50. The probability of falsely





Kb : ∃Kbe s.t. (Kb,Kbe) ∈Kp
}
. (2.29)
In the example in Figure 2.5, Kbe = 91, K̄be = 226 and K̄b = 431.
2.1.4.3 Analysis of the Bounds of Number of Colluders
From Figure 2.5 and (2.29), if Kb > K̄b, Kbe < Kbe, or Kbe > K̄be, then it is impossible
to find a β that increases all colluders’ payoffs, and SCb and SCbe will not cooperate with
each other. Therefore, during collusion, as a preliminary step, colluders should first check
that Kb ≤ K̄b and Kbe ≤ Kbe ≤ K̄be. Then, they should ensure that (Kb,Kbe) is in the set
Kp defined in (2.29), and guarantee that there exists at least one β that increases both SCb
and SCbe’s payoffs. In the following section, we will analyze the boundary points of Kp
(Kbe, K̄be and K̄b) in details.
Kbe Using exhaustive search, we find that at point ‘A’ in Figure 2.5, Kb = 56 and Kbe =






















(point ’A’ in Figure 5)
lower bound of β from (32)
upper bound of β from (30)
















(point ’A’ in Figure 5)
upper bound of β from (30)
lower bound of β
from (32)
(b)
Figure 2.6: Upper and lower bound of β at point ‘A’ in Figure 2.5. Nb = Ne = 50000,
σ2w = σ
2
n = 1, γ = 1/3, Pf a = 10
−3, and θ = 50. (a): Kb = 56, (b): Kbe = 91.
and πbe = πb = 0. To have a better understanding of Kbe, Figure 2.5 plots β and β̄ around
the point (Kb = 56,Kbe = 91). As can be seen from Figure 2.5, at point ‘A’, β = β̄ = β+,
and Sp has only one item, which is Sp =
{
(πb,πbe) : β = β+
}
. Since πbe = πbe when
β = β, and πb = πb when β = β̄. Therefore, at the boundary point ‘A’, (Kb,Kbe) satisfies
πb(Kb,Kbe,β+) = πb = 0,
πbe(Kb,Kbe,β+) = πbe = 0.
(2.30)
To find Kb, we should first find the solution (Kb,Kbe) to the above equation (2.30) and
then select Kbe = dKbee. Using Figure 2.5 as an example, given the parameters Nb =
Ne = 50000, γ = 1/3, θ = 50 and Pf a = 10−3, we first find the solution to (2.30), which
is (Kb = 55.88,Kbe = 90.15). We then calculate Kbe = dKbee = 91, which is consistent
with the result we find using exhaustive search.
K̄be To analyze K̄be, using exhaustive search, we find that at point ‘B’ in Figure 2.5,
Kb = 1 < K0( fc = fb) = 100 and Kbe = 226 > K0( fc = 1) = 126. Therefore, at this
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(point ’B’ in Figure 5)
lower bound of β
from (32)
upper bound of β
from (30)
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from (30)




Figure 2.7: Upper and lower bound of β at point ‘B’ in Figure 2.5. Nb = Ne = 50000,
σ2w = σ
2
n = 1, γ = 1/3, Pf a = 10
−3, and θ = 50. (a): Kb = 1. (b): Kbe = 226.
point, πb = 0 and πbe = πbenc > 0. As shown in Figure 2.7, at this point, β = β̄, and Sp ={
(πb,πbe) : β = β = β̄
}
has only one entry. Also, from Figure 2.7b, when Kbe = K̄be,
if SCb has more than one attacker (that is, Kb ≥ 2), there is no β that can improve both
SCbe and SCb’s payoffs. Therefore, point ‘B’ corresponds to the scenario where Kb = 1,

























and then let K̄be = bKbec. In (2.31), Rbec = θ/[( fb)γ + Kbe], Rb = θ( fb)γ/[( fb)γ + Kbe],
and πbenc is in (2.17). As an example, given the system setup in Figure 2.5, the solution to
(2.31) is Kbe = 226.64 and thus K̄be = b226.64c= 226. It is consistent with the result we
found using exhaustive search.
K̄b At point ‘C’ in Figure 2.5, we find Kb = 431 and Kbe = 125 using exhaustive search
and β = β+, as shown in Figure 2.8. From the analysis in Section 2.1.4.2, for a given
Kbe, to satisfy the constraint β ≤ β+, it is required that Kb ≤ Kb′ , where Kb′ is defined
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point ‘C’ in Figure 5
lower bound of β from (32)















point ‘C’ in Figure 5
lower bound of β from (32)
(b)
Figure 2.8: Upper and lower bound of β at point ‘C’ in Figure 2.5. Nb = Ne = 50000,
σ2w = σ
2
n = 1, γ = 1/3, Pf a = 10
−3, and θ = 50. (a): Kb = 125. (b): Kbe = 431.














versus Kbe. Nb = Ne = 50000, σ2w = σ
2
n = 1, γ = 1/3, Pf a = 10
−3, and
θ = 50.
in (2.26). Therefore, we have K̄b = bmaxKbe Kb
′c. Using the system setup in Figure 2.5
as an example, Figure 2.9 plots Kb
′
versus Kbe, and Kb
′
achieves a maximum of 431.88
when Kbe = 125. Consequently, K̄b = b431.88c = 431, which agrees with the result we
found using exhaustive search.
To summarize, given Nb, Ne, and other parameters including θ and γ, in order to en-
sure that cooperation can help both SCb and SCbe improve their payoffs, colluders should
first follow the analysis in Section 2.1.4.3 and ensure that Kbe ≤ Kbe ≤ K̄be and Kb ≤ K̄b.
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Then, attackers should further check whether (Kb,Kbe) satisfies the constraints in (2.28)
and whether Sp is not empty. If (Kb,Kbe) ∈ Kp, colluders should use (2.22) and (2.24)
to calculate β̄ and β, respectively, and find Sp =
{
(πb,πbe) : β ≤ β ≤ min(β̄,β+)
}
. By
doing so, no matter which pair (πb,πbe) that colluders select in Sp, it is a Pareto optimal
solution and all colluders increase their payoffs by cooperating with each other.
2.2 Fair Bargaining Solutions in Colluders Social Net-
work
Based on the discussion in Section 2.1, we know the situations that the attackers will
mount multi-user collusion. The next question to ask is which collusion strategy is fair
and all colluders will agree with it.
2.2.1 Fairness Criteria
Depending on the definition of fairness and the objectives of collusion, colluders select
different collusion strategies and aim to reach agreement under different fairness criteria.
In this section, we demonstrate the behavior analysis of colluder social network by four
commonly used fairness criteria during bargaining.
Absolute Fairness: The most straight-forward fairness criteria is the absolute fairness,
which means the utility of every user in the colluder social network is equal, where
πAbsolute = π(i) = π( j) ∀i, j ∈ SC. (2.32)
Moreover, since we have assumed colluders who receive the same quality copies have
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equal utility, (2.32) can be simplified to
πAbsolute = πb = πb,e. (2.33)
Properties: Although absolute fairness solution is the simplest and seemed most
fair criteria, depending on the parameter L(i), |SCb|, and |SCb,e|, absolute fairness solution
does not always exist. Therefore, other fairness criteria have to be taken into account.
MaxMin Fairness: To guarantee the utility of every one who participate the colluder
social network, colluders can reach the agreement that the collusion parameters maximize





{π(i) : i ∈ SC}, (2.34)




Max Sum Fairness: Under some circumstances, all the users in the colluder social net-
work have the same goal so that they are willing to maximize the total utility over the








Properties: Max sum solution has a desired property that if it is feasible, it is
Pareto-Optimal. Pareto optimality means no player can increase his/her payoff without
decreasing others’. In a bargaining situation, players would always like to settle at a
Pareto-optimal outcome. This is because if they select a point that is not Pareto-optimal,
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then there exists another solution where at least one player can have larger payoff without
hurting the interest of the other players.
Proof : If πmaxsum = Kbπbmaxsum + K
b,eπ
b,e
maxsum is feasible but not Pareto-Optimal,
then there exists (πbmaxsum,π
b,e′) or (πb
′






maxsum by the definition of Pareto-Optimal. Thus there exists a feasible π′ > πmaxsum,
which contradict the definition in (2.36).
Nash-Bargaining Solution: Nash-Bargaining solution, which is also Pareto-Optimal [7],
is a famous bargaining solution in game theory, in which the basic idea being proportional










where πb∗ = min
β
{πb} , πbe∗ = min
β
{πbe}, (2.37)
and Bb,Bb,e are the bargaining power of SCb, SCb,e, respectively. When Bb = Bb,e = 1,
Nash-Bargaining solution divides the additional utility between the two players in a ratio
that is equal to the rate at which this utility can be transferred. If Bb 6= Bb,e, then the
bargaining solution deviate from the proportional fairness solution and favors the player
with higher bargain power.
2.2.2 Case Study and Simulation Results
In this section, we take two different utility functions as examples to illustrate the human
behavior dynamics of colluder social network.
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2.2.2.1 Case one: Reward is not proportional to risk
To have a clear picture of the agreement that the four fairness criteria will achieve, we









which is a special case of (2.5) where γ=0 and D(P(i)d )=1, meaning the reward of redis-
tributing the colluded copy is equally distributed to all the colluders. Therefore, the utility
functions of the two players, scb and scb,e can be written as
π
b = (R−Lb)Pbd +R and π





In the following, we will analyze the feasible region, the Pareto-Optimal set, and
the bargaining solutions based on different fairness criteria. Moreover, since the loss term
L(i) is a private information and is declared by the colluders themselves, we will also
discuss which value of L(i) would be optimal for each player.
1. Feasible Set
Given a N-person general-sum game, there is a certain subset S of RN , called the
feasible set. It is feasible in the sense that, given any (π1,π2, ...,πN) ∈ S, it is possi-
ble for the players u1,u2, ...,uN , acting together, to obtain the utilities π1,π2, ...,πN ,
respectively.
The self-probing fingerprint detector has approximately the same performance as
the optimal detector. Therefore, colluders should consider the worse-case scenario
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Figure 2.10: An example of Pareto-optimal set for the bargaining problem in case one
and assume that the fingerprint detector can always select the detection statistics
with the largest mean. Following the analysis in [37], under the assumption that the














σw for i ∈ SCb,






























2 dt is the Gaussian tail function.
From (2.40), for a given β, µb is fixed while µb,e1 may take three different values.
To find the feasible set of the game, we need to find the relationship between β and
µb,e first.
• Scenario 1 µb,e = µbb,e: µb,e = µ
b






























Nb +Ne. So the second upper bound in (2.41) is
always larger or equal to the first one. Thus, we have































Hence, for all Nb > 0, the upper bound of β in (2.42) is always smaller than
0. Therefore, µb,e 6= µbb,e and µ
b





b,e. Based on the above analysis, scenario 1 can never happen in real
cases.
• Scenario 2 µb,e = µeb,e: µb,e = µ
e
























Using the same analysis as in (2.42), the necessary and sufficient condition
for scenario 2 is:








≤ β ≤ 1. (2.45)
• Scenario 3 µb,e = µcb,e: Since scenario 1 has been proven to not exist, µb,e must
equal to one of µeb,e and µ
c
b,e. Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for Scenario 3 must be the compliment of the necessary and sufficient
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condition for Scenario 2. Hence, :









From the above analysis on P(i)d , we can calculate the payoffs π
(i) for all colluders
for any given β. From the definition of the payoff function (2.4), colluders who
receive fingerprinted copies of the same quality have the same payoff. We define
πb,e as the payoff for colluders in SCb,e, and πb as the payoff for colluders in SCb.
Figure 2.10 illustrates πb versus πb,e, and the feasible set is shown by the solid line.




is independent of β. Therefore, πb,e keeps the same while πb keeps decreasing with
β increasing. Similarly, the curve segment in Figure 2.10 corresponds to scenario
3, in which µb,e = µcb,e and π
b,e increases as β increases, while πb decreases as β
increases.
2. Pareto Optimality
After finding the feasible set, it is important to find the set of Pareto-Optimal points.
A solution is Pareto-Optimal if and only if no player in the game can increase
his/her payoff without decreasing others’ [7]. In a bargaining situation, players
would always like to settle at a pareto optimal outcome. This is because if the
colluders select a point that is not Pareto-optimal, then there exists another solu-
tion where at least one player can have larger payoff without hurting the interest
of other players. Therefore, the player who can have higher payoff without hurt-
ing others’ has the incentive to push other players to deviate from the non-Pareto-
optimal solution, and the other rational players will agree with him/her since their
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interests are not influenced. Therefore, if possible, the colluders will always look
for Pareto-optimal solutions to satisfy all the users in the colluder social network.
Also, Pareto-optimal solutions are not unique in most cases. In this subsection,
we investigate the Pareto-optimal points and analyzes the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a point to be Pareto-optimal.
Note that from (2.40), colluders in SCb can increase their payoff if and only if
they select a smaller β. On the other hand, πb,e remains the same when scenario 3
happens. Therefore, we start our analysis of the Pareto-optimality by πb.
• Necessary Condition: If a point is Pareto-Optimal, then decreasing µb and
increasing the payoff of those colluders in SCb must increase µb,e and decrease
πb,e. Note that from (2.40), µb is an increasing function of β. Thus, If a
point is a Pareto-Optimal point, µb,e must be a decreasing function of β, which
happens only when µb,e = µcb,e. Consequently, if a point is Pareto-Optimal, β
must satisfy (2.46), and (2.46) is the necessary condition of a Pareto Optimal
point.
• Sufficient Condition: If µb,e = µcb,e, then to increase the payoff of those col-
luders in SCb,e, colluders must decrease µb,e by selecting a larger β. However,
a larger β implies a larger µb, thus, it decreases the payoff of those colluders in
SCb. Consequently, those points that satisfy (2.40) are Pareto-Optimal points,
and (2.40) is the sufficient condition of Pareto-Optimal.
To conclude, the collusion is Pareto-Optimal if and only if µb,e = µcb,e and (2.40) is
satisfied, which is the curve segment in Figure 2.10.
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3. Absolute Fairness Solution There are many ways for colluders to share the risk
and the reward, depending on their definition of “fairness”. Absolute fairness is
widely adopted in the literature and most straight-forward, where all colluders have
the same payoff. Based on the definition in (2.33) and the utility function in (2.4),







where Pb,ed (β) and P
b
d (β) are the sc
b and scb,e’s probability of being detected defined
as in (2.40), and Lb and Lb,e are the loss term claimed by the two players, respec-
tively. According to the feasible set definition, Pb,ed (β) is a non-decreasing function





a monotonely increasing function of β, and (2.47) can be easily solved by numerical







Optimal value of L(i): Suppose the absolute fairness solution exists, and scb wants
to get more reward by falsely report the private information, the loss term Lb.
Since πb is a monotonely decreasing function of Pd(β) and Pd(β) is a monotonely
decreasing function of Pb,ed (β)/P
b
d (β), π
b is a monotonely increasing function of
Pb,ed (β)/P
b




d (β) satisfies (2.47) for the absolute fairness solu-
tion, it can easily be proven that if scb, instead of claiming the actual loss Lb, he/she
cheats to claim a higher loss L′b > Lb, the resulting absolute fairness solution will
give a P′bd < P
b
d . Therefore, the bargained payoff π
′b by claiming higher loss is
higher than the payoff πb which is the absolute-fairness solution with honestly-
reported loss Lb. Hence, scb can earn more payoff by cheating on his/her private
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information. The same analysis can be applied to scb,e and is not repeated here.
To conclude, reporting higher loss will increase the user’s payoff under absolute
fairness condition. Thus any selfish and rational user is going to report the highest
possible loss Lmax to maximize his/her own interest. As a result, Lb = Lb,e = Lmax,
and based on (2.47), Pb,ed = P
b
d in absolute fairness solution.
4. Max-Min Solution In this example, the players’ payoffs is affine to risk, hence the




where µb and µb,e are defined in (2.40).
The Max-Min fairness solution with payoff function defined in (2.38) has the fol-
lowing property:
Properties: Max-Min solution always exists, and at least one of the Max-Min so-
lution is Pareto-optimal. If the Max-Min solution is unique, then absolute fairness
solution exists and the max-min solution is also the absolute fairness solution.
Proof : First prove the existence: since both πb and πb,e are continuous functions of
β, then min{πb,πb,e} is also a continuous function of β. Also 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, therefore,
the Max-Min solution always exists.
Suppose π(β′) is a Max-Min solution which is not Pareto-Optimal. Since πb,e re-
mains the same in the feasible but not pareto-optimal set, and the largest πb in the
non-Pareto-optimal set is at the boundary to the Pareto-optimal set. Therefore, if
π(β′) = πb,e(β′) <= πb(β′) is a Max-Min solution in the non-Pareto-optimal set,
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Ne)/Nb also gives a Max-Min solution
because πb(β′′) >= πb(β′) >=πb,e(β′) = πb,e(β′′). On the other hand, if πb,e(β′) >
πb(β′) = π(β′) is a Max-Min solution in the non-Pareto-optimal set, then there ex-
ists a small positive number ε that πb,e(β′− ε) > πb(β′− ε) = πb(β′) > πb,e(β′) in
the non-Pareto-optimal set which contradict the assumption that π(β′) is the Max-
Min solution.
If the Max-Min solution is unique, from the above proof, it can easily be shown
that the solution must be Pareto-optimal. Since πb(β) is a monotonely decreasing
function of β and πb,e(β) is a monotonely increasing function of β in the Pareto-
optimal set, if πmaxmin(β) = πb(β) < πb,e(β) is the unique Max-Min solution in
the Pareto-optimal set, then there exists a small positive number ε that πb,e(β′−
ε) > πb(β′−ε) = πb(β′−ε) > πb,e(β′) which contradicts the Max-Min assumption.
Similarly, we can easily prove that πmaxmin(β) = πb(β) > πb,e(β) also cannot be the
unique Max-Min solution. As a result, the unique Max-Min solution must have
the property that πmaxmin(β) = πb(β) = πb,e(β) which is also the absolute fairness
solution. 2
Based on the above analysis, when the reward is evenly distributed among all col-
luders and Max-Min solution is unique, the Max-Min solution is similar to the ab-
solute fairness solution with nice properties such as Pareto-optimal and existence.
Solving Max-Min fairness is similar to solving absolute fairness, except the bound-
ary points of the Pareto-optimal set have to be compared too.
Optimal value of L(i): If the Max-Min solution is unique, then it is the absolute
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fairness solution by the above proof. Therefore, under such circumstance, reporting
higher loss gives the player higher payoff and both players scb and scb,e have the
incentive to report the highest loss Lmax.
If the Max-Min solution is not unique, based on the above analysis, some of the
bargained solutions give πb(β) > πb,e(β) = πb,emax, where π
b,e
max is the maximal payoff
of scb,e. Hence the max-min solution gives maximal πb,e (β = 1). In such circum-
stance, the max-min solution already gives scb,e the most advantage, as the result,
scb,e has no incentive to cheat on the loss term Lb,e since he/she cannot earn more
utility than the max-min solution.
On the other hand, if scb reports his/her lost to be Lb + L′b, which makes π′b(β) =







Thus by reporting higher loss term Lb + L′b, scb can push the bargained max-min
solution from the boundary of the Pareto-optimal set to the absolute solution inside
the Pareto-optimal set. Apparently, from Figure 2.10, any point inside the Pareto-
optimal set gives higher payoff for scb,e than the boundary point of the Pareto-
optimal set. Therefore, scb can gain higher payoff for by cheating on private infor-
mation and scb has the incentive to report the highest loss Lb = Lmax.
Base on the above analysis, scb always wants to report the highest loss, and some-
times scb,e has the incentive to cheat (when the max-min solution is in the Pareto-
optimal set) and sometimes does not. Since the loss Lb and Lb,e are claimed before
the bargaining process and scb,e cannot predict whether the max-min solution will
be Pareto-optimal before bargaining, the players should both claim Lmax to ensure
46
the highest possible payoff.
5. Max-Sum Solution The Max-Sum solution can be formulated as minimizing
Csum = Pbd K
b(R+Lb)+Pb,ed K
b,e(R+Lb,e). (2.49)
As shown in the previous section, the max-sum solution is always Pareto-optimal.
Therefore, the minimizer of the above function is either in the boundary or when

























The max-sum solution can be solved numerically by the above equation.
Optimal value of L(i): Depending on the original Max-sum solution (both player
report the loss honestly), the analysis of optimal value of L(i) can be divided into


































σ2n Kb,e < 0 when 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
(2.51)
Hence, scb can push the max-sum solution to a smaller β (lower Pbd thus higher
payoff for scb) by reporting higher Lb. Similarly, scb,e can also get higher payoff by




Colluders may also select proportional fairness, where some colluders benefit more
at a cost of higher risk. One popular solution is the Nash-Bargaining solution, which
is based on the idea that players who can gain more will naturally ask for more in
the bargain. The Nash-Bargaining solution is based on the definition of fairness
that the additional payoff must be divided between the two players in a ratio equal
to the rate at which this utility can be transferred.
The Nash-Bargaining solution is in the Pareto-Optimal set and, therefore, it always
satisfies (2.45). Consequently, (2.37) becomes:




























Note that Nash-Bargaining solution is always Pareto-Optimal and the set of β corre-
sponding to the Pareto-Optimal points is closed. Thus, g(β) is a concave function,
and it is maximized when the gradient of g(β) equals to zero or when β is on the
boundary.





































Note that both B(β) and ∂A(β)/∂β are increasing functions of β, while A(β) and
∂B(β)/∂β are decreasing functions of β. Thus, the solution of (2.53) is a monotoni-
cally decreasing function of Bb/Bb,e. It implies that the subgroup of colluders with
a larger bargaining power benefits more than the others even the bargaining. De-
pending on the criteria of setting bargaining power in the Nash-bargaining problem,
the bargaining power may change in different colluder social networks. One of the
most common bargaining power is using the number of colluders, Kb and Kb,e.
Optimal value of L(i): Note that in (2.53), both sides of the equate have the com-
mon term (R + Lb)(R + Lb,e) and can be eliminated. Hence, the Nash-bargaining
solution does not depend on the users’ loss Lb and Lb,e. Therefore, the Nash-
bargaining solution can be considered as cheat-proof, which is, the bargained solu-
tion remains the same even the players cheat on the private information.
To conclude, both players scb and scb,e can gain higher reward by reporting higher
loss if the fairness criteria is absolute fairness, Max-Min, or Max-Sum. And the Nash-
bargaining solution is not influenced by the private information L(i) of each player. How-
ever, the loss is declared before the bargaining process, and at then the colluders do not
know which solution the bargaining process will converge to. Therefore, both players scb
and scb,e have the incentive to report as higher loss as possible, resulting in Lb = Lb,e =
Lmax being the same for all colluders in the utility function definition (2.4).
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Absolute Fariness, MaxMin Solution
Max Sum Solution
Nash−Bargaining Solution
Figure 2.11: Feasible region and bargaining solutions with utility function as in
(2.38),Pf a = 10−3, Nb = Ne = 50000, Kb = 100, Kb,e = 150, and |Ub|= |Ub,e|= 250.
2.2.2.2 Case two: Reward is proportional to risk
In real-world social networks, reward is usually distributed unequally among the collud-
ers. There are multiple reasons for the uneven reward distribution, for instance, each
member has his/her own personal concern and position in the society. Therefore, some
colluders might be more greedy and want to gain more reward in this collusion. Intu-
itively these colluders have to pay more cost (probability of being detected) to maintain

















to illustrate the feasible region and the bargaining solution when the colluders distribute
reward proportional to each copy’s quality and risk (probability of being detected).
In this case, the reward each colluder gets is linear to his/her probability of being
detected. Also, colluders who subscribe to higher resolution copy also gain more reward.
The analysis of the four bargaining solutions are similar as in Section 2.2.2.1 and not
repeated here. Based on the same analysis, we can also conclude that both players have
the incentive to report highest loss Lb = Lb,e = Lmax before collusion. Hence, we will show
the bargaining solutions for this case by the simulations with both colluders claiming loss
term Lmax.
2.2.2.3 Simulation Setting and Results
In our simulations, we first generate independent vectors following Gaussian distribution
N (0,1), and then apply Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization to generate orthogonal finger-
prints. The lengths of the fingerprints embedded in the base layer and the enhancement
layer are Nb = Ne = 50000, and both two layers contain 20 frames, respectively. The total
number of users is 500, where Ub = Ub,e. The probability of accusing an innocent user,
Pf a, is 10−3. Among the K = 250 colluders, Kb = 100 of them receive the fingerprinted
base layer only, and the other Kb,e = 150 of the colluders receive fingerprinted copies of
high resolution.
Figure 2.11 shows the feasible region and the four bargaining solutions with util-
ity function as in (2.38), and bargaining powers in (2.37) are Bb = 2,Bb,e = 3, which is
proportional to Kb and Kb,e. Compared to the absolute fairness solution, the max-sum
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Figure 2.12: Feasible region and bargaining solutions with utility function as in
(2.54),Pf a = 10−3, Nb = Ne = 50000, Kb = 100, Kb,e = 150, and |Ub|= |Ub,e|= 250.
solution gives the group with more people more utility, which is scb,e in this case. The
Nash-Bargaining with bargain power Bb = 2,Bb,e = 3 even more favor scb,e since now
the number of colluders works as the exponential term rather than the linear term in the
max-sum solution. The other reason for such phenomenon is, in this simulation setting,
Kb is much smaller than Kb,e (2/3 of Kb,e), therefore, according to the definition of Nash-
bargaining solution in (2.37) the highest risk of SCb, which can be considered as SCb
collude alone without SCb,e is much higher then that for SCb,e. Therefore, the minimal
payoff of SCb, πb∗, is also smaller than the minimal payoff of SCb,e, resulting in SCb has
more extra payoff for bargaining thus leads to better bargain position. Setting the bargain-
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ing power to be the number of colluders who receive different quality copies matches the
real-world scenario: the group of colluders with more users act together and should have
more bargain power.
Figure 2.12 shows the feasible region and the four bargaining solutions with utility
function defined in (2.54). First, the whole feasible set is Pareto-optimal since πb is a
monotonely decreasing function of πb,e as shown in the figure. There is no non-Pareto-
optimal feasible points as the straight line segment in Figure 2.11. The reason for such








d is the same, but P
b
d
keeps reducing as β increases. Hence, for all u(i) who receives higher resolution copies,
the denominator of the second term in the utility function (2.54) keeps increasing as β
increases while the numerator is the same. As a result, unlike case 1 in which πb,e(β) is a






Ne)/Nb, πb,e(β) is a decreasing function of β






Ne)/Nb in case 2 thus all the points in the feasible set
are also Pareto-optimal.
The four bargaining solution in Figure 2.12 shows the same trend as in Figure 2.11:
the max-min solution is the same as the absolute fairness solution, the max-sum solution
favors scb,e better that, and the Nash-bargaining solution with Bb = 2,Bb,e = 3 gives scb,e
maximal utility. The same trend of the four bargaining solutions in these two cases shows
our methodology can fit to different collusion problems once the utility function is defined
since our analysis in on the bargaining level and the trend of the bargaining solutions are
independent of utility function definitions. Nevertheless, the ”absolute fairness solution”
under proportional reward distribution also has proportional fairness characteristics.
Furthermore, comparing the feasible region in Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12, it is
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clear that both the maximum utilities that scb and scb,e can achieve are much higher if
reward is distributed proportionally (πbmax = 1.441 and π
b,e
max = 1.403 in Figure 2.11 while
πbmax = 2.182 and π
b,e
max = 1.947 in Figure 2.12). These maximal utilities happen for ex-







one of Pbd or P
b,e
d is much higher than the other, and one of sc
b or scb,e earn most of the
reward resulting in high payoff.
2.2.3 Time-sensitive Bargaining Model
In the previous subsections, we have discussed several fairness criteria. The two players
scb and scb,e can keep offering each other until one of the fair solution is achieved. In
such model, we did not take the time-sensitiveness of the value of multimedia signals into
account. In this section, we further extend our behavior modelling of the colluder social
networks to a time-sensitive bargaining model, provide the optimal bargaining offer of
both players in the game, and reach the equilibrium.
2.2.3.1 Bargaining Model and Payoff Functions
The reward of redistributing the colluded multimedia signal depends on not only the col-
luded copy’s quality, but also on the time that the copy being released. The market value
of colluded copy with lower quality decreases faster than higher-resolution copy. For in-
stance, when the movie is still in theater, people might want to watch the low-resolution
colluded copy to catch the trend. But if the movie is off theater and its DVD has been
released, people might still want to purchase the high-resolution pirated copy since the
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Figure 2.13: Feasible region for bargaining after the first two rounds
cost would be lower than DVD, but the incentive of paying for low-resolution pirated
version is very little, since the DVD is easily accessible and not very costy. Also, if the
colluded copy is the only pirated copy in the market, all the market value will go for it
and not shared with other copies. Therefore, the colluders are competing not only with
the movie industry but also the other colluders over the speed of generating the pirated
copy. An illustration of the time-sensitiveness of the colluders’ reward is shown in Figure
2.13. The blue solid curve is the feasible region that the colluders can bargain with before
the bargaining process, the green circled curve and the red dashed curve are the feasible
region after the first and second bargaining rounds, respectively. As in Figure 2.13, the
colluders have to finish their bargaining process as soon as possible, to avoid the utility
loss.
Under such circumstance, both groups of colluders, scb and scb,e would want to
reach agreement as soon as possible. We model the process of reaching agreement among
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colluders using a time-sensitive bargaining model:
• In the first bargaining stage, scb,e offers the collusion parameter β1 that uniquely
maps to the utility pair (πb1,π
b,e
1 ) on the Pareto-optimal set, in which both sc
b and
scb,e can not increase their payoff without decreasing the other’s. The example of
Pareto-optimal set is illustrated in Fig 2.10.
• Upon receiving the offer, scb has the choice to accept this offer and gets the payoff





continues to the second stage.
• If scb decided to offer back, scb,e again has the choice to accept the offer (πb2,π
b,e
2 )
or offer back. The bargaining process would continue until both groups of colluders
agree on one offer.
Here we adopt the exponentially decay model for the market value of the colluded
copy [7]. The reward that player i get in the next round of bargaining will be decayed by a
constant δ(i). If the two players scb and scb,e reach agreement at the kth bargaining stage,
their reward would be decreased to δk−1b and δ
k−1













where (i) ∈ {(b),(b,e)} and R(i) as defined in (2.5). 0 < δb < 1 and 0 < δb,e < 1 are
the reward-decay constant of scb and scb,e, respectively. The market value of the high-
resolution copy is more resistant to time than low resolution copies. For instance, after
the DVD of the movie available at the rental stores, the low-resolution copies almost have
no value in the market, but high-resolution copies still conserve parts of the value as long
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as their prices are lower than the rental fee. Therefore, a reasonable constraint of the
decaying factors is δb,e ≥ δb.
In this model, scb,e makes offer first since colluders with higher resolution copies
take advantage during bargaining. This advantage comes from that even scb,e cannot
reach agreement with scb, they can still release their high-resolution colluded copy with
high market value, but on the other hand, scb themselves can only generate low-resolution
colluded copy. Hence scb,e has more bargain power over scb, and should make the offer
first.
The equilibrium in this time-sensitive bargaining game is the ”offer pairs” that both
players will agree immediately upon offered. From the offerer side of view, he/she wants
to make the offer attractive enough that the other player will agree on the offer and not
offer back to reserve the full value of the colluded multimedia signal. On the other hand,
the offerer also does not want to make an offer that benefit the other player too much an







colluders would reach agreement at the kth bargaining stage has the following property:
suppose SCb,e makes an offer (πbk ,π
b,e
k ) at the k
th stage, then πbk should be large enough
that scb will accept it, and no larger. On the other hand, scb should accept πbk if it is
not smaller than the discounted payoff −P(i)d (βk+1)∗L+δ
k
(i)R
(i) that scb would receive if

































We assume the worst-case scenario for the fingerprint detector that the colluders have
perfect information about the detector’s detection strategy. This is the widely adopted
concept in the collusion analysis toward the best protection of multimedia. Thus Pb,ed (β)
and Pbd (β) are known to the colluders. So we have two linear-independent equations with
two unknowns and the time-sensitive bargaining equilibrium can only be found numeri-
cally since Pb,ed (β) and P
b
d (β) involve the Gaussian tail function.
2.2.3.2 Case Study and Simulation Results
In this section, we take the second utility functions as in Section 2.2.2 as examples to
illustrate the time-sensitive bargaining in the colluder social network. Since in real-world
social networks, reward is usually distributed unequally because every member has differ-
ent personal concern and position in the society, thus we consider the general utility func-
tion as in (2.54) to illustrate the time-sensitiveness when the colluders distribute reward
proportional to each copy’s quality and the user’s risk (probability of being detected). We
apply our analysis to the real video data and verify our results.
In our simulations, we test over the first 40 frames of “carphone”, and use Fb =
{1,3, · · · ,39} and Fe = {2,4, · · · ,40} as an example of the temporal scalability. The
lengths of the fingerprints embedded in the base layer and enhancement layer are Nb =
85938 and Ne = 85670 respectively. We assume that there are a total of M = 500 users and
|Ub|= |Ub,e1|= 250. We first generate independent vectors following Gaussian distribu-
tion N (0,1/9), and then apply Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization to generate orthogonal
fingerprints for different users.
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(a) δb = 0.7 and δb,e = 0.85



















(b) δb = 0.8 and δb,e = 0.85
Figure 2.14: Utilities of SCb and SCb,e versus number of bargaining rounds.Pf a = 10−3,
Nb = Ne = 50000, Kb = 100, Kb,e = 150, and |Ub|= |Ub,e|= 250 with different discount
factors.
During collusion, the colluders apply the intra-group collusion followed by the
inter-group collusion, and follow the above analysis when choosing the collusion pa-
rameters. In our simulations, we adjust the power of the additive noise such that ||n j||2 =
||JND jW
(i)
j ||2 for every frame j in the video sequence. The probability of accusing an
innocent user, Pf a, is 10−3. Among the K = 250 colluders, Kb = 100 of them receive
the fingerprinted base layer only, and the other Kb,e = 150 of the colluders receive finger-
printed copies of high resolution.
Figure 2.14 shows the bargaining equilibrium versus the number of stages that the
colluders need to make agreement with utility function as in (2.54), and different dis-
count factors: Figure 2.14(a) uses δb = 0.7,δb,e = 0.85, and Figure 2.14 (b) is the result
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of δb = 0.7,δb,e = 0.85. The feasible region and the Pareto-optimal set with the same
utility function for the first stage of the game is shown in Figure 2.13. It is clear from
Figure 2.14 that both colluders have incentive to finish the bargaining process as soon as
possible under both settings of discount constants, especially for SCb, who’s utility de-
cays faster than SCb,e. Therefore, at the very first bargaining stage, the first-mover will
offer based on the equilibrium by solving (2.56) and (2.57). Thus SCb would let SCb,e to
take the advantage of offering first. It is clear by comparing Figure 2.14(a) and (b) that
higher discount factor results in higher payoff. The discount factors δb,δb,e can also be
considered as the power of bargaining for SCb and SCb,e. For instance, if the two groups
of colluders cannot make agreement and they decide to collude within groups and gen-
erate two colluded copy with different qualities. Apparently SCb would get much less
reward than SCb,e since their colluded copy has lower quality. Thus SCb has much more
intention to cooperate with SCb,e, and this intention leads to less bargaining power.
2.3 Equilibriums of the Detector-Colluder Game
In the previous sections, we have discussed how the colluders bargain with each other and
what are the fair types of collusion that can satisfy all colluders and lead to a successful
collusion. A successful collusion must not only be fair to all colluders but also maxi-
mize all colluders’ utility under the fairness constraint. On the other hand, the fingerprint
detector also has to adjust its strategy according to the collusion type to achieve highest
probability of detection. Therefore, there exists complex dynamics among the colluders
and the fingerprint detector and they altogether also form a social network, called the mul-
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timedia fingerprint social network [17]. Hence the bargaining solutions that the colluders
being willing to follow have to be the best response to the detector’s optimal strategy and
form equilibriums between the fingerprint detector and the colluders.
Hence, in this section, we will prove that the bargaining solutions we discussed
in this section are also the equilibria strategies for the colluders in the detector-colluder
game thus are the best move for the colluders under different fairness constraints.
2.3.1 Stackelberg Game Model of dynamics between colluders and
fingerprint detector
To capture users’ behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in
making choices depends on the choices of others, Game Theory [7], [8] is a useful tool
to model the complex dynamics among multimedia social network members. Therefore,
to analyze the optimal strategies of both fingerprint detector and the colluders under the
fairness constraints, we formulate the interaction between the two groups of the multime-
dia fingerprinting social network users as a game with two players: the colluders acting
as one single player and the fingerprint detector as the other [17].
Game between colluders and fingerprint detector
• Players: There are two players: colluders who make the move first as the leader,
followed by the follower, who is the fingerprint detector that applies detection after
receiving a suspicious copy.
• Payoff Function: In this game, what colluders gain is the lost of the detectors, thus
the two group of users, colluders and the fingerprint detector in the fingerprinting
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social network have totally conflict objectives. Therefore, the sum of the utilities
of all colluder equals to the utility of the digital right enforcer with negative sign.
Based on the utility of each individual colluder during bargaining as in (2.4) and
the assumption that all the colluders, the payoff functions of the colluders and the
fingerprint detector can be defined as
πC = Rsum− Pbd K
b(Lmax +Rb)−Pb,ed K
b,e(Lmax +Rb,e)
and πD =−πC, (2.58)
where Rsum is the total reward of redistributing the colluded copy, and πC and πD
are the utility functions for colluders and the fingerprint detector, respectively.
Based on the utility function definition as in (), all colluders has the same goal
of minimizing his/her risk of being detected P(i) under fairness constraint. From
the detector’s point of view, whatever the colluders’ gain is the lost of the digital
right enforcer, so we can define the detector’s payoff as πD = −πC. Therefore, to
maximize his/her own payoff, the fingerprint detector also have the incentive to
maximize the probability of catching colluders in both group, Pbd and P
b,e
d .
• Colluders’ Strategies: The colluders’ strategies are the set of all possible collusion
parameter β that achieves fairness for each colluder leads to one strategy for the
colluders in the colluder-detector game. Therefore, the colluders have uncountably
infinite number of strategies.
• Detector’s Strategies: Since the fingerprinting is Gaussian and orthogonal, the
best detector is the correlation detector. Upon receiving the suspicious copy, the
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correlation-based fingerprint detector can decide which part of the suspicious he/she
is going to use for detection. Note that for users in SCb, since their copies only
contain the base layer, the detector only has one choice, which is utilizing the whole
base layer for identification.
Hence, as discussed in Chapter 2, the detector’s strategies includes the collective
detector, single-layer detector, and the self-probing detector. The collective detec-
tor uses the whole sequence to identify SCb,e; the single-layer detector uses either
base layer or enhancement layer to identify SCb,e; the self-probing detector, as in-
troduced in Section 2.1.1, probe the side information (the mean of the detection
statistics) first, and then choose to use collective detector or the single-layer detec-
tor for detection.
In this game, there are multiple detection statistics that the fingerprint detector can
use to identify colluders. However, by the analysis and simulation results shown in our
previous work [17], the self-probing detector can always achieves better or equal per-
formance as all other detectors (collective detector and single-layer detector). Thus to
maximize his/her payoff, the fingerprint detector always probes side information about
collusion and selects the detection statistics that has the largest chance of successfully
capturing colluders.
From the angle of game theoretical analysis, probing side-information is equiva-
lent to observing the colluders’ action. The near-optimal performance of the self-probing
detector implies the detector (follower in this game) can observe the colluders’ action
completely. Furthermore, to provide the best protection of multimedia content, here we
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Figure 2.15: Game tree illustration of the colluder-detector dynamics. C1, C2, · · · , CN are
the N possible sets of collusion parameters that achieve bargaining solutions under vari-
ous fairness constraints when the fingerprint detector uses the optimal detection statistics
to identify colluders; while D1, D2, · · · , DN are the corresponding optimal fingerprint
detection strategies.
assume the worst case scenario that the colluders know exactly the detector’s strategy,
which means the colluders (leader) know that the detector observes their action. Hence,
colluders as the leader have perfect knowledge of the detection strategies that the finger-
print detector will use, because the detector has no incentive to deviate from the self-
probing detector. Therefore, the detector have no means of committing to a follower
action that deviates from the self-probing detector, which is the best response, and the




With the self-probing fingerprint detection process in Section 2.1.1, for each type of col-
lusion, the fingerprint detector can always choose the detection statistics that gives the
best probability of detection performance for SCb,e. Such phenomenon can be illustrated
as the game tree shown in Figure 3.5. In this game, assuming that there are N possible
collusion strategies under the fairness constraint (can be either absolute fairness, max-min
fairness, max-sum fairness, Nash-Bargaining, or the time-sensitive bargaining), the col-
luders first choose the fair collusion strategy based on Section 2.2 and Section 2.2.3, and
then the fingerprint detector selects the optimal detection statistics.
Since the follower (detector) can observe the leader’s (colluders’) strategy, the equi-
librium of the game model can be solved by backward induction. By backward induction,
since both the colluders and the fingerprint detector know that the optimal detection statis-
tics will be used to identify colluders, once attackers determine the collusion strategy,
their payoff is fixed and the colluders can accurately estimate their payoff. The colluders
consider what the best response of the detector is, i.e. how the detector will respond once
he/she observes the leader’s strategy. The colluders then pick a strategy that maximizes its
payoff, anticipating the predicted response of the detector. The detector actually observes
this by using the self-probing detector and in equilibrium picks the expected quantity as
a response.
Hence, the equilibrium of the detector-colluder game is as follows: during collu-
sion, colluders should always consider the self-probing detector as the detector’s strategy,
and find the bargaining solutions under the fairness constraint. And on the other hand, the
65
detector always use the self-probing detector. Since the bargaining solutions discussed in
Section 2.2 and Section 2.2.3 are based on the self-probing detector, they are the equilibria
strategies of the colluders.
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter studies user dynamics in multimedia social networks and provides a case
study of cooperation analysis for multiuser collusion in multimedia fingerprinting. We
build a game-theoretic framework to analyze the complex dynamics among colluders and
model the dynamics among colluders as a bargaining process, where colluders negotiate
with each other to achieve fairness of collusion. In this chapter, we analyze the necessary
conditions for attackers to cooperate with each other, examine the impact of the selection
of fellow attackers on an attacker’s payoff, and investigate the fair collusion strategies that
the colluders will all agree with.
We first model the fairness dynamics among colluders as a non-cooperative game,
where each colluder aims to maximize his/her own utility through bargaining to achieve
fair agreement. We propose a general model of utility functions which allows uneven
reward-distribution. We then consider a scenario where all attackers receive fingerprinted
copies of the same resolution and the colluded copy is a simple average of all copies
with equal weights. In such a scenario, we first investigate K0, the smallest number of
colluders that gives attackers a non-negative payoff. Attackers collude with each other if
and only if the total number of colluders is larger than or equal to K0. We then show that
colluding with more attackers does not always increase a colluder’s payoff, and analyze
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the optimum number of colluders (Kmax) that maximizes a colluder’s utility.
We further extend scenario to that attackers receive fingerprinted copies of different
resolutions. Our analysis shows that in this scenario, colluding with more attackers does
not always increase an attacker’s payoff and attackers may not always want to cooperate
with each other. They collude with each other if and only if cooperation helps increase all
attackers’ utilities. We first investigate the necessary conditions for colluders to cooperate
with each other. We analyze Kp, the set including all pairs of (Kb,Kbe) where it is possible
for all colluders to benefit from cooperation, and explore all possible collusion strategies
that increase every attacker’s utility for a given (Kb,Kbe) ∈ Kp. We then examine how
the number of colluders in each subgroup, (Kb,Kbe), affects colluders’ utilities.
In the last part, we analyze human behavior by four bargaining criteria: absolute
fairness, max-min, max-sum, and Nash-Bargaining solution. Then we extend our model
to address the special time-sensitive property of multimedia contents analyze the collud-
ers’ behavior by modelling collusion as a time-sensitive bargaining process and find the
equilibrium of the bargaining game. Our analysis shows that in the colluder social net-
work, the colluders will make agreement at the first bargaining stage and reach equilib-
rium; and if the market value of the colluded copy is not time-sensitive, colluders choose
different points in the feasible set, depending on the colluders’ definition of “fairness”
and their agreement on how to distribute the risk and the profit among themselves. Fur-
thermore, we also prove that all the bargaining solutions that satisfy the fairness criteria
are also the equilibrium in the colluder-detector game. Such result shows the bargain-
ing solutions are the best strategies for the colluders under the fairness criteria with the
corresponding optimal correlation-based detector that all colluders would satisfy and not
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deviate from. Therefore, the possible types of collusion can be reduced to the set of these
bargaining solutions. This chapter provides a methodology that can fit human behavior




Fingerprinting Social Networks with Side
Information
Multimedia fingerprinting is an emerging forensic tool to protect multimedia from illegal
alteration and unauthorized redistribution. It uses traditional data-hiding techniques [38]
to embed a unique label, known as “fingerprint”, into each distributed copy to track the
usage of multimedia data. Multiuser collusion is a powerful attack against multimedia
fingerprinting, where a group of attackers collectively and effectively mount attacks to
remove traces of the identifying fingerprints [39]. To offer consistent and reliable traitor
tracing, multimedia fingerprinting should resist such multiuser collusion as well as attacks
by a single adversary [40].
In multimedia fingerprinting, colluders and the fingerprint detector form a multi-
media social network: colluders who apply multiuser collusion attempt to remove the
identifying fingerprints in their copies, and the digital rights enforcer detects the embed-
ded fingerprints in the suspicious copy to capture colluders. There are many collusion
strategies that the colluders can use to remove the identifying fingerprints. Also, the de-
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tector can apply different detection strategies to identify the colluders. Most prior work
focuses on the modelling and analysis of collusion and design multimedia fingerprints that
can resist collusion attacks [10–12, 14, 41–45]. However, the complicated dynamics be-
tween the colluders and the fingerprint detector has not been studied and the investigation
of possible side information that can help detection is also lacked.
In this chapter, we investigate two important issues in multimedia fingerprinting
social networks. First, we study the impact of the dynamics between the two group of
users (colluders and the fingerprint detector) in the social network when side information
is available. If some information of collusion attacks can be made available during the
colluder identification process, intuitively, utilizing such information can help improve the
traitor tracing performance. We define this information about collusion that can improve
detection probability as side information. Second, we model the user dynamics using a
game-theoretic framework and find the optimal strategies for all users.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the multi-
media fingerprinting system. In Section 3.2, we investigate how the fingerprint detector
probes and utilizes side information about collusion to improve the collusion resistance.
In section 3.3, we analyze the equilibrium of the colluder-detector game, study the collud-
ers’ strategies to minimize their risk under the fairness constraint, and finds the solution
to the min-max formulation of the colluder-detector dynamics. Section 3.4 shows the
simulation results, and conclusions are drawn in Section 3.5.
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3.1 Multimedia Fingerprinting System
In this section, we will briefly introduce the structure and users involved in a multimedia
fingerprinting social network.
3.1.1 Temporally Scalable Video Coding Systems
As multimedia networking develops, scalability in multimedia coding becomes increas-
ingly important for rich media access from anywhere by anyone [46]. Scalable video
coding encodes multimedia into several bit streams (or layers) of different priorities; the
base layer contains the most important information and must be received by all users,
while the enhancement layers refine the resolution of the receiver’s reconstructed copy
and have lower priorities. Such an encoding structure provides flexible solutions for mul-
timedia transmission and offers adaptivity to heterogeneous networks, varying channel
conditions and diverse computing capability at the receiving terminals.
Without loss of generality, we use temporally scalable video coding as an example
which provides multiple versions of the same video with different frame rates. Follow-
ing the same model in [15], we consider a temporally scalable video coding system with
three-layer scalability, and we use frame skipping and frame copying to implement tem-
poral decimation and interpolation, respectively. In such a video coding system, different
frames in the video sequence are encoded in different layers. Define Fb,Fe1 and Fe2 as
the sets containing indices of the frames that are encoded in the base layer, enhancement
layer 1 and enhancement layer 2 respectively. F(i) includes the indices of the frames in
the copy that user u(i) receives. Ub = {i : F(i) = Fb} is the subgroup of users who re-
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ceive the base layer only, Ub,e1 = {i : F(i) = Fb ∪Fe1} contains all users who subscribe
to the medium-resolution version with the base layer and the enhancement layer 1, and
Uall = {i : F(i) = Fb ∪Fe1 ∪Fe2} contains the indices of the users who receive all three
layers.
3.1.2 Multimedia Fingerprinting System and Collusion Attacks
3.1.2.1 Fingerprint Embedding
Proven to be robust against many single-copy attacks and common signal processing,
spread spectrum embedding is a popular data hiding technique to embed fingerprints into
the host multimedia signals [39, 47]. For the jth frame in the video sequence represented
by a vector S j, and for each user u(i) who subscribes to frame j, the content owner gener-
ates a unique fingerprint W(i)j of the same length as S j. The fingerprinted frame j that is
distributed to u(i) is X (i)j (k) = S j(k)+JND j(k) ·W
(i)
j (k), where X
(i)
j (k), S j(k) and W
(i)
j (k)
are the kth components of the fingerprinted frame X(i)j , the host signal S j and the fin-
gerprint vector W(i)j , respectively. JND j is used to control the energy and achieve the
imperceptibility of the embedded fingerprints [47].
We consider orthogonal fingerprint modulation [10] in this chapter. We first gener-
ate independent vectors following Gaussian distribution N (0,σ2W ), and then apply Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalization to produce fingerprints that are strictly orthogonal to each
other with equal energies.
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Figure 3.1: Two-stage collusion for scalable-encoded multimedia content
3.1.2.2 Collusion Attacks
During multiuser collusion, attackers collectively mount attacks to effectively remove
traces of the embedded fingerprints. Since no one is willing to take a higher risk than the
others, an important issue during collusion is to distribute the risk evenly among colluders
and achieve fairness of the attack. As studied in [43], given the same amount of noise, for
Gaussian fingerprint, the nonlinear attack can be modelled as averaging attack, which is
a special case of the optimal attack when all colluders receive the same quality copy. The
work in [15] studied how to ensure that all attackers have the same probability of being
captured when they receive fingerprinted copies of different quality due to network and
device heterogeneity.
Let SCb be the set with the indices of the colluders who receive the fingerprinted
base layer only; SCb,e1 contains the indices of all colluders who subscribe to the medium
resolution copy; and SCall contains the indices of the colluders who receive all three
layers. Kb = |SCb|, Kb,e1 = |SCb,e1| and Kall = |SCall| are the number of colluders in SCb,
SCb,e1 and SCall , respectively. K = Kb +Kb,e1 +Kall is the total number of colluders.
Following the two-stage collusion model in [15], colluders first apply intra-group
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collusion as shown in Figure 3.1.2.2. For each frame j ∈ Fb in the base layer, colluders in
SCb generate Zbj = ∑k∈SCb X
(k)
j /K
b; for each frame j ∈Fb∪Fe1 that they receive, colluders
in SCb,e1 calculate Zb,e1j = ∑k∈SCb,e1 X
(k)
j /K
b,e1; and for every frame j = Fb ∪Fe1 ∪Fe2




colluders combine these three copies, {Zbj} j∈Fb , {Z
b,e1
j } j∈Fb∪Fe1 , and {Zallj } j∈Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2 ,
and apply inter-group collusion. For each frame j ∈ Fb in the base layer, the colluded
frame is




j +n j (3.1)
where 0 ≤ β1,β2,1−β1−β2 ≤ 1. For each frame j2 ∈ Fe1 in the enhancement layer 1,
colluders calculate




j2 +n j2 (3.2)
where 0≤α1 ≤ 1. For each frame j3 ∈Fe2 in the enhancement layer 2, the colluded frame
j is
V j3 = Z
all
j3 +n j3. (3.3)
n j is additive noise to further hinder detection.
During collusion, the colluders seek the collusion parameters α1, β1 and β2 to min-
imize their risk under the constraint that all colluders have the same probability of being
detected. From the above collusion model, the collusion parameters α j and βl directly
reflect the collusion strategy. And the side information we will discuss in the follow-
ing sections is the information hidden in the colluded copy that can give detector better
estimation of the collusion, and lead to a better detection performance. If the detector
is correlation-based, then the mean value of the detection statistics can be used as side
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information, which we will show in Section 3.2.
3.1.2.3 Fingerprint Detection and Colluder Identification
We consider a non-blind detection scenario where the host signal is first removed from
the test copy before colluder identification. The detector then extracts the fingerprint Y j
from the jth frame V j in the colluded copy. Then, he/she calculates the similarity between
the extracted fingerprint Y and each of the original fingerprints {W(i)}, compares with a
pre-determined threshold h, and outputs the estimated identities of the colluders ŜC.
To analyze the performance of multimedia fingerprints, we adopt the commonly
used criteria in the literature [10]. In order to measure the performance of the fingerprint
system under various conditions, such as top-secret scenario in which the fingerprint de-
tector aim to catch as many colluders as possible and the popular commercial scenario in
which the non of the innocent user should be falsely accused. Let P(i)d is the probability
of user i being accused as a colluder, we use the following measurements:
• Pd: the probability of capturing at least one colluder. The motivating application of
Pd is to provide digital evidence in the court of law. From the analysis in [10], Pd
can be formulated as 1−∏i∈SC(1−P
(i)
d ), where SC is the set of the colluders.
• Pf p: the probability of accusing at least one innocent user. Pf p serves as the proba-
bility of false alarm in high-security system. It reflects the confidence of the detector
about the accused users–the lower the Pf p is, the higher the detection confidence.
Pf p can be formulated as 1−∏i 6∈SC(1−P
(i)
d ).
• E[Fd]: the expected fraction of colluders that are successfully captured. When the
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digital rights enforcer’s concern is to catch as many colluders as possible, E[Fd] is
a suitable performance criteria. Mathematically, E[Fd] = ∑i∈SC P
(i)
d /K, where K is
the number of colluders.
• E[Ff p]: the expected fraction of innocent users that are falsely accused. E[Ff p]
and E[Fd] are used to show the balance between capturing colluders and placing
innocents under suspicion, where E[Ff p] = ∑i6∈SC P
(i)
d /(M −K). Here, M is the
total number of users.
3.2 Analysis of Detector’s Strategies with Side Informa-
tion
This section analyzes how side information about collusion can help improve the collu-
sion resistance and influence the detector’s action. We study how to probe side informa-
tion about collusion from the colluded copy. Consider the scenario where the colluded
copy contains all three layers and has the highest quality, and the analysis for other sce-
narios, such if the colluders only have two layers of the video, is similar. Without loss of
generality, we use users in Uall as an example to demonstrate the detection process and
analyze the performance. For users in Ub,e1 and Ub, the colluder identification process
and the performance analysis are similar.
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3.2.1 Different Fingerprint Detection Strategies
As we discussed in Section 3.1.2.3, when detecting fingerprints, there are many different
ways to measure the similarity between the extracted fingerprint Y and the originally
embedded one W(i).
3.2.1.1 A Collective Fingerprint Detector
The work in [15] considered a simple fingerprint detector that uses fingerprints extracted
from all layers collectively to identify colluders. For each user u(i), the detector first
calculates F̆(i) = F(i) ∩ Fc, where F(i) contains the indices of the frames received by











where ||W(i)j || is the Euclidean norm of W
(i)
j . Given a pre-determined threshold h, ŜCc =
{i : T N(i)c > h}.
Assume that the colluders choose the parameters {αk,βl} in the same way as in
[15]. Without loss of generality, we consider the scenario where the colluders generate a
colluded copy of the highest resolution and Fc = Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2 [48]. With orthogonal fin-
gerprint modulation as in Section 3.1.2.1, under the assumption that the detection noises

























Nb, Ne1 and Ne2 are the lengths of the fingerprints embedded in the base layer, enhance-
ment layer 1 and enhancement layer 2, respectively. For a given user u(i), define P(i)s as
the probability of successfully capturing him/her if he/she is guilty, and P(i)f a is the prob-







if i ∈ SC,





if i 6∈ SC, (3.5)



































P[T N(i)c > h]/K = ∑
i∈SC






and E[Ff p] = ∑
i6∈SC
P[T N(i)c > h]/(M−K) = ∑
i 6∈SC






Assuming that the fingerprint detector will always use (3.5) and fingerprints ex-
tracted from all layers collectively to determine if u(i) participates in collusion, the work
in [15] studied how the colluders should select the parameters α1, β1 and β2 such that
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{P(i)s } are the same for all colluders i ∈ SC and will be compared with the results in
Section 3.3.
3.2.1.2 Fingerprint Detection at Each Individual Layer
Given Ye2, Ye1 and Yb which are the fingerprints extracted from the enhancement layer
2, enhancement layer 1 and the base layer, respectively, in addition to the collective detec-
tor (3.4) in Section 3.2.1.1, the digital rights enforcer can also examine Ye2, Ye1 and Yb
independently and use the detection results at each individual layer to estimate the collud-
ers’ identities. Therefore, in addition to the collective detector, the digital rights enforcer
can also use detectors at base layer, enhancement layer1, and enhancement layer 2. To
demonstrate this colluder identification process and analyze its performance, we use users
in Uall who receive all three layers as an example. The analysis for users in Ub,e1 and Ub
is similar and thus omitted.
Let Ft be the set of indices of the frames in layer t in which t = b,e1,e2 represents
base layer, enhancement layer 1, and enhancement layer 2, respectively. For user ui ∈Uall
who receive all three layers from the content owner, given {Y j} j∈Ft , the fingerprints from














to measure the similarity between the extracted fingerprint and the originally embedded
fingerprint. The detector at layer t accused u(i) as a colluder if T N(i)t > h, and sets i ∈ ŜC,
which is the suspicious-colluder set. Here, h here is a predetermined threshold.
The analysis of the detection statistics T N(i)t in (3.8) is similar to that of T N(i) in
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(3.4). If the detection noises are i.i.d. and follow Gaussian distribution N (0,σ2n), for user
u(i) ∈ Uall , T N(i)t are independent Gaussian with marginal distribution
T N(i)t ∼

N (µ(i)t ,σ2n) if i ∈ SC,
N (0,σ2n) if i 6∈ SC,
























and the probability of falsely accusing him/her if he/she is innocent is






The analysis of Pd , Pf p, E[Fd] and E[ f f p] is the same as that in Section 3.2.1.1 and not
repeated. It is clear from (3.9) and (3.8) that the higher the µ(i)t is, the better the traitor-
tracing performance.
3.2.2 Performance Comparison
This section compares the performance of the four detection statistics (3.4) and (3.8)
when identifying colluders in SCall . From the above analysis, for a given h and a fixed
Pf p, comparing Pd of different detection statistics is equivalent to comparing their means.
For a colluder i ∈ SCall , Figure 3.2 shows an example of the means of the detection
statistics in (3.4) and (3.8). In Figure 3.2, we first generate independent vectors follow-
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e1 , and µ
(i)
b in (3.9) for i ∈ SC
all .
(Nb,Ne1,Ne2) = (50000,50000,100000). K = 250 and Kb = 50. Each point on the X
axis corresponds to a unique triplet (Kb,Ke1,Ke2). Fc = Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2.
ing Gaussian distribution N (0,1), and then apply Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization to
generate orthogonal fingerprints for different users. The lengths of the fingerprints em-
bedded in the base layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhancement layer 2 are Nb = 50000,
Ne1 = 50000 and Ne2 = 100000, respectively. In Figure 3.2, we fix the total number of
colluders K = 250, and Kb = 50 of them receive the fingerprinted base layer only. Each
point on the X axis corresponds to a unique triplet (Kb,Ke1,Ke2). The colluders follow
the work in [15] to select the collusion parameters and generate a colluded copy with all
three layers under the fairness constraints.
From Figure 3.2, T N(i)c in (3.4) has the best performance when more than 60% of
the colluders receive a high-quality copy with all three layers. This is because in this sce-
nario, u(i)’s fingerprints are spread all over the entire colluded copy V, and W(i)’s energy
is evenly distributed in the three layers of V. Therefore, from detection theory [49], fin-
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gerprints extracted from all layers should be used during detection to improve the perfor-
mance. When Kall/K < 0.6, due to the selection of the collusion parameters, a significant
portion of W(i)’s energy is in the enhancement layer 2, while the other two layers of the
colluded copy contain little information of u(i)’s identity. Thus, in this scenario, T N(i)e2
in (3.8) gives the best detection performance. Also, since larger Kall introduces smaller
fingerprint energy in enhancement layer 2 for SCall , and the total number of colluders
remains the same, thus smaller Kb and Kb,e1 result in higher fingerprint energy for SCb
and SCb,e in base layer and enhancement layer 1. Therefore, α1, β1, β2 must be lower to
ensure equal probability of being detected for every user. Hence µe1 and µb for SCall may
increase as Kall increases.
3.2.3 Colluder Identification with Side Information
For the four detection statistics in Section 3.2.1, their traitor tracing capability is deter-
mined by their statistical means. The larger the statistical mean is, the better the perfor-
mance. Note that from the above analysis, the collusion parameters ({α j} and {βl} in the
two-stage collusion model) determine the means of the detection statistics. Thus, if side
information about the statistical means of different detection statistics (or equivalently,
the collusion parameters) is available to the fingerprint detector, he/she should select the
detection statistics that has the largest statistical mean to improve the traitor-tracing capa-
bility.
During the fingerprint detection and colluder identification process, the fingerprint
detector should first examine the colluded copy and probe such side information, then
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select the best detection statistics and identify colluders. As an example, to identify col-
luders who receive all three layers, the key steps in probing the means of the detection
statistics and selecting the optimum detection statistics are as follows:
• For every user u(i) in Uall , the detector first calculates T N(i)c , T N(i)e2 , T N
(i)
e1 and T N
(i)
b
as in Section 3.2.1, and obtains
ŜC
all
c = {i : T N
(i)
c > ht}, ŜC
all





e1 = {i : T N
(i)
e1 > ht}, and
ŜC
all
b = {i : T N
(i)
b > ht} (3.11)
for a given ht .














































• The detector compares µ̂c, µ̂e2, µ̂e1 and µ̂b and selects the detection statistics with
the largest estimated mean. For example, the collective detector in (3.4) is chosen
if µ̂c has the largest value.
When identifying colluders in SCb,e1, the side information probing process is similar and
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Figure 3.3: Performance of the self-probing fingerprint detector for the example in Figure
3.2. (a) Probability of selecting the optimum detection statistics when identifying collud-
ers in Uall . (b) Pd of the collective detector, the optimum detector with perfect knowledge
of the detection statistics’ means, and the self-probing detector that probes the side infor-
mation itself. ht is chosen to let P
(i)
f a = 10
−2 for an innocent user i 6∈ SC. Pf p = 10−3. The
result is based on 10000 simulation runs.
not repeated. Then, the fingerprint detector follows Section 3.2.1 and estimates the iden-
tities of the colluders.
3.2.4 Performance Analysis and Simulation Results
In our simulations, we simulate three different fingerprint detectors: the simple collective
detector in (3.4); the optimum detector with perfect knowledge of the statistical means of
the four detection statistics; and the self-probing detector, which first uses the algorithm
in Section 3.2.3 to select the best detection statistics and then follows Section 3.2.1 to
identify colluders.
The simulation setup is the same as that in Figure 3.2. We choose the parameters
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based on the analysis in [15], which shows the total number of 250 colluders in a 750-
user system is large enough to effectively reduce the fingerprint energy and reduce the
probability of each colluder to be accused to around 10%, in which the fingerprint system
can barely provide protection. Hence under such tough scenario, we would test whether
the proposed self-probing detector can provide better collusion resistance.
There are a total of K = 250 colluders, and Kb = 50 of them receive the fingerprinted
base layer only. Each point on the X axis in Figure 3.3 corresponds to a unique triplet
(Kb,Kb,e1,Kall). The colluders select {αk,βl} in the same way as in [15] and generate a
colluded copy with all three layers. For each frame j in the colluded copy, we adjust the
power of the additive noise such that ||n j||2 = ||W
(i)
j ||2. Other values give the same trend.
Figure 3.3 (a) plots the probability that the proposed probing algorithm in Section
3.2.3 selects the optimum detection statistics when identifying colluders in Uall . In the
example in Figure 3.2, we only choose between T N(i) and T N(i)e2 since T N
(i)
e1 and T N
(i)
b
never outperform the other two. From Figure 3.3 (a), the proposed probing algorithm
selects the optimum detection statistics with probability 0.6 when Kall/K ≈ 0.6; while
in other scenarios, the detector always picks the best detection statistics. Note that from
Figure 3.2, when Kall/K ≈ 0.6, µc and µ
(i)
e2 have similar values and, therefore, T N
(i) and
T N(i)e2 have approximately the same performance. Consequently, in this scenario, choos-
ing the sub-optimum detection statistics does not significantly deteriorate the detection
performance. When µc and µ
(i)
e2 differ significantly from each other, the self-probing de-
tector always chooses the optimal detection statistics when identifying colluders in Uall .
To evaluate the traitor-tracing performance of the proposed colluder identification
algorithm with side information, we consider the catch one scenario, where the fingerprint
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detector aims to capture at least one colluder without falsely accusing any innocents. In
this scenario, the criteria used to measure the performance is Pd and Pf p. The analysis
for other scenarios using other performance criteria is similar and gives the same trend.
For a fixed Pf p = 10−3, Figure 3.3 (b) shows Pd of the three detectors. From Figure 3.3
(b), utilizing side information about the means of different detection statistics can help
the fingerprint detector significantly improve its performance, especially when Kall/K is
small and the colluders’ fingerprints are not evenly distributed in the three layers of the
colluded copy. Furthermore, from Figure 3.3 (b), when the difference between µc and
µ(i)e2 is large, the side information probing algorithm in Section 3.2.3 helps the detector
choose the best detection statistics and achieve the optimal performance. When µc and
µ(i)e2 are approximately the same, the performance of the self-probing fingerprint detector
is almost the same as that of the optimal detector with perfect knowledge of the means of
the detection statistics, and the difference between these two is no larger than 0.005 and
can be ignored.
3.2.5 Impact of Side Information on Fairness of Multi-user Collusion
Without probing side information, the detector will always use all the frames collectively
to identify the colluders, hoping that more frames will give him/her more information
about colluders’ identities. On the other side, colluders adjust the collusion parameters
{α j} and {βl} to seek the collective fairness. Under such circumstances, the colluders
and the fingerprint detector reaches the collective fairness equilibrium. However, side
information about collusion not only improves the fingerprint detector’s performance, it
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Optimal Detector for i ∈ SCb
Optimal Detector for i ∈ SCb,e1
Optimal Detector for i ∈ SCall
Figure 3.4: Each colluder’s probability of being detected (P(i)s ) with the self-probing fin-
gerprint detector. The simulation setup is the same as that in Figure 3.3, and colluders
follow [15] when selecting the collusion parameters {αk} and {βl}. The threshold h is
selected to satisfy Pf p = 10−3. The results are based on 10000 simulation runs.
also affects each colluder’s probability of being detected and influences how they col-
lude [50]. Thus, side information breaks the collective fairness equilibrium between the
colluders and the fingerprint detector, and both sides need to search for a new equilibrium.
To demonstrate how side information breaks the collective fairness equilibrium,
Figure 3.4 shows each colluder’s probability of being detected with the self-probing fin-
gerprint detector. The simulation setup is the same as that in Figure 3.3. In Figure 3.4,
colluders follow [15] to select the collusion parameters {α j} and {βl} during the two-
stage collusion, and we adjust the power of the additive noise such that ||n j||2 = ||W
(i)
j ||2
for each frame in the video sequence. From Figure 3.4, when Kall/K < 0.6, those col-
luders who receive all three layers have a much larger probability of being detected than
the others. In this example, during collusion, attackers only consider the collective de-
tector in (3.5), and they select the parameters {α j} and {βl} such that {T N
(i)
c } in (3.5)
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have the same statistical mean for all attackers. However, during the colluder identifica-
tion process, the fingerprint detector considers all possible detection strategies in Section
3.2.1, probes side information about detection statistics, and uses the one that gives the
best collusion resistance. Therefore, with the self-probing fingerprint detector in Section
3.2.3, colluders have to find a new set of collusion parameters to ensure the equal risk of
all attackers.
3.3 Equilibrium of the Colluder-Detector Game With Side
Information
In this section, we will model the behavior dynamics with side information between the
two group of users in the multimedia fingerprinting social network as a two-person two-
stage game. We formulate the equilibrium of this colluder-detector game as a min-max
problem and find the optimal strategy of all users in the social network.
3.3.1 Game-Theoretical Modelling of Colluder-Detector Dynamics
In the multimedia fingerprint social network, different members have different goals and
utilities: the colluders mount attacks to generate the colluded copy for redistribution, and
the forensic detector try to identify the colluders from the redistributed colluded copy.
The colluders gain rewards by redistributing the colluded content and they take the risk to
be caught by the digital rights enforcer. In this game, the colluders’ gain is the detector’s




To capture users’ behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success
in making choices depends on the choices of others, game theory [7], [8] is a useful tool
to model the complex dynamics among multimedia social network members. Hence, to
analyze the optimal strategies of both fingerprint detector and the colluders, we formulate
the interaction between the two groups of social network members as a game with two
players: the colluders acting as one single player and the fingerprint detector as the other.
• Players: There are two players: colluders who make decision first as the leader,
followed by the fingerprint detector who apply detection as a follower.
• Payoff Function Definition: To analyze the dynamic between colluders and the
forensic detector, we assume all the colluders have the same objectives and agree
to share the same risk and reward. Therefore, during the fair collusion, every col-
luder has the same goal of minimizing his/her risk of being detected P(i)s under the
constraint that {P(i)s } are the same for all colluders. Thus, a natural definition of
colluder i’s payoff function is πC = 1−P(i)s , the probability that each colluder suc-
cessfully removes traces of his/her fingerprint during collusion. From the detector’s
point of view, the colluders’ gain is the loss of the digital rights enforcer, so we can
define the detector’s payoff as πD =−πC.
• Colluders’ Strategies: Each set of the collusion parameters {α1,β1,β2} that achieves
equal probability of detection for each colluder leads to one strategy for the collud-
ers in the colluder-detector game.
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• Detector’s Strategies: As discussed in Section 3.1.2.3, the detector’s strategies
include the collective detector, single-layer detector, and the self-probing detector.
We assume the detector can probe the side information (the mean of the detection
statistics) when he/she chooses the strategy.
In this game, there are multiple detection statistics that the fingerprint detector can
use to identify colluders. However, by the analysis and simulation results shown in Sec-
tion 3.2.3, the self-probing detector can always achieve better or equal performance as all
other detectors (collective detector and single-layer detector). Thus, to maximize his/her
payoff, the fingerprint detector always probes side information about collusion and se-
lects the detection statistics that has the largest chance of successfully capturing collud-
ers. From the angle of game theoretical analysis, probing side-information is equivalent
to observing the colluders’ action. This scenario implies that the detector (follower in
this game) can observe the colluders’ action, and the colluders (leader) know that the
detector observes their action. Hence, colluders as the leader have perfect knowledge of
the detection strategies that the fingerprint detector will use, because the detector has no
incentive to deviate from the self-probing detector. Therefore, the detector has no means
of committing to a follower action that deviates from the self-probing detector which is
the best response, and the colluders know this. Therefore, the colluder-detector game is a
Stackelberg game [8] with perfect information.
Equilibrium Analysis As shown in Figure 3.4, with side information available
to the fingerprint detector, the selected collusion parameters in [15] cannot guarantee
the fairness of collusion. Therefore, the colluders need to find new sets of collusion
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Figure 3.5: Game tree illustration of the colluder-detector dynamics. C1, C2, · · · , CN are
the N possible sets of collusion parameters that achieve absolute fairness when the fin-
gerprint detector uses the optimal detection statistics to identify colluders; while D1, D2,
· · · , DN are the corresponding optimal fingerprint detection strategies. For the example
of (Kb,Kb,e1,Kall) = (50,25,175) in Section 3.3.5, N=3,C1 set of parameters satisfies
(3.45), C2set of parameters satisfies (3.46), and C3 set of parameters satisfies (3.47). In
D1, the fingerprint detector uses T N
(i)
b for i ∈ U
b,e1 and T N( j)c for j ∈ Uall . In D2, the
fingerprint detector uses T N(i)e1 for i ∈ Ub,e1 and T N
( j)
c for j ∈ Uall . In D3, the fingerprint
detector uses T N(i)c for i ∈ Ub,e1 and T N( j)c for j ∈ Uall .
parameters to achieve fairness.
With the proposed self-probing fingerprint detection process in Section 3.2.3, for
every type of collusion, the fingerprint detector will always choose the detection statistics
that gives the best traitor-tracing performance which can be illustrated as the game tree
shown in Figure 3.5. In this game, assuming that there are N possible collusion strategies
under the fairness constraint, the colluders first choose the collusion strategy, and then the
fingerprint detector selects the optimal detection statistics.
Since the follower (detector) can observe the leader’s (colluders’) strategy, the game
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model can be solved by backward induction. The backward induction starts from the last
stage of the game, which is the detector’s strategy. As shown in Section 3.2.3, the self-
probing detector is the optimal strategy for all the fair collusion. Hence we can move
forward to the previous stage in the game, which is the colludes’ strategy. Since both
the colluders and the fingerprint detector know that the optimal detection statistics will
be used to identify colluders, once attackers determine the collusion strategy, their payoff
is fixed and the colluders can accurately estimate their payoff. The colluders consider
what the best response of the detector is, i.e., how the detector will respond once he/she
observes the leader’s strategy. The colluders then pick a strategy that maximizes its pay-
off, anticipating the predicted response of the detector. Hence, during collusion, colluders
should consider the worst case scenario where the fingerprint detector always makes the
right decision when selecting which detection statistics to use. They select the collusion
parameters to minimize their risk under the constraint that all colluders have the same
probability of being detected. Thus, the equilibrium of this game can be modelled as a
min-max problem.
As we discussed in Section 3.2.5, without side information, the colluders and the
detector achieve the collective fairness equilibrium: the fingerprint detector uses the col-
lective detection statistics in (3.4), and the colluders select the collusion parameter as
in [15] to ensure the same risk under the collective detector. Probing and utilizing side
information moves the equilibrium of the colluder-detector game from the collective one
to the min-max solution as discussed in Section 3.3.3.
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3.3.2 Min-Max Problem Formulation of the Equilibrium
For each user u(i), define D(i) as the set including all possible detection statistics that can
be used to measure the similarity between the extracted fingerprint Y and u(i)’s fingerprint
W(i). For example, D(i) = {T N(i)c , T N(i)e2 , T N
(i)
e1 , T N
(i)
b } for a colluder i ∈ SC
all who
receives all three layers, while D(i) = {T N(i)c , T N(i)e1 , T N
(i)
b } for user i ∈ SC
b,e1 who




as the probability that
colluder u(i∈SC) is captured by the digital rights enforcer.





















, ∀i1, i2 ∈ SC.(3.13)
From the analysis in the previous section, for a given threshold h and fixed σ2n, P
(i)
s is
determined by the mean of the detection statistics that are used. Therefore, for colluder
i1 ∈ SCb, i2 ∈ SCb,e1 and i3 ∈ SCall , (3.13) can be simplified to
min
{αk,βl}





s.t. 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1, 0 ≤ βl ≤ 1,
where µ(i1)max = µ
(i1)
c ,

































































from the analysis in Section 3.2.1.
Given (Kb,Kb,e1,Kall) and (Nb,Ne1,Ne2), for colluder i1 ∈ SCb, i2 ∈ SCb,e1 and i3 ∈
SCall who receive fingerprinted copies of different resolutions, they first find all possible






max. Then, they select
the one that gives them the minimum risk of being detected.
3.3.3 Analysis of µ(i)max
To solve the problem of (3.14), we first need to analyze µ(i)max for each colluder u(i) and
study which detection statistics have the maximum mean under which condition.
For Colluder i ∈ SCb,e1
For colluder i ∈ SCb,e1 who receives a medium resolution copy, there are three

























































































. Therefore, combining (3.16) and (3.17), for colluder i ∈ SCb,e1,
µ(i)max = µ
(i)

















































































. Thus, combining the results in (3.19), we have
µ(i)max = µ
(i)












c : This scenario happens if µ
(i)
c ≥ µ(i)b and µ
(i)
c ≥ µi)e1. Following the same
analysis as in the previous two scenarios,
































































Consequently, µ(i)max = µ
(i)

















For Colluder i ∈ SCall
For Colluder i ∈ SCall , if the colluded copy includes all three layer, there are four




































where µ(i)b ≥ µ
(i)












and µ(i)b ≥ µ
(i)








Note that we have the constraint 0 ≤ β1,β2 ≤ β1 + β2 ≤ 1 in (3.14) when select-
ing the collusion parameters. Therefore, from (3.24), in order to satisfy µ(i)b ≥ µ
(i)
e2 and








c }, Ne2 ≤ Nb must be true. This explains why that in the
example shown in Figure 3.2 where Ne2 = 2Nb, among the four detection statistics, T N
(i)
b
never achieves the best performance.
u(i)max = u
(i)
















where µ(i)e1 ≥ µ
(i)












and µ(i)e1 ≥ µ
(i)





















c }. This is the reason that in Figure 3.2 with Ne2 = 2Ne1, T N
(i)
e2



















where µ(i)e2 ≥ µ
(i)













and µ(i)e2 ≥ µ
(i)


















e1 will always hold.
u(i)max = u
(i)
c : Following the same analysis as in the previous section,
µ(i)max = µ
(i)
c ⇔ µ(i)c ≥ µ(i)b , µ
(i)
c ≥ µ(i)e1 , and µ
(i)
c ≥ µ(i)e2 ,




























3.3.4 Analysis of the Feasible Set
Given the above analysis on µ(i)max, for each given (Nb,Ne1,Ne2) and (Kb,Kb,e1,Kall), the
next step is to study how attackers achieve fairness of collusion and let µ(i)max be the same
for all colluders. This section investigates the constraints on collusion to ensure the fair
play of the attack.
Without loss of generality, in this section, we use Nb : Ne1 : Ne2 = 1 : 1 : 2 as an
example to illustrate how colluders achieve fairness of the attack and analyze the con-
straints on collusion. We assume that colluders generate a high-resolution colluded copy
including all three layers. In this scenario, from the analysis in the above section, for
a colluder i2 ∈ SCb,e1 who receives a medium resolution copy, µ
(i2)
max has three possible










c . Furthermore, for a colluder i3 ∈ SCall




c , and µ
(i3)
max 6= µ(i3)b and
µ(i3)max 6= µ(i3)e1 . Thus, there are a total of 6 possible scenarios.
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Scenario 1 µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)
b for i2 ∈ SC
b,e1 and µ(i3)max = µ
(i3)
e2 for i3 ∈ SCall




















To achieve fairness of the attack, colluders select the collusion parameters {αk,βl} such
that µ(i1) = µ(i2)max = µ
(i3)



























c }, from (3.18), the























2)Kb,e1/Kall in our example of Nb : Ne1 : Ne2 = 1 : 1 : 2. Similarly, to let
µ(i3)max = µ
(i3)


































2(Kb +Kb,e1)/Kall if Nb : Ne1 : Ne2 = 1 : 1 : 2.
Define Rb = Kb/K, Rb,e1 = Kb,e1/K and Rall = Kall/K as the percentages of collud-
ers who are in SCb, SCb,e1 and SCall , respectively. 0≤ Rb,Rb,e1,Rall ≤ Rb +Rb,e1 +Rall =
1 and Rall ≤ 1−Rb. Note that during the two-stage collusion in Section 3.1.2.2, 0 ≤














Furthermore, in order to be able to select a α1 that satisfies both B≤ α1 ≤ A and 0≤ α1 ≤
1, it is required that A ≥ 0 (which is always true for all Kb,e1 ≥ 0 and Kall ≥ 0) , B ≤ 1
and B ≤ A. Consequently, (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) must satisfy















































To summarize, if (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) satisfies (3.34), colluders can achieve fairness of
the attack by following, and the resulting feasible set is the black area in Figure 3.6(a).
(3.29)-(3.31) when selecting the collusion parameters {αk,βl}. In this scenario, µ
(i2)
max =
µ(i2)b for i2 ∈ SC
b,e1 and µ(i3)max = µ
(i3)
e2 for i∈ SCall . Figure 3.6 (a) plots all the (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall)
that satisfy (3.34).
Scenario 2 µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)




e2 for i3 ∈ SCall
Following the same analysis as in Section 3.3.4, for the example of Nb : Ne1 : Ne2 =





























































Figure 3.6 (b) shows all the (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) that satisfy (3.35).
Scenario 3 µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)




e2 for i3 ∈ SCall































































then µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)




e2 for i3 ∈ SCall , and all colluders have the
same probability of being detected by the fingerprint detector. Figure 3.6 (c) plots all the
(Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) that satisfy (3.37).
Scenario 4 µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)
b for i2 ∈ SC
b,e1 and µ(i3)max = µ
(i3)
c for i3 ∈ SCall















≤ Rall ≤ 1−Rb (3.39)


































colluders achieve fairness of collusion and µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)
b for i2 ∈ SC
b,e1 and µ(i3)max = µ
(i3)
c for
i3 ∈ SCall in this scenario. Figure 3.6 (d) plots all the (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) that satisfy (3.39).
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Scenario 5 µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)




c for i3 ∈ SCall





















≤ Rall ≤ 1−Rb, (3.41)


































during collusion. In this scenario, µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)




c for i3 ∈
SCall . Figure 3.6 (e) shows all the (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) that satisfy (3.41).
Scenario 6 µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)




c for i3 ∈ SCall




















≤ Rall ≤ 1−Rb (3.43)
















































then all colluders have the same risk and µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)










Figure 3.6: (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) that satisfy (a): (3.34) in Scenario 1, (b): (3.35) in Scenario
2, (c): (3.37) in Scenario 3, (d): (3.39) in Scenario 4, (e): (3.41) in Scenario 5, and (f):
(3.43) in Scenario 6. Here, Nb : Ne1 : Ne2 = 1 : 1 : 2.
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3.3.5 Min-Max Solution
Given the analysis in Section 3.3.4, for three colluders i1 ∈ SCb, i2 ∈ SCb,e1 and i3 ∈
SCall , the colluders first identify all the possible collusion parameters {αl,βk} that satisfy
µ(i1)max = µ
b,e1
max = µallmax under the constraints, and then select the one that gives them the
minimum risk of being detected.
To demonstrate this process, we use the system setup in Figure 3.3 as an example,
where the lengths of the fingerprints embedded in the base layer, the enhancement layer
1 and the enhancement layer 2 are Nb = 5000, Ne1 = 5000 and Ne2 = 10000, respectively.
When generating fingerprints, we first generate independent Gaussian vectors following
distribution N (0,1) and then apply Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization to produce finger-
prints that have equal energies and are strictly orthogonal to each other.
Assume that there are a total of K = 250 colluders. Among the 250 colluders, if
Kb = 50, Kb,e1 = 25, and Kall = 175, i.e., (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) = (0.2,0.1,0.7), then from
Section 3.3.4, (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) satisfies the constraint (3.39) in Scenario 4 as in Appendix,
the constraint (3.41) in Scenario 5, and the one (3.43) in Scenario 6.
• Since (Rb,Rb,e1,Rall) satisfies the constraint (3.39) in Scenario 4, colluders can


































Here, µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)
b for colluder i2 ∈ SC
b,e1 and µ(i3)max = µ
(i3)
c for colluder i3 ∈ SCall .
103
For any colluder i ∈ SC, µ(i)max has the smallest possible value of 2.0545 when β1 =
0.4594, β2 = 0.2297, and α1 = 0.0951.


































they have the same probability of being detected. Here, µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)
e1 for colluder




c for colluder i3 ∈ SCall . For any colluder i ∈ SC, µ
(i)
max
reaches its minimum value of 2.0545 when β1 = 0.4594, β2 = 0.0951, and α1 =
0.2297.















































−α1 = 0.3248−α1 (3.47)
during collusion. In this scenario, µ(i2)max = µ
(i2)
c for colluder i2 ∈ SCb,e1 and µ
(i3)
max =
µ(i3)c for colluder i3 ∈ SCall , and µ
(i)
max = 2.0545 for all colluders.
The means of the detection statistics in these three scenarios are the same; therefore,
colluders can choose either (3.45), (3.46) or (3.47) during collusion. (In fact, (3.45) and
(3.46) are the two boundaries of (3.47).)
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In the example of (Kb,Kb,e1,Kall) = (50,75,125), the constraints (3.35) in Sce-
nario 2 and (3.37) in Scenario 3 are satisfied, and the minimum value of µ(i)max equals to
2.5298, when colluders select (β1 = 0.5657, β2 = 0.0544, α1 = 0.4485) or use (β1 =
0.5657, β2 = 0.3929, α1 = 0.4071) during collusion.
If (Kb,Kb,e1,Kall) = (50,125,75), none of the six constraints in Section 3.3.4 are
satisfied, and colluders cannot generate a high-resolution colluded copy while still achiev-
ing fairness of the attack. They have to lower the resolution of the attacked copy to
medium to guarantee the equal risk of all colluders.
3.4 Simulation Results
In our simulations, we test over the first 40 frames of “carphone”, and use Fb = {1,5, · · · ,37}, Fe1 =
{3,7, · · · ,39} and Fe2 = {2,4, · · · ,40} as an example of the temporal scalability. The
lengths of the fingerprints embedded in the base layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhance-
ment layer 2 are Nb = 42987, Ne1 = 42951 and Ne2 = 85670, respectively. We assume
that there are a total of M = 750 users and |Ub|= |Ub,e1|= |Uall|= 250. We first generate
independent vectors following Gaussian distribution N (0,1/9), and then apply Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalization to generate orthogonal fingerprints for different users.
We assume that 0 ≤ Kb,Kb,e1,Kall ≤ 250 are the number of colluders in subgroups
SCb, SCb,e1 and SCall , respectively, and the total number of colluders is fixed to 250.
During collusion, the colluders apply the intra-group collusion followed by the inter-
group collusion, and follow Section 3.3 when choosing the collusion parameters. In our




for every frame j in the video sequence.
The fingerprint detector follows Section 3.2.3 when identifying selfish colluders.
The detector first estimates the means of different detection statistics, selects the detection
statistics with the largest estimated mean, and then identifies the colluders.
In Figure 3.7, we compare the performance of three detectors: the simple collec-
tive detector in (3.4), the optimum detector which always selects the detection statistics
with the largest mean, and the self-probing detector in Section 3.2.3. Similar to Figure
3.3, when the means of different detection statistics differ significantly from each other,
the proposed self-probing detector in Section 3.2.3 always selects the optimum detection
statistics with the largest mean. When the difference between different means is small,
the optimum and the suboptimum detection statistics have approximately the same perfor-
mance. Thus, even though the proposed method may make errors when deciding which
detection statistics give the best performance, selecting the suboptimum detection strat-
egy does not significantly deteriorate the detection performance when compared with the
optimum detection statistics. In Figure 3.7, the performance gap is smaller than 2×10−3
and can be ignored. Exploring side information about collusion can significantly help
improve the detection performance, and the proposed self-probing detector has approx-
imately the same performance as the optimum detector with perfect knowledge of the
detection statistics’ means.
Figure 3.8 plots each colluder’s probability of being detected when they follow Sec-
tion 3.3 to select the collusion parameters. It is obvious that in this example, all colluders






























































Figure 3.7: Simulation results on the first 40 frames of sequence “carphone” from 10000
simulation runs. (a) and (b): Probability that the self-probing detector selects the optimum
detection statistics with the largest mean. (c) and (d): Pd when Pf p = 10−3. (e) and
(f): E[Fd] with E[Ff p] fixed as 10−3. In (a), (c), and (e), Rb = 0.2 and each point on
the x axis corresponds to a unique triplet (Kb,Kb,e1,Kall) where Kb = 50 and Kb,e1 =
K −Kb −Kall . In (b), (d), and (f), Rb = 0.25, and each point corresponds to a unique
triplet (Kb,Kb,e1,Kall) where Kb = 73, and Kb,e1 = K −Kb −Kall . Results are based
10000 simulation runs.
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(a) Rb = 0.20 (b) Rb = 0.25
Figure 3.8: Each colluder’s probability of being detected (P(i)s ) when they follow Section
3.3 to select the collusion parameters. The simulation setup is similar to that in Figure
3.7. There are a total of K = 250 colluders. In (a), Kb = 50 of them receive the fin-
gerprinted based layer only, and each point on the x axis corresponds to a unique triplet
(Kb,Kb,e1,Kall) where Kb = 50 and Kb,e1 = K−Kb−Kall . In (b), Kb = 75. Results are
based 10000 simulation runs.
108
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter studies user behavior in the multimedia fingerprint social networks. We
model the complex dynamics of the users in the social network using game theory and
find the optimal strategies of both players in the game. We study how side information
about collusion can help the fingerprint detector increase the traitor-tracing capability, and
influence the strategies of the colluders and the forensic detector.
We first investigated multimedia forensics with side information. Our analysis and
simulation results show that the side information about the means of the detection statis-
tics can help the detector significantly improve the collusion resistance. We then propose
a method for the detector himself/herself to probe such side information from the colluded
copy. Our simulation results demonstrate that the proposed self-probing detector has ap-
proximately the same performance as the optimal fingerprint detector, and the difference
between these two can be ignored.
Side information not only improves the fingerprint detector’s collusion resistance,
but it also affects each colluder’s probability of being detected and makes some colluders
take a larger risk than others. Thus, it breaks the collective fairness equilibrium between
the colluders and the fingerprint detector, and they have to choose different strategies.
We model the colluder-detector dynamics with side information as a zero-sum game. We
show that under the assumption that colluders demand absolute fairness of the attack, the
min-max solution achieves the equilibrium which is the optimal strategy of all users in the
multimedia fingerprint social network. Neither the colluders nor the fingerprint detector





Incentive Cooperation Strategies for
Peer-to-Peer Live Multimedia Streaming
Social Networks
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) live streaming is one of the biggest multimedia social networks on
the Internet in which users collaborate with each other to watch live broadcasting TV
programs over networks simultaneously. Due to the fully distributed nature, centralized
architecture is not an option to enforce and regulate users cooperation. Therefore, it is
critical to analyze the users’ behavior to fully understand how would the users behave to
maximize their own utilities, thus provide incentives and develop optimal strategies for
cooperation. In addition, some users in P2P live streaming systems are strategic and ratio-
nal, in that they are likely to manipulate any incentive system (for example, by cheating)
to maximize their payoff. And some malicious are attackers and aim to exhaust others’
resources and attack the system. As such, in large-scale social networks, users influence
each other’s decisions and performance, and there exist complicated dynamics among
users. It is of ample importance to investigate user behavior and analyze the impact of
human factors on multimedia social networks.
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In the literature, there have been a lot of work on providing incentives for coopera-
tion in P2P file sharing [51, 51–53]. However, providing incentives in P2P live streaming
is much more challenging than file sharing, and only a few work has addressed this prob-
lem [24, 26, 27]
The above prior work on incentive mechanisms for P2P live streaming either relied
on trusted central billing services to implement micro-payment, or they assumed that
all users are rational and honest. In real-world social networks, there are always users
with different objectives, for example, rational users and attackers, and everyone wants
to maximize his or her own payoff as in Figure 4.1. Hence, in this chapter, we will
focus on designing distributed, cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation stimulation
strategies for P2P live streaming social networks under a game theoretic framework. We
first consider a simple scenario with non-scalable video coding and study a game with
only two players. We investigate the Nash equilibriums of the game and derive cheat-
proof stimulation strategies. This analysis aims to stimulate each pair of users in P2P
live streaming to cooperate with each other and achieve better performance. Then, we
address the issue of cooperation stimulation among multiple users with non-scalable video
coding, and investigate cheat-proof and attack-resistant incentive mechanisms. Finally,
we design a chunk-request algorithm to maximize users’ video quality when the layered
video coding is used, which is the unique issue in P2P live streaming. We combine the
algorithm together with our proposed cheat-proof and attack-resistant strategies to provide
incentives for cooperation. Our proposed cheat-proof and attack-resistant mechanism
rewards users who contribute more with more video chunks and thus better quality. It
includes a request-answering algorithm for the data supplier to upload more to the peers
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Figure 4.1: User dynamics in real world social networks
from which it downloads more, and a chunk-request algorithm for the requestor to address
the tradeoffs among different quality measure and to optimize the reconstructed video
quality.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the mesh-
pull P2P live streaming system model, studies the two-player game model, and analyzes
the Nash equilibriums. In section 4.2, we propose a cheat-proof and attack-resistant strat-
egy to stimulate user cooperation among all peers in P2P live streaming, and prove that
it achieves Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, and subgame perfectness. Section 4.3
proposes a cheat-proof and attack-resistant incentive mechanism with layered video cod-
ing. Section 4.4 shows simulation results to evaluate the performance of the proposed
strategies. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.
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4.1 Optimal Strategies in a Two-Player P2P Live Stream-
ing Game
In this section, we first describe how two users in a P2P live streaming social network
cooperate with each other. We then define the payoff function and introduce the game-
theoretic formulation of user dynamics.
4.1.1 Mesh-pull P2P Live Streaming
We first introduce the basic protocol and streaming mechanisms of mesh-pull P2P live
streaming system as in Fig. 4.2(a). In a mesh-pull delivery architecture for live video
streaming [25], a compressed video bit stream of bit rate B bps is divided into media
chunks of M bits per chunk, and all the chunks are available at the original streaming
server. When a peer wants to view the video, he/she obtains a list of peers that are cur-
rently watching the video, and establishes partnership with several peers. At any instance,
a peer buffers up to a few minutes worth of chunk within a sliding window. Each user
keeps a “buffer map”, indicating the chunks that he/she has currently buffered and can
share with others, and they exchange their buffer maps with each other frequently. For
example, in Figure 4.2(b), peer 1 has first 2 chunks, while peer 2 has last 2 chunks, indi-
cated by grey blocks in their video buffer maps. After peer 1 receives peer 2’s buffer map,
peer 1 can request one or more chunks that peer 2 has advertised in his/her buffer map.
Time is divided into rounds of τ seconds. Figure 4.2 (b) shows how the peers cooperate



















(a) Overall system (b) Peer cooperation
Figure 4.2: Mesh-pull P2P Live Streaming Model
to one of his peers or to the original streaming server. Then, the supplier either replies
with the requested chunk or rejects the request.
4.1.2 Two-Player Game Model
We assume that there are totally N users in the live streaming social network and every
user buffers L chunks. The video stream is originally stored in the streaming server whose
upload bandwidth can only afford transmitting K′ chunks in one round (τ seconds) with
K′ << N. The server has no information of users’ network topology, and the peer-to-
peer system is information-pull, which means that the server only sends chunks that are
requested by some users, and it replies the chunk requests in a round robin fashion. Due
to the playback time lags among peers [25], different users request different chunks, and
the server cannot answer all users’ requests. In such a scenario, peers have to help each
other to receive more chunks and thus better-quality videos.
This section investigates the incentive mechanisms for peer cooperation in live
streaming. We start with a simple scenario with two cooperating users and nonscalable
video coding structure. To simplify the analysis, in this chapter, we consider a simple
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scenario where in each round, every peer can only request one chunk from the other peer
and also uploads at most one chunk to the other.
We first define the utility (payoff) function of the two-player game. In each round,
if player i answers the other player k’s request and sends the requested data chunk to k,
we define i’s cost ci as the percentage of his/her upload bandwidth used to transmit the
requested chunk. That is, ci = M/(Wiτ), where Wi is player i’s total available upload
bandwidth, M is the size of the chunk and τ is the time duration of the round. If player k
forwards the data that i requested and player i receives the chunk correctly, then i receives
a gain of gi, which is a user-defined value between 0 and 1. Every user in the p2p live
streaming social network defines his/her own value of gi depending on how much he/she
wants to watch the video. For instance, if all the user does is watching the live streaming
and not distracted by other activities, gi can be chosen as 1, which also implies that the
user is willing to cooperate with others to get the better-quality video. On the other
hand, if the user is watching several videos, browsing the Internet, or downloading files
simultaneously, he/she will not value the live streaming much thus set lower value gi.
Intuitively, if the user does not care about the video quality, gi would be set to 0 and
the user will download the video directly from the server and not join the live streaming
social network, since by joining the live streaming social network, some of his/her upload
bandwidths would be occupied. We assume that ci is upper bounded by cmax, which
is the same as if there exists a minimum upload bandwidth Wmin for all users such that
Wi ≥Wmin. The minimum upload bandwidth constraint is necessary since if the user can
not even completely upload a chunk in one round period, other users have no incentive to
cooperate with him/her. Here, Wi and gi are player i’s private information, and it is not
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known to the other player unless player i reports them.
Let the action of player i takes at each round be ai. In each round, player i can
choose its action ai from 0,1, where ai = 0 means in this round, player i chooses not
to respond to the other player’s request, while ai = 1 indicates that player i is willing to
cooperate at this round. Let P12 denote the probability that the chunk is successfully trans-
mitted from user 1 to user 2, and P21 is defined as the probability that user 2 successfully
transmits the requested chunk to user 1. Then, for each round, provided that the action
profile (a1,a2) being taken, player 1 and 2’s payoffs are calculated as follows:
π1(a1,a2) = (a2P21)g1−a1c1 = (a2P21)g1−a1
M
W1τ




The above payoff function consists of two terms: the first term in πi denotes the gain of
user i with respect to the other’s action, and the second term denotes his/her cost with
respect to his/her own action. From (4.1), it is reasonable to assume that P21g1 ≥ c1 and
P12g2 ≥ c2, since users will only cooperate with each other if cooperation can benefit
both users and give them positive payoffs. Let π(a1,a2) = (π1(a1,a2),π2(a1,a2)) be the
payoff profile.
It is easy to check that, if this game will only be played for onetime, the only
Nash equilibrium (NE) is (0,0), which means no one will answer the other’s request.
According to the backward induction principle [55], this is also true when the repeated
game will be played for finite times with game termination time known to both players.
Therefore, in such scenarios, for each player, its only optimal strategy is to always play
noncooperatively. However, in live streaming systems, these two players will interact
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many rounds and no one can know exactly when will the other user quit the game. Next,
we show that cooperative strategies can be obtained under a more realistic setting. Let si=
(a(1)i ,a
(2)
i , ...) denote player i’s behavior strategy in the infinitely repeated game, where
a( j)i be the action that player i takes at the j
th round, and s = (s1,s2) is the strategy profile.
When the game is played more than one time, sum of payoff in every time should be
considered as each players utility. However, in infinite time game model, sum of payoff
usually goes to infinity, therefore, averaged payoff is considered instead. Which means,









Let us analyze the NEs for the infinitely repeated game with utility function Ui defined
as above. According to the Folk theorem [55], there exists at least one NE to achieve
every feasible and enforceable payoff profile. A feasible payoff profile is the payoff that
can be achieved; an enforceable payoff profile is the payoff that can be enforced by any
mechanism to be achieved, which is, a feasible payoff profile that every players payoff is
larger than or equal to zero. The set of feasible payoff profiles for the above game is:
V0 = convex hull{(v1,v2)|∃ (a1,a2) with (π1(a1,a2),π2(a1,a2)) = (v1,v2)},
where a1,a2 ∈ {0,1}. (4.3)
and the set of enforceable payoff, denoted by V1,
V1 = {(v1,v2)|(v1,v2) ∈V0 and v1,v2 ≥ 0}. (4.4)
Figure 4.3 illustrate the feasible and the enforceable regions of the above infinitely












Figure 4.3: Feasible and Enforceable payoff profiles
V1 is the gray region shown in Figure 4.3, which is the intersection of the feasible region
and the first quadrant. It is clear that there exists an infinite number of Nash Equilib-
riums. To simplify our equations, in this chapter, we use x = (x1,x2) to denote the
set of NE strategies corresponding to the enforceable payoff profile (π1(x),π2(x)) =(




. Intuitively, the NE strategy xi can be viewed as
the averaged action that player i takes over all rounds in the infinite game. Thus xi =
limT→∞ ∑Tj=0 a
( j)
i /T , and 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1.
4.1.3 Nash Equilibrium Refinement
From the above analysis, one can see that the infinitely repeated game has infinite number
of Nash Equilibriums, and apparently, not all of them are simultaneously acceptable.
For example, the payoff profile (0,0) is not acceptable from both players’ point of view.
Therefore, in this section, we will discuss how to refine the equilibriums based on new
optimality criteria to eliminate those less rational Nash Equilibriums and find out which
equilibrium is cheat-proof. In this section, we consider the most widely used optimality




A payoff profile v ∈V0 is Pareto Optimal if and only if there is no v′ ∈V0 such that v′i ≥ vi
for all i ∈ N [7]. Pareto optimality means no one can increase his/her payoff without
degrade other’s, which the rational players will always go to. It’s clear from Figure 4.3
that the line segment between (P21g1,− MW2τ) and (P21g1 −
M
W1τ
,P12g2 − MW2τ) in the first
quadrant and the line segment between (− MW1τ ,P12g2) and (P21g1 −
M
W1τ
,P12g2 − MW2τ) in
the first quadrant is the Pareto-Optimal set.
4.1.3.2 Proportional Fairness
Next, we will further refine the solution set based on the criterion of proportional fairness.
Here, a payoff profile is proportionally fair if the product U1(s)U2(s) can be maximized,
which can be achieved by maximizing the product π1(x)π2(x) in every round. It has been
shown that the proportional fairness solution is always Pareto Optimal. The proportional
fairness point x∗ = (x∗1,x
∗
2) can be derived by solving :
max
x1,x2
f (x1,x2) = x1x2(P12P21g1g2 + c1c2)− x21c1P12g2− x22c2P21g1
s.t. 0 ≤ x1,x2 ≤ 1. (4.5)
In (4.5), same as in (4.1), ci = M/(Wiτ) for i = 1,2. It can be easily shown that the objec-
tive function f (x1,x2) and the constraint functions are continuously differentiable at any
feasible points, satisfying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [56]. Thus the maximizer
(x∗1,x
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= x∗1(P12P21g1g2 + c1c2)−2x∗2P21g1c2 = 0, (4.6)
which has only one solution (x∗1 = 0,x
∗
2 = 0) with f (0,0) = 0. Apparently, it is not a
desired solution. If (x∗1,x
∗
2) is on the boundary of the feasible region, then it satisfies
























































Although absolute fairness solution is not always Pareto-Optimal, it is also an important
criteria in many situations. Here we consider the absolute fairness in payoff, which refer
to intuitively the most direct fairness criteria that the payoff of every player in the game




















4.1.4 Optimal and cheat-proof Strategies
In Section 5.2.2,we obtained several unique equilibriums with different optimality crite-
ria. However, as in (4.8) and (4.9), all these solutions involve some private information
(gi,Wi,Pji) reported by each player. Due to players’ greediness, honestly reporting pri-
vate information cannot be taken for granted and players may tend to cheat whenever they
believe cheating can increase their payoffs.
4.1.4.1 Cheat on Private Information (gi,Wi,Pji)
One way of cheating is to cheat on the private information (gi,Wi,Pji). First, let us ex-




















From (4.11), if user 2 reports false and lower values of the product P12g2W2, he/she can
lower x∗2 and, therefore, further increase his/her own payoff π2(1,x
∗























By falsely reporting lower values of the product P21g1W1, user 1 can lower x∗1 and thus fur-
ther increases his/her own payoff π1(x∗1,1) = P21g1− x∗1
M
W1τ
. Therefore, the proportional
fairness solution in (4.8) is not cheat-proof. Applying similar analysis on the absolute
fairness solution in (4.9), we can also prove that the absolute fairness solution is also not
cheat-proof with respect to private information. Therefore, players have no incentives
to honestly report their private information. On the contrary, they will cheat whenever
cheating can increase their payoff.
From the above analysis, to maximize their own payoffs, both players will report the
minimum value of the product PjigiWi. Since we have assume that Pjigi ≥ ci = M/(Wiτ)
and Wi ≥Wmin, both players will claim PjigiWi = M/τ, and the solution (4.8) and (4.9)
become
x∗ = (1,1), (4.14)








It implies that both players should always cooperate with each other. It is clear that the
solution in (5.12) forms an Nash Equilibrium, is Pareto-Optimal, and is cheat-proof with
respect to private information gi, Wi and Pji
4.1.4.2 Cheat on Buffer Map Information
Here we assume every user has a buffer with fixed length L, which means the buffer
stores L future chunks. At the beginning of each round, each player has to exchange
his/her own buffer information with the other player, that is, telling the other player which
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chunks he/she has in the buffer. The other way of cheating is to cheat on the buffer map
information, that is, although player i has the kth chunk, LCk, in the buffer, he/she tell the
other player, player j, that he/she does not have LCk. By reporting this wrong buffer map
information, the cheating user i can reduce the number of requests from user j since user
j will never ask for the cheated chunk LCk. As a result, increasing the cheating player’s
own payoff by lower si.
The only circumstance that cheating on buffer information is effective is that, when
the cheated chunk LCk is the only chunk that the honest player needs, and the honest user
has other chunks that the cheater needs. Which means, the cheater can ask the honest user
for help, but the honest user can not ask the cheater for help because there is no chunk
in the cheater’s buffer that the honest user need. Under this circumstance, the cheater get
the reward, but the honest user gets nothing. To prevent this kind of cheating, each player
should not send chunks more than the other one sent.
To summarize, our two-player cheat-proof P2P live streaming cooperation strategy
is as follows: in the two-player P2P live streaming game, in order to maximize each user’s
own payoff and be resistant to possible cheating behavior, a player should not send more
chunks than its opponent does for it. Specifically, for each player in each round, it should
always agree to send the requested chunk unless its opponent refused it in the previous
round or there’s no useful chunk in the opponent’s buffer.
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Figure 4.4: Simulation results on 2-person cheat-proof P2P live streaming cooperation
strategy.
4.1.5 Performance of 2-Person cheat-proof Cooperation Strategy
Here we study the performance of the two-player cheat-proof P2P live streaming coop-
eration strategy proposed above. In our simulation setting, there are totally 500 users in
the network, and everyone is downloading chunks directly from the server. Each peer is
either a DSL peer with 768 kbps uplink bandwidth, or a cable peer with 300 kbps uplink
bandwidth. We fix the ratio between DSL peers and cable peers as 4:6. The video is
initially stored at an original server with upload bandwidth of 3 Mbps. The request round
is 1 second and each peer has a buffer that can store 30 seconds’ video. We choose the
”Foreman” video sequence with 352x288 spatial resolution at frame rate 30 frames per
second and padding the video by another to two-hour long. A MPEG-4 video codec [57]
is used to encode the video sequence into a non-scalable bit stream with bit rate 150
kbps. We divide the video into 1-second chunks, thus each chunk has M = 150K bits.
Among those peers, we randomly choose two who cooperate with each other using the
proposed two-player cheat-proof P2P live streaming cooperation strategy. We set g1 = 1,
g2 = 1,0.9,0.8,0.7, and every peer claims the lowest bandwidth Wmin = 300kbps.
In our simulations, user 1 always reports accurate private information to user 2,
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and user 2 cheats on his/her buffer map information. Among all the chunks that user 2
received, he/she randomly selects pc percent of them, manipulates his/her buffer map, and
tells user 1 that he/she does not have those selected chunks in the buffer. Figure 4.4 shows
the utility of user 2 with different gain g2, where the x axis is pc and the y axis is the utility
vi. From Figure Figure 4.4, for a given g2, a higher value of Pc gives the cheating user a
lower payoff. In addition, when g2 is small (for example, when g2=0.7), if the cheating
user selects a larger pc, then he/she receives a zero payoff. That is, cheating cannot help
a user increase his/her payoff, but rather reduces his/her utilities. It clearly demonstrates
the cheat-proof property of our proposed strategy in in Section 4.1.4. In addition, from
our simulations, by cooperating with each other, both peers double the number of chunks
that they receive, which is 278 without cooperation and 542 after cooperation. Therefore,
users can reconstruct a better-quality video.
4.2 P2P Live Streaming Game
4.2.1 Multi-user Game Model
Next, we will investigate how to stimulate cooperation for all members in peer-to-peer
live streaming over heterogeneous and error-prone networks, and analyze users’ behavior
dynamics. We focus on the scenario that video streaming will keep alive for a relatively
long time, and there exist a finite number of users, for example, people watch live Super
Bowl over the Internet. Each user will stay in the social network for a reasonably long
time, for example, from the beginning to the end of the game. They are allowed to leave
126
and reconnect to the network when necessary.For each user, uploading chunks to other
users will incur some cost, and successfully receiving chunks can improve the quality of
his/her video and thus brings some gain. To simplify the analysis, in this section, we
assume the video stream is encoded using non-scalable video codec. Therefore, for each
user i, each received chunk gives the same gain gi, whose value is specified by the user
individually and independently. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, gi, the gain of receiving a
chunk for the live video, is evaluated by user i by how much he/she wants to watch the
video. For instance, gi should be set to 1 if at this moment, all user i wants to do is watch
the live streaming. The more activities user i is doing simultaneously using the network
bandwidth, the lower the gi is. If user i is utilizing lots of his/her upload bandwidth and
does not care about the quality of the live video stream, gi should be set to 0, and user i
will not join the P2P live stream social network.
In a real-world social network, some users may be malicious, whose goal is to cause
damages to other users. In this chapter, we focus on insider attackers, that is, the attackers
also have legitimate identities, and their goal is to prevent the selfish users from getting
chunks. In P2P live streaming social networks, there are two ways to attack the system:
1. Incomplete chunk attack: The malicious user agrees to send the entire requested
chunk to the peer, but sends only portions of it or no data at all. By doing so, the
requesting peer wastes his/her request quota in this round, and has to request the
same chunk again in the next round.
2. Pollution attack: The other kind of attack in peer-to-peer live streaming is pol-
lution [58]. In P2P streaming system, a malicious user corrupts the data chunks,
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renders the content unusable, and then makes this polluted content available for
sharing with other peers. Unable to distinguish polluted chunks from unpolluted
files, unsuspecting users download the polluted chunks into their own buffers, from
which others may then download the polluted data. In this manner, polluted data
chunks spread through the system.
Instead of forcing all users to act fully cooperatively, our goal is to stimulate co-
operation among selfish users as much as possible and minimize the damages caused by
malicious users. In general, not all cooperation decisions can be perfectly executed. For
example, when a peer decides to send another peer the requested chunk, packets of the
chunk may be dropped due to the overloaded routers. It is also possible that the chunk
may fail to be completely received in one round due to the significant delay caused by
the congested network. In this chapter, we assume that the requesting peer gives up the
chunk once it does not arrive in the round, and we use pi j to denote the probability of
successful transmission of a chunk from peer i to peer j in one round of τ second. At the
beginning of every round, each user will send only one chunk request to one user. Each
user will respond to only one request. We assume every chunk request can be received
immediately and perfectly.
In order to formally analyze cooperation and security in such peer-to-peer live
streaming networks, we model the interactions among peers as the following game:
• Server: The video is originally stored at the original streaming server with upload
bandwidth Ws, and the server will send chunks in a round-robin fashion to its peers.
• Players and player type: There are finite number of users/peers in the peer-to-
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peer live streaming social network, denoted by N. Each player i ∈ N has a type
θi ∈ {selfish,malicious}. Let Ns denote the set of all selfish players and Nm = N\Ns
is the set including all insider attackers. A selfish user aims to maximize his/her
own payoff, and may cheat other peers if cheating can help increase his/her payoff.
A malicious user wishes to exhaust other peers’ resources and attack the system.
• Chunk requesting: In each round, each player has one chunk-request quota, where
he/she either requests a chunk from a peer, requests a chunk from the video stream-
ing source, or does not request any chunks in this round.
• Request answering: For each player, after receiving a request asking for the upload
of a chunk in its buffer, it can either accept or refuse the request.
• Cost: For any player i ∈ N, uploading a chunk to another player incurs cost ci =
M/Wiτ, where Wi is player i’s upload bandwidth and Wi ≥Wmin ≥ M/τ, same as in
Section 4.1.2.
• Gain: For each selfish user i ∈ Ns, if he/she requests a data chunk from another
peer j, and if an unpolluted copy is successfully delivered to him/her, his/her gain
is gi where Pjigi > ci.
• Utility function: We first define the following symbols: for each player i ∈ N,
– Cr(i)( j, t) is the total number of chunks that i has requested from j by time t.
Here, j can be either a peer ( j ∈ N) or j is the streaming server. Cr(i)(t) =
∑ j∈{N, source}Cr(i)( j, t) denotes the total number of chunks that i has re-
quested by time t.
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– By time t, peer i has successfully received Cs(i)( j, t) chunks from peer j in
time (a chunk is received in time if and only if it is received within the same
round that it was requested). Cs(i)(t) = ∑ j∈{N,source}Cs(i)( j, t) is peer i’s
total number of successfully received chunks by time t.
– By time t, C(i)p ( j, t) is the total number of polluted chunks that peer i received
from peer j. The total number of successively received unpolluted data chunks
that peer i received from peer j is Cs(i)( j, t)−C(i)p ( j, t), and each successfully
received unpolluted chunk gives peer j a gain of gi.
– Cu(i)( j, t) denotes the number of chunks that i has uploaded to player j by
time t. Cu(i)(t) = ∑ j∈{N,source}Cu(i)(t). The cost of uploading each chunk is
ci for peer i.
Let t f be the lifetime of the peer-to-peer live streaming social network, and T (i)(t)
denotes the total time that peer i is in the network by time t. Then, we model the
player’s utility as follows:
1. For any selfish player i ∈ Ns, its utility U
(i)
s (t f ) is defined as
U (i)(t f ) =
[
Cs(i)(t f )−∑ j∈N C
(i)
p ( j, t f )
]
gi−Cu(i)(t f ) MWiτ
Cr(i)(t f )
, (4.16)
where the numerator denotes the net profit (i.e., the total gain minus the total
cost) that the selfish peer i obtained, and the denominator denotes the total
number of chunks that i has requested. This utility function represents the
average net profit that i can obtain per requested chunk, which i aims to max-
imize.
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2. For any malicious player j ∈ Nm, its objective is to maximize its utility
U ( j)m =
∑i∈Ns Cu
(i)( j, t f ) MWiτ +∑i∈Ns
[
Cr(i)( j, t f )−Cs(i)( j, t f )
]
Pjigi−Cu( j)(t f ) MW jτ
T ( j)(t f )
.
(4.17)
The numerator in (4.17) represents the net damage caused by j: the first term
describes the total costs to other peers when sending the requested chunks to
the malicious user j; the middle term evaluates other selfish peers’ potential
loss in gain due to the incomplete chunk attack by peer j; and the last term is
peer j’s cost by uploading chunks to other peers. We normalize it using the
lifetime of peer j, T ( j)(t f ). Now, this utility function represents the average
net damage that j causes to the other nodes per time unit.
4.2.2 Cheat-Proof and Attack-Resistant Cooperation Stimulation Strate-
gies
Based on the system description in Section 4.2.1, we can see that the multiple player game
is much more complicated than the two-person game as in Section 4.1, and pose new
challenges. Thus, direct application of the two-player cooperation strategies to multiple
player scenarios may not work.
4.2.2.1 Challenges in Multiple User Scenario
For peer-to-peer live streaming networks in heterogeneous Internet traffic environments,
user cooperation stimulation has the following challenges:
• Repeated game model is not applicable. For example, a peer may request chunks
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from different peers at different times to maximize the utility. A direct consequence
of such a non-repeated model is that favors cannot be simultaneously granted.
This makes cooperation stimulation in peer-to-peer live streaming networks an ex-
tremely challenging task.
• Packet delay is inevitable in Internet can cause severe trouble. For the two-player
cheat-proof cooperation strategy, if the link between users is too busy that some
packets of the chunk can not arrive within a round time, the game will be terminated
immediately and the performance will be degraded drastically. In addition, the
malicious users can claim it was due to the erroneous Internet traffic and pretend to
be non-malicious. Distinguishing misbehavior caused by bit errors and packet loss
from that caused by malicious intention is a challenging task.
4.2.2.2 Credit Mechanism for Malicious User Detection
To distinguish “intentional” malicious behavior from “innocent” misbehavior caused by
packet delay, we introduce the credit mechanism. Addressing the pollution attack, for any
two peers i, j ∈ N,
Cc(i)( j, t) = Cu(i)( j, t)−C( j)p (i, t) (4.18)
calculates the total number of unpolluted chunks that peer i has uploaded to peer j by
time t. If the chunk is unpolluted, and is received before its playback time, then the
chunk is useful. Note that for a selfish user i ∈ Ns, as discussed in the previous section,
he/she has no incentives to intentionally send others polluted data chunks, since doing so
will ultimately hurt himself/herself and lower the quality of his/her own video. However,
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since peer i cannot identify a chunk as a polluted one until he/she starts decoding and
playing that chunk, it is possible that user i unintentionally forwards a polluted chunk to
other peers. In this chapter, addressing the above issue, we include the term C( j)p (i, t) in
(5.17) and consider the potential unintentional forwarding of polluted data chunks.
Given (5.17), we then define
D(i)( j, t) = Cc(i)( j, t)−Cc( j)(i, t) =
(








which is the difference between the number of useful chunks that peer i has sent to peer
j and the number of useful chunks that peer j uploaded to peer i. Now, similar to the 2-
player cooperation-stimulation strategy in Section 4.1.4, we consider the following strat-
egy: each selfish peer i ∈ Ns limits the number of chunks that he/she sends to any other
peer j such that by any time t, the total number of useful(unpolluted) chunks that i has
forwarded to j should be no more than Cu( j)(i, t)−C(i)p ( j, t)+D(i)max( j, t), that is,
D(i)( j, t)≤ D(i)max( j, t), ∀t ≥ 0. (4.20)
Here, D(i)max( j, t) is the ”credit line” that user i sets for user j at time t. The credit line is set
for two purposes: 1) to prevent egoism when favors cannot be simultaneously granted and
to stimulate cooperation between i and j, and 2) to limit the possible damages that j can
cause to i. By letting D(i)max( j, t) ≥ 0, i agrees to send some extra, but at most D(i)max( j, t)
chunks to j without getting instant payback. Meanwhile, unlike acting fully cooperatively,
the extra number of chunks that i forwards to j is bounded to limit the possible damages
when j plays non-cooperatively or maliciously.
Player i’s goal of setting the credit line is to avoid helping player j much more than
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player j helps i in long term’s view, and vice versa, since neither of i, j has incentive
to send more chunks than the other does. Meanwhile, due to the dynamically changing
network conditions, the request rates between i and j may vary from time to time. In
this case, the credit line has to be large enough since a small credit line will refuse some
requests even when the long-term average request rates between i and j are equal. The ul-
timate goal of setting the credit line is to make sure that player i and j send asymptotically
equal number of unpolluted chunks to each other, and
lim
t→∞
Cc(i)( j, t) = lim
t→∞
Cc(i)( j, t). (4.21)
Combining the definition of D(i)max( j, t) with (4.21), D
(i)






which also implies that arbitrarily increasing credit lines cannot always increase the num-
ber of accepted requests. (4.22) provides an asymptotic upper bound for D(i)max( j, t). Based
on the above analysis, to stimulate cooperation in the first few rounds, D(i)max( j, t) should
be large enough in the first few cooperating rounds between user i and j. On the other
hand, D(i)max( j, t)/[total number of rounds after time t] should be closed to 0 to prevent
decreasing the utility of user i. Therefore, when choosing D(i)max( j, t), user i should first
estimate the number of remaining rounds for the live streaming, and choose a relatively
small number Dtemp. Then compare Dtemp with the reciprocal of Pi j, so that D
(i)
max( j, t)
should be larger than 1/Pi j to stimulate the cooperation. A simple solution to this is to set
the credit lines to be reasonably large positive constants, as in our simulations in Section
4.4.
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4.2.2.3 Malicious User Detection
Malicious attacks, such as the incomplete chunk attack and the pollution attack, exhaust
other peers’ resources and cause damages to the P2P live streaming system. Thus, it is of
critical importance to implement a monitoring system to detect and identify misbehaving
users, and a challenging issue is to differentiate “innocent” misbehavior (due to erroneous
and congested networks) from “intentional” ones (for example, intentional pollution at-
tacks).
If the credit line is set properly to satisfy (4.22), the damage of the pollution attack
can be controlled to 0 asymptotically. Since the pollution attack will not effect honest
users’ utility by the credit line mechanism, in this section, we propose a malicious user
detection algorithm that can differentiate the incomplete information attack to ensure the
attack-resistance of the P2P live streaming social network.
Pi j is the probability of successful transmitting one chunk within round period τ.
Hence when player idecides to send a chunk to player j, with probability 1−Pi j, this
chunk transmission cannot be completed within one round because of packet dropping or
delay caused by high traffic internet. That is, we use a Bernoulli random process to model
the unsuccessful transmission of a chunk due to high traffic internet connection. Recall
that that Cu( j)(i, t) denote the number of chunks that i has requested from j and j has
agreed by time t, and Cs(i)( j, t) is the number of chunks that peer i successfully receives
from j in one round. Given the Bernoulli random process, if user j does not intentionally
deploy the incomplete chunk attack, based on the Central Limit Theorem [59], for any
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Cs(i)( j, t)−Cu( j)(i, t)Pji√
Cu( j)(i, t)P ji(1−Pji)
≥−x
= Φ(x), (4.23)




−t2/2dt is the Gauss tail function. If user j does not intentionally
sends incomplete chunks, (4.23) indicates that when the peer-to-peer live streaming game
keeps going and Cu( j)(i, t) is large enough, then Cs(i)( j, t)−PjiC
( j)
u (i, t) can be approxi-
mated by a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance Cu( j)(i, t)Pji(1−Pji),
that is,





Therefore, based on (4.24), given a predetermined threshold h > 0, every selfish peer i can
identify peer j as a malicious user by thresholding Cs(i)( j, t)−Cu( j)(i, t)Pji as follows:
j ∈ N(i)m (t) if and only if Cs(i)( j, t)−Cu( j)(i, t)Pji ≤ −h
√
Cu( j)(i, t)Pji(1−Pji),
and j ∈ N(i)s (t) if and only if Cs(i)( j, t)−Cu( j)(i, t)Pji > −h
√
Cu( j)(i, t)Pji(1−Pji).(4.25)
In (4.25), N(i)m (t) is the set of peers that are marked as malicious by peer i at time t,
and N(i)s (t) is the set of peers that are marked as selfish by peer i at time t. Based on
(4.25), if the malicious user is always sending incomplete chunks to other users, then
the probability of correctly identify the malicious user (Pd) and the probability of falsely
accusing a nonmalicious user as malicious (Pf a) can be written as
Pd = 1−Φ(h), and Pf a = Φ(h). (4.26)
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4.2.2.4 Cooperation-Stimulation Strategies
In reality, the interactions between peers are determined by the Internet topology and the
communication pattern in the network. To analyze the effect of internet topology, we
define Pi j as the probability that peer j successfully receives a chunk from peer i in one
round period τ, Psi denotes the probability of i successfully receiving a chunk from the
streaming server in one round period τ, Ps denotes the percentage of requests that the
streaming server can answer in one round. These probabilities, Pi j, Psi, Ps, can be probed
or estimated [27].
Theorem 1 For a selfish peer i, if
Psi×Ps > Pji, ∀ j ∈ N, j 6= i, (4.27)
then his/her optimal strategy is to always download the live video from the streaming
server and to reject all chunk requests from other peers.
Proof. First, consider the optimal strategy for each round. At each round, peer i has
one chunk-request quota by which i can ask a chunk either from the source or one peer
j∈ N. The probability that peer i will successfully receive the requested chunk if i sends
request to source is Psi×Ps, while the probability that peer i will successfully receive the
requested chunk if i sends request to j is Pji × probability of j agrees to send the chunk.
Obviously the probability of j agrees to send the chunk is less than or equal to one, and
since (4.27) holds, sending request to the source will give i highest probability of getting
the chunk/reward, which is the optimal chunk-request strategy in each round. Therefore,
always asking chunks from the source is the optimal chunk-request strategy in the whole
game. And since peer i always requests chunks from the original source, it doesn’t have
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incentive to send any chunks to other peers in the network since it cost M/Wiτ to send a
chunk which decreases peer i’s utility as in (4.16). From the above analysis, peer i will
always operate non-cooperatively.2
Theorem 1 suggests that if a peer has a very good connection with the original
streaming server, which is much better than the connections with all the other peers,
then he/she will always refuse to cooperate. Cooperation can not be enforced to these
peers. But in real-world case, there are usually very few peers that can meet the above
condition since peer-to-peer live streaming social networks are usually very big. Thus,
the streaming server is often very busy with low Ps, and makes the condition Psi×Ps > Pji
for all j ∈ N, j 6= i in Theorem 1 very difficult to satisfy.
The other extreme scenario is when peer i is has the worst connection with other
peers, that is, for every j ∈ N, j 6= i, there always exists another peer k ∈ N, k 6= i, j such
that Pi j < Pk j. In this scenario, will all the other peers in the network refuse to cooperate
with him/her? The answer is no because of the dynamics in peer-to-peer social networks
and the assumption of a busy server. Note that in peer-to-peer live streaming, different
users have different playback time. If peer i’s playback time is earlier than all the other
peers in the network, then it is very likely that his/her buffer has chunks that no other
peers have, which is the incentive for other peers to cooperate with i under the constraint
that D( j)(i, t)≤ D( j)max(i).
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4.2.2.5 Multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation strat-
egy
By summarizing the above results, we can arrive at the following cooperation stimulation
strategies in peer-to-peer live streaming social networks:
Multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation strategy: in the peer-
to-peer live streaming game, for any selfish peer i ∈ Ns who does not meet the necessary
condition (4.27) of Theorem 1, he/she initially marks every other user j ∈ N, j 6= i as
selfish. Then, in each round, i uses the following strategy:
• If i has been requested by j to send a chunk, i will accept this request if j has not
been marked as malicious by i and (4.20) holds; otherwise, i will reject the request.
• When i is requesting a chunk, he/she will send the request to peer j who satisfies
j = arg max
j∈N(i)s (t), j 6=i
P′ji (4.28)
• Let 1−Φ(h) be the maximum allowable false positive probability from i’s point
of view, then, when Cu( j)(i, t) is large enough for any users j ∈ N, i will apply the
detection rule (4.25) to detect malicious behavior after each chunk request initiated
by i.
4.2.3 Strategy Analysis under no Attacks
This section analyzes the optimality of the above proposed strategy for peers who do not
satisfy the necessary conditions in Theorem 1 when there are no malicious users. We first
consider an infinite-lifetime situation with Cr(i)(t)→ ∞ as t → ∞, and the finite-lifetime
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situation will be discussed later. First, we assume D(i)max( j, t) satisfies (4.22), which is to
guarantee at most a finite number of i’s requests will be refused by j, and ensure i needs
j’s help the same as i helps j averagely.
Lemma 1. In the peer-to-peer live streaming game where some chunks may be
dropped or delayed due to high traffic volume in the Internet, for a selfish player j, if
all other users follow the multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proofing cooperation strat-
egy, then playing non-cooperatively and sending only part of the requested chunks will
not increase j’s payoff.
Proof. If user j has agreed to upload a chunk to another user i ∈ N, by transmitting
only part of the requested chunk will help j reduce his/her cost. However, even though j
agrees to upload the chunk, it does not count as a successfully received chunk. In addition,
player i follows the multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation strategy, and
always tries to let
lim
t→∞
Cs(i)( j, t)≥ lim
t→∞
Cs(i)( j, t). (4.29)
Since (4.22) is satisfied, thus by sending partial of the requested chunk, player j loses
one chance to request a chunk from player i. To get this one-chunk-request chance back,
player j has to send another chunk completely and successfully to player i. Therefore,
intentionally sending partial information of the requested chunks cannot bring any gain
to player j. 2
Lemma 2. For a selfish peer i ∈ Ns in the peer-to-peer live streaming game with
no malicious attackers, once i has received a chunk request from another node j ∈ N, if
(4.20) holds and if j follows the multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proofing cooperation
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strategy, then accepting the request is always an optimal decision from player i’s point of
view.
Proof. From player i’s point of view, if (4.22) is satisfied, agreeing to send the re-
quested chunk will not introduce any performance loss, since the average cost of helping
j goes to zero when t → ∞. Meanwhile, refusing the request may cause D( j)(i, t) >
D( j)max(i, t) and thus forbids user i to request chunks from player j in the future. Therefore,
accepting the request is an optimal decision. 2
Lemma 3. In the peer-to-peer live streaming game with no malicious attackers, a
selfish peer i ∈ Ns has no incentive to cheat on his/her buffer map information.
Proof. From player i’s point of view, cheating on his/her buffer information will pre-
vent other peers from requesting chunks from him/her, and thus will decrease the total
number of chunks he/she needs to upload (Cu(i)(t)). However, since other users always
enforce (4.22) and Cu( j)(i, t) + D( j)max(i, t) < Cu(i)( j, t), decreasing Cu(i)(t) will also de-
crease the chance of getting chunks from other peers and lower player i’s overall payoff,
similar to the two-player game in Section 4.1.2. Therefore, selfish peers have no incentive
to cheat on buffer information. 2
Theorem 2. In the peer-to-peer live streaming game without malicious attackers, if
all the selfish players who do not satisfy the necessary conditions in Theorem 1 follow the
multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proofing cooperation strategy forms a equilibrium




for any i, j ∈ N, this equilibrium is also strongly Pareto optimal.
Proof. : 1) Cheat-proof: Similar to the analysis of the two-person game in Section
4.1, since no private information is involved in the game and Lemma 3 says that selfish
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users have no incentive to cheat on buffer information, we can conclude that the proposed
cooperation-stimulation strategy is cheat-proofing.
2) Nash Equilibrium: To prove that this strategy profile forms a subgame perfect equilib-
rium, note that this multiuser game can be decomposed into many two-player subgames.
Therefore, we only need to consider the two-player subgame between player i and j. Sup-
pose that player i does not follow the above strategy: either i refuses to send chunks to
player j when (4.20) is satisfied; or i intentionally sends only part of the chunk requested
by player j; or i sends more chunks than it should for player j, that is, j agrees to send the
requested chunks even (4.20) is not satisfied. First, from Lemma 1 and 2, neither refusing
to sending chunks for other players when (4.20) is satisfied nor intentionally sending in-
complete chunks will give player i any performance gain. Secondly, sending many more
chunks (i.e., more than D(i)max( j, t)) than player j has sent to i will not increase player i’s
own payoff either. This is because according to the assumption of credit line selections, j
will always cooperate with i since j has sent chunks less than i. Therefore, giving j more
favor will only cost i more bandwidth. Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that
the above multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proofing cooperation strategy forms a Nash
equilibrium.
3) Subgame perfectness: In every subgame of the equilibrium path, the strategies are:
if player j is marked malicious by peer i, player j will play non-cooperatively forever,
which is a Nash equilibrium; otherwise, player j follows the multiuser attack-resistant
and cheat-proofing strategy, which is also a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the proposed
cooperation-stimulation strategy is subgame perfect .
4) Strong Pareto optimality: From the selfish user’s utility function in (4.16), a player
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i can either try to increase Cs(i)(t) or decrease Cu(i)(t) to increase his/her own payoff.
However, from the above analysis, further decreasing of Cu(i)(t) will reduce other peers’
successfully received useful chunks and therefore lower their payoff. In order to increase
his/her payoff, the only thing that player i can do is to increase limt→∞Cs(i)(t)/Cr(i)(t),
which means that some other players will have to send more chunks to player i. Since
all Cr(i)(t)s are in the same order, increasing limt→∞Cs(i)(t)/Cr(i)(t) (and thus improving
player i’s payoff) will definitely decrease the other players’ payoff. Therefore, the above
strategy profile is strongly Pareto optimal. 2
Until now, we have mainly focused on the situation that the game will be played for
an infinite duration. In most situations, a peer will only stay in the network for a finite
period of time, for example till the end of the video streaming. Then, for each player i, if
D(i)max( j, t) is too large, he/she may have helped other users much more than his/her peers
have helped i. Meanwhile, if D(i)max( j, t) is too small, he/she may lack enough peers to
send chunks to him/her. How to select a good D(i)max( j, t) is a challenging issue. Section
5.5 will study the trade-off between the value of D(i)max( j, t) and the peers’ utility through
simulations. It is shows there that under given simulation scenarios, a relatively small
D(i)max( j, t) value is good enough to achieve near-optimal performance, when compared to
setting D(i)max( j, t) to be infinity. Here, it is also worth mentioning that the optimality of the
proposed strategies cannot be guaranteed in finite-duration scenarios. However, we will
show in the simulation results that the performance our cheat-proof and attack-resistant
cooperation strategies is very closed to optimal.
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4.2.4 Strategy Analysis under Malicious Attacks
In this section, we focus on the following two widely used attack models, the incom-
plete chunks attack and the pollution attack, and analyze the performance of the proposed
cooperation-stimulation strategy when there exist malicious users. To simplify our anal-
ysis, we assume that Wi = W , gi = g, and g MWτ < ∞ for all i ∈ N.
Pollution attack: We first study the performance of the proposed strategy under the
pollution attack. By always accepting selfish users’ requests and sending polluted chunks
to the selfish nodes, the malicious attackers can waste the selfish users’ quota and prevent
them from obtaining the gain of receiving useful chunks in that round. Note that every
selfish user i ∈ Ns forces D(i)( j, t)≤D
(i)
max( j, t), calculates D(i)( j, t) as in (4.19), and does
not include the polluted chunks in D(i)( j, t). Thus, for every selfish peer i, the damage






and therefore, the overall damage due to pollution attacks becomes negligible.
Incomplete chunk attack: By sending incomplete chunks to others, malicious users
inject trash traffic into the network and waste other peers’ limited upload bandwidth. With
the proposed attacker detection strategy in (4.25), for a malicious attacker to maximize
the damages to the system, always sending incomplete chunks may not be a good strat-
egy since it can be easily detected. Instead, to avoid being detected, attackers should
selectively send incomplete chunks and send complete chunks in other time. According
to the multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proofing cooperation strategy in Section 4.2.1,
peer j identifies i as malicious if Cs( j)(i, t)−Cu(i)( j, t)Pi j ≤ −h
√
Cu( j)(i, t)Pi j(1−Pi j).
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Assume that by time t, user i has agreed to upload a total of n chunks to user j. There-
fore, to avoid being marked as malicious by j, i has to successfully forward at least
nPi j−h
√
nPi j(1−Pi j) complete chunks, and the maximum number of incomplete chunks
that i can send to j is upper bounded by n(1−Pi j)+ h
√
nPi j(1−Pi j). Note that among
these n(1−Pi j)+h
√
nPi j(1−Pi j) incomplete chunks, n(1−Pi j) of them are dropped or
delayed by the network due the high Internet traffic volume, and the actual number of
intentional incomplete chunks sent to j by i is bounded by h
√
nPi j(1−Pi j). Therefore,
for user j, the extra damaged caused by attacker i’s intentional malicious attack is upper
bounded by h
√
nPi j(1−Pi j)g. Furthermore, to avoid being identified as malicious, at-
tacker i has to successfully forward at least nPi j − h
√
nPi j(1−Pi j) complete chunks to






Wτ . Thus, following
(4.17), the utility that attacker i receives from intentionally sending incomplete chunks is
at most h
√
nPi j(1−Pi j)( MWτ +g)−n(1−Pi j)
M





nPi j(1−Pi j)( MWτ +g)
n(1−Pi j) MWτ
= 0, (4.31)
selectively sending incomplete chunks can bring no gain to the attackers if they want
to remain being undetected. In other words, if the game will be played for an infinite
duration, sending incomplete chunks attack cannot cause damages to selfish nodes.
In summary, when the multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proofing strategy is used
by all selfish users, malicious attackers can only caused limited damage to the system.
Further, the relative damage caused by the incomplete chunk attack will asymptotically
approach zero when the game will be played for an infinite duration of time. Therefore,
except some false alarm of identifying selfish users as malicious, selfish players’ overall
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payoff will not be affected under attacks. From the above analysis, we can also see that no
matter what objectives the attackers have and what attacking strategies that they use, as
long as selfish peers apply the multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proofing cooperation
strategy, the selfish users’ payoff and the overall system performance can be guaranteed.
Optimal attacking strategy: Based on the above analysis on the pollution attack and the
incomplete chunk attack, we can conclude that, for the infinite-duration game, an attacker
j’s overall payoff is upper bounded by





provided that all selfish users follow the multiuser attack-resistant and cheat-proof coop-
eration strategy. This upper bound can be achieved by the following optimal attacking
strategy in infinite game model: in the peer-to-peer live streaming game, upon receiving a
request an attacker j ∈ Nm should always reject the requests; the attackers should always
send requests to selfish users, until they do not agree to help.
When the game will only be played for a finite period of time, the above attacking
strategy is not optimal any more. In addition to the pollution attack, the attackers can also
send incomplete chunks without being detected. This is because the malicious attacker
detection algorithm in Section 4.2.2.3 requires that the game has been played for a long
time and peer i and j have interacted for a large number of times to provide an accurate
estimation, and it will not be initiated unless Cu( j)(i, t) is large enough to avoid high false
alarm rate. In such a scenario, different from the asymptotic analysis in (4.31), selfish
users’ performance will be degraded because of the incomplete chunk attack. However,
in this chapter we focus on the scenario the game will be played for a reasonably long
146
time. Thus the users would have enough rounds to interact with each other and correctly
estimate the statistics of chunk transmission, the relative damage is still insignificant.
4.3 P2P Live Streaming Game With Multiple Layered
Coding
The previous section discussed the cheat-proofing and attack-resistant multiuser peer-to-
peer live streaming cooperation-stimulation strategy with non-scalable video coding. In
this section, we will extend the cooperation strategy to the scenario with layered video
coding, where different chunks may belong to different layers and thus have different
gain to the peers. In this scenario, an important issue is to schedule the chunk requests
to maximize each peer’s utility. We first investigate the chunk-request algorithm for a
two-person P2P live-streaming social network that optimizes three different video qual-
ity measures in Section 4.3.2. We then propose a two-person chunk request algorithm
considering tradeoff between these measures and extend it to N-person case. Then we
will discuss the request-answering strategy when a peer i receives more than one chunk
requests at one round, and propose a cheat-proofing and attack-resistant cooperation strat-
egy for P2P live streaming social networks.
4.3.1 P2P Live Streaming with Scalable Video Coding
In P2P live streaming social networks, peers belong to different domains with different up-
lad/download bandwidth, where scalable video coding is widely adopted to accommodate
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Figure 4.5: Buffer map at a given time t.
heterogenous networks [27], [60]. [27] shows that layered video coding provides higher
quality of service in peer-to-peer live streaming social networks than multiple descrip-
tion coding (MDC) [61], thus we only consider the layered video coding. It decomposes
the video sequence into different layers of different priority. The base layer contains the
most important information of the video and is received by all users, and the enhance-
ment layers gradually refine the reconstructed sequence at the decoder’s side.Although
scalable video coding provides service depending on peers’ bandwidth capacity, it also
has its unique challenges when used in P2P live streaming social network: the importance
of different layers is unequal since higher layers can not be decoded without successful
decoding of lower layers. Therefore, in a P2P live streaming social network with scal-
able video coding, chunk-request algorithms need to assign higher priorities to the lower
layers than to the higher layers.
In this chapter, we encode a video into L layers, and assume that the bit rate of every
layer is the same Bs bits/second. We further divide each layer into layer chunks (LCs) of
τ seconds. Figure 4.5 shows an example of the buffer map at one user’s end. The grey
blocks represent the chunks in buffer, while the white blocks denote the chunks that are
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not in the buffer, and ‘D’ stands for layer chunks that are directly decodable after arriving.
For example, this user only has the chunks in base layer with time index t+1 and t+3, and
the chunk in layer 2 with time index t+2 in buffer. A chunk is decodable if and only if all
the lower layers in the same chunk time have been decoded correctly.
For user j, we define a( j)(t) as the number of decodable layer chunks at time t. For
example, in the example in Figure 4.5, a( j)(t + 1) = 1, a( j)(t + 2) = 0, a( j)(t + 3) = 1,
and a( j)(t + 4) = 0. Let T ( j) denote the duration that peer j is in this network, then we





> as a vector containing all the {a( j)(t)}{t=1,2,...,T ( j)}.
N( j) is the number of all (decodable and successfully received non-decodable) chunks
peer j receives during his stay in the P2P live streaming social networks.
4.3.2 Video Quality Measure
This chapter focuses on investigating the best chunk-request strategy for each user in the
peer-to-peer live streaming social network to optimize his/her own received video quality.
In the literature, there are many video-quality measures. In this chapter, we consider the
following three popular criteria to evaluate our algorithms:
Chunk Decodable Rate: Every member in the P2P live-streaming social network has
stringent bandwidth available, and every peer wants to use it as efficiently as possible.
The chunk decodable rate R( j) of peer j measures the bandwidth-efficiency of the chunk-









Video Smoothness: Intuitively, a video stream with nearly constant quality will be more
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where | · | is the absolute value operator. S( j)(A) increases when the variance of {a( j)(t)}
goes up, and decreases when the difference between adjacent {a( j)(t)} is lowered. To
improve the quality and maximize the smoothness of the received video, user j should
request the chunks to minimize S( j)(A).
Video Discontinuity Ratio: Discontinuity ratio α( j) of peer j is defined as the percentage
of times that a video is undecodable and unplayable. In a scalable video coding scheme,
if all frames in the base layer are available, then the video is decodable and playable. Note
that a( j)(t) stands for the number of chunks that is decodable at chunk time i. Therefore,










where U(a( j)i ) = 1 when a
( j)
i > 0, otherwise U(a
( j)
i ) = 0.
4.3.3 Optimal Chunk-Request Algorithms
In this subsection, we will propose three optimum chunk-request algorithms subject to
the three video quality measures discussed in the previous section.
• Maximizing Chunk-Decodable Rate: We first discuss the chunk-request algo-
rithm which aims to maximize the chunk decodable rate. According to the defini-
tion of chunk-decodable rate in (4.33), chunks that are not decodable do not give
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g if LC(t ′, l) is decodable
0 if LC(t ′, l) is not decodable,
(4.36)
where g > 0 is a constant, t ′ is the time index of the requested layered chunk and l
stands for the layer index of the requested chunk. Therefore, maximizing payoff
function in (4.1) is equivalent to making gi = g, and it is to always requesting
chunks that are directly decodable after arriving. In the example in Figure 4.5, at the
current state, requesting any one of the ”D” chunks, LC(t+1,layer 2), LC(t+2,layer
1), LC(t+3,layer 2), and LC(t+4,layer 1), will maximize the player’s payoff.
• Maximizing Video Smoothness: If the player concerns more about the video
smoothness as defined in (4.34), the gain of receiving a requested chunk LC(t ′, l)














i−1| if LC(t ′, l) is decodable
0 if LC(t ′, l) is not decodable,
(4.37)
where a′( j)i is the number of decodable layers in chunk time i after receiving the
requested chunk LC(t ′, l), and t0 is the current playback time. The first term of
the summation, |a( j)i − a
( j)
i−1| represents the difference between the number of de-










i−1| denotes the video smoothness if the requested
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chunk LC(t ′, l) is successfully received. Therefore, to maximize the video smooth-











i−1| (with maxima greater than 0). If the maxima is
less than 0, the peer should always choose undecodable chunks. Using the buffer
map in Figure 4.5 as an example, the peer should request LC(t +4, layer1).
• Minimizing Video Discontinuity Ratio: If the peer wants to minimize video dis-
continuity ratio, the base layer is the most important and every chunk in base layer
has equal importance according to the discontinuity definition in (4.35). Therefore,
the gain of receiving a requested chunk LC(t ′, l) for player j should be
g j =

g if l = 1
0 if l 6= 1.
(4.38)
To maximize g j, the peer should request chunks in base layer. For the example in
Figure 4.5, requesting either LC(t+2, layer 1) or LC(t+4, layer 1) will maximize g j.
The above three algorithms use different video quality measures defined in Section
4.3.2 and select different chunks to maximize each individual criteria. To address the
tradeoff between different video quality measure, we combine the above three chunk-
request algorithms as follows.
Step 1: For user j, for each chunk LC(t ′, l) that is not in j’s buffer but is available at other
peers’ buffers, user j assign a score SC(t ′, l) as follows:
• j first assigns an original score SC(t ′, l) = ((t + L)− t ′)/L to the chunk LC(t ′, l),
where t is the current time and L is user j’s buffer size. It addresses the stringent
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time constraint in video streaming, and gives the chunk LC(t ′, l) a higher score (thus
higher priority for requesting) when it is closer to the playback time.
• If LC(t ′, l) is decodable after arriving, then the score is updated as SC(t ′, l) =
SC(t ′, l)+w1.










i−1|> 0, then j updates SC(t ′, l) = SC(t ′, l)+
w2g2.
• If l = 1, then SC(t ′, l) = SC(t ′, l)+w3.
Here, w1 ≥ 0,w2 ≥ 0,w3 ≥ 0, w1 + w2 + w3 = 1 are the weighs that the peer can adjust
depending on the importance of each video-quality measure.
Step 2: Then, for each LC(t ′, l) that is not in j’s buffer but is available at other peers’
buffers, let Ω(t ′, l) be the set of all users that who are not identified as malicious by user
j, those who satisfy (4.20), and those who have LC(t ′, l) in their buffers. Then, user j
further updates the score of each chunk LC(t ′, l) as
SC(t ′, l) = Pk jSC(t ′, l), where Pk j = max
u∈Ω(t ′,l)
Pu j. (4.39)
Step 3: Finally, user j selects the chunk with the highest score, that is, (t∗, l∗)= argmax{t ′,l} SC(t ′, l),
and requests the chunk LC(t∗, l∗) from peer k who gives the highest successful transmis-
sion probability among all peers in Ω(t∗, l∗), that is, k = argmaxu Pu j,u ∈ Ω(t∗, l∗).
Since there is no algorithm bring optimal for all the three video quality measures,




According to our analysis in Section 4.2.2.4, selfish users who do not satisfy the con-
ditions of Theorem 1 should not reject chunk requests from other selfish peers, some
peers may receive several chunk requests in a single round while our P2P environment
assume that every user can upload at most one chunk per round. Thus we need a request-
answering algorithm to address the above issue.
The peer-to-peer live streaming social network will last till the end of the video
and has finite life time, selfish peers tend to consider the contributions from other peers
when choosing which request to answer. This situation will encourage the selfish users
to be always cooperative in the finite time model. Let N(i)r (t)⊆ N(i)s (t) be the set of users
who send a chunk request to peer i in round t and all users in N(i)r (t) are not marked as
malicious by peer i, and also satisfy (4.22). We propose the following request-answering
algorithm: for every selfish peer i, when he/she receives multiple chunk requests, he/she
randomly chooses one peer j with probability
P(i)( j, t) =




where ε is a small number that gives newcomers who have not sent any chunks to peer i a
chance to start cooperation. γi is a parameter that controls the sensitivity of peer i to other
peers’ contribution. If γi = 0, every peer sent a request to peer i has the same probability
of being answered. On the contrary, if γi → ∞, the request from peer who has send most
chunks to peer i will definitely be answered.
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4.3.5 P2P Live Streaming Cooperation Strategy with Layered Video
Coding
From the above discussion, the P2P live streaming cooperation strategy with layered
video coding is as follows: for any selfish node i ∈ Ns who does not meet the necessary
conditions of Theorem 1, initially i marks every other nodes j ∈ N, j 6= i as selfish. Then,
in round t, i uses the following strategy:
• In the chunk-requesting stage, i chooses its own (w1,w2,w3), applies the chunk-
request algorithm in Section 4.3.3, and sends one chunk request to one peer in
N(i)s (t).
• In the request-answering stage, i first identifies the selfish peers that satisfies (4.22).
Then, i chooses a peer j among them based on the probability distribution in (5.25),
and agrees to send the requested chunk to j.
• Let 1−Φ(h) be the maximum allowable false positive probability from i’s point of
view, then, as long as Cu( j)(i, t) is large enough for any node j ∈ N, i applies the
malicious user detection rule (4.25) after each chunk request that is initiated by i.
4.4 Simulation Results
In our simulation, there are 200 DSL peer with 768 kbps uplink bandwidth and 300 cable
peer with 300 kbps uplink bandwidth. The video is initially stored at an original server
with upload bandwidth 3 Mbps. We choose the ”Foreman” video sequence (352x288)
resolution with frame rate 30 frame/sec and by attaching duplicated copies to the original
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(a) 3-layer video coding with τ= 0.4 second



































(b) 4-layer video coding with τ= 0.2 second
Figure 4.6: Selfish peers’ performance under proposed strategies with and without attack.
video, make it into a 60 minutes video. Each user has a buffer with length 30 seconds. To
exam the influence of different parameters on the performance of the proposed coopera-
tion strategies, we run the simulations under two settings: First, we let the round duration
τ is 0.4 second resulting in 9000 rounds in total for the P2P live streaming social network,
and the video is coded into 3-layer bitstream with 50 kbps per layer. Then the video is
divided into 1 second layered chunks, thus chunk size M= 50 kbits. In our second simula-
tion setup, we let τ=0.2 second and the total number of rounds is 1.8×104. The video is
encoded into 4-layer bitstream with 37.5kbps per layer. Each chunk is of 1 second length
and includes M-37.5K bits. We set the score weighing as w1 = 3/6,w2 = 1/6,w3 = 2/6
and the malicious peers can either mount attack by sending incomplete or polluted chunks.
The non-malicious (selfish) peers follow the cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation
strategies in Section 4.3.5.
We first study how different credit lines can affect cooperation stimulation. Figure
4.6 demonstrates the relationship between the credit line when the percentage of attackers
are 0, 25%, 37% and 50%, respectively. The attackers are chosen randomly from all the
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500 peers. Selfish peers follow the attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation strategy
in Section 4.3.5, and the attackers follow the attack strategy in Section 4.2.4. From these
results, we can see that, in both simulation setups, when the credit line is over 50, the
selfish nodes’ payoffs are saturated. As the credit line keeps increasing, selfish nodes’
utilities start to decrease very fast under attack. The selfish users’ utilities remain the
same if there are no attackers presented. It is clear from (4.32) that the maximum damage
attackers can cause is linearly proportional to the credit line, while total number of rounds
is 9000, when credit line is larger than 120 and 50% attackers, by (4.32), the damages are
no longer negligible. Also, figure 4.6 suggests that setting credit line of 50 is an optimal
choice for both simulation settings since it stimulates the cooperation to the maximum
degree. Nevertheless, arbitrarily increasing credit line is dangerous for the selfish users
since they do not know how many malicious users are in the network.
Next, we examine the robustness of our cooperation strategies against attackers and
free-riders in terms of PSNR. Since from Fig. 4.6, both simulation settings give similar
trends, here we use simulation setting 1 to demonstrate the robustness. Also, to show how
the total number of users effects the optimal credit line, we test our proposed cooperation
schemes on 500 users and 1000 users with fixed ratio between cable and DSL peers (3:2).
We let the credit line equals to 50, 100, 200, or 300, respectively. Selfish peers follow the
cooperation strategy in Section 4.3.5. And the malicious peers are randomly selected and
follow the optimal attack strategy in Section 4.2.4. Figure 4.7(a) and (b) show the PSNR
of a selfish user’s video versus the percentage of attackers with different credit lines and
different number of users. It is clear that when the credit line is chosen correctly, and is
around 50, our cooperation strategies is attack-resistant in both cases. Even the credit line
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is too large, around 100, the PSNR of selfish users’ video does not degrade too much even
there are 60% malicious. From the above discussion, we can conclude that the optimal
credit line is the value that just stimulates the cooperation, which should be around several
dozen. If there are fewer users in the network, or the total number of rounds is larger, the
range of attack-resistant credit line is larger. Although there is no explicit way to choose
the credit line, in general, a credit line between 50 an 100 will simulate cooperation among
selfish users, resist cheating behavior, and give good performance.
Figure 4.7(c) shows the video quality (PSNR) of peers who follows our cooperation
strategy with 500 users in Section 4.3.5 and the free-riders versus % of free riders. The
credit line in Figure 4.7(b) is 50. It is clear that there is no incentive for the peers to be
free riders since their video quality is very bad, also our attack-resistant and cheat-proof
cooperation strategy guarantees the peers’ quality of service.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we investigate cooperation stimulation in P2P live streaming social net-
works under a game theoretic framework. Besides selfish behavior, possible attacks have
also been studied, and attack-resistant cooperation stimulations have been devised which
can work well under various traffic network and hostile environments. An illustrating
two-player game is studied, and different optimality criteria, including Pareto-Optimal,
proportional fairness and absolute fairness is performed to refine the obtained Nash Equi-
libriums. Finally, a unique Nash equilibrium solution is derived, which states that, in
the two-person live streaming game, a node should not help its opponent more than its
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Peers follow strategies in Section 4.5
free−riders
(c) versus free-riders
Figure 4.7: Selfish peers’ video quality (PSNR) versus the percentage of attackers and
free-riders with 500 users
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opponent has helped it.
The results are then extended to stimulate multiuser live streaming, and comb-
ing with the chunk-request and request-answering algorithm, a fully-distributed attack-
resistant and cheat-proof cooperation stimulation strategy has been devised for P2P live
streaming social networks. Simulation results have illustrated that the proposed strategies
can effectively stimulate cooperation among selfish peers in internet with various traffic
and hostile environments, and the chunk-request algorithm with tradeoffs performs the
same as optimal algorithms when the percentage of attackers is lower than 20%.
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Chapter 5
Cooperation Stimulation Strategies for
Peer-To-Peer Wireless Live Video-Sharing
Social Networks
In a wireless live-streaming system, all users directly download the video chunks from
the server in the Internet. However, all users share the same link through the access point
to the Internet and each user has different playback time and ask for different chunks
at the same time. Also there are other users in the wireless network accessing Internet
simultaneously. Thus the link might be busy and some chunks can not be received by the
end users in time for the playback time. Furthermore, many of the users in the wireless
networks have high mobility. Therefore, they would change physical positions from time
to time and the quality of network connections may be unstable. All these factors motivate
user stimulation in wireless live-streaming social networks to cooperate with each other.
In the literature, the work in [62] proposed an auction-based mechanism for wire-
less peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing, and the work in [63] studied the capacity of user-
cooperation in wireless network. The live streaming over wireless networks has not been
studied. In this chapter, we focus on designing cooperation stimulation strategies for wire-
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less live streaming social networks. We first model the cooperation between two users as a
Bayesian game and investigate the Bayesian-Nash equilibria. Then, we address the issue
of cooperation stimulation among multiple users and investigate cheat-proof and attack-
resistant incentive mechanisms. We consider the pollution attack, incomplete-chunk at-
tack, and handwash attack in our model. Our proposed cheat-proof and attack-resistant
mechanism rewards users who contribute more with more video chunks (and thus better
quality). It includes a request-answering algorithm for the data supplier to upload more
to the peers from whom he/she downloads more, and a chunk-request algorithm for the
requestor to address the tradeoffs among different quality measure and to optimize the
reconstructed video quality.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the wireless
live-streaming system model and the two-player game-theoretical framework. Section 5.2
studies the two-player game and the equilibria. In section 5.3, a cheat-proof and attack-
resistant strategy with trust modeling is proposed to stimulate user cooperation among
all users in P2P wireless live streaming. Two more issues of wireless live video-sharing,
multiple-layered coding and broadcasting nature of wireless channels, are discussed in
Section 5.4, and the final wireless live video-sharing cooperation strategy that incorporate
these two issues is also studied. Section 5.5 shows simulation results to evaluate the
performance of the proposed strategies. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes this chapter.
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of a wireless live-streaming social network
5.1 System Model and Two-Player Game
In this section, we first describe the model of wireless live streaming systems and how
two users in a wireless live streaming social network cooperate with each other. We then
define the payoff function and introduce the game-theoretic framework of user dynamics.
5.1.1 Wireless Live Streaming Model
Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of a wireless video live-streaming social network. The
wireless network service is provided by an access point connected to the Internet. The
video bit stream is divided into media chunks of M′ bits in the original server, and are
channel-coded to M bits, which is equivalent to t-second piece. All chunks are available
at the streaming server in the Internet. Here we assume that there is a dedicated channel
of bandwidth BHz for user cooperation and this channel is different from the channel
between users and the access point. We assume that the channel for cooperation between
users is symmetric and is a slow fading channel with additive white Gaussian noise with
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variance σ2n. Here we adopt the wireless signal model in [64]




where Xi is the signal transmitted to user i, Yi is the signal that user i receives, Zi is the
additive Gaussian noise, Ai j(t) is the channel fading factor at time t, and di j is the distance
between user i and user j. We assume the channel is slow fading and the fading does not
change within a round, hence Ai j(t) remains constant within a round. We also assume
that the fading is non-directional Rayleigh fading.
We assume that two users, u1 and u2 try to cooperate with each other by exchanging
chunks. Each user has a buffer of length L, which keeps L f chunks to be played, and
L− L f chunks that have been played. First u1 and u2 exchange information about the
availability of each chunk in the other’s buffer, and the transmission power P1 and P2
that u1 and u2 use to transmit the chunks, respectively. To ensure quality of cooperation,
intuitively, users will not cooperate with people who use too small power for cooperation.
Hence we assume that P1 and P2 are larger than the minimum transmission power required
Pmin. The chunk exchange is done on a round by round basis. At the beginning of each
round, each user sends requests to the other users, and at the same time keeps downloading
from the original server. Each user is allowed to send multiple requests in each round,
and he/she can also answer multiple requests. Let τ be the duration of each round. Figure
5.1 shows how two users cooperate with each other: At the beginning of each round,
every user sends chunk requests to each other. Then, the supplier either replies with the
requested chunks and starts transmission or rejects the request. After a round duration τ,
the same request-answering process is repeated.
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Figure 5.2: Cooperation model for users in the P2P live streaming social network
5.1.2 Two-Player Game Model
To simplify the analysis, we start with modeling the cooperation in each round as a
two-person game with single-layer video coding structure. Note that in a mesh-pull live
streaming system, although all users watch the same real-time video, the progress at video
playback on a peer is determined by how fast the peer collects video chunks from the sys-
tem. When a new user enters the network, before starting playing the video, he/she waits
for a while until he/she has received the first few chunks in the sequence and has buffered
enough continuous chunks. Therefore, due to the diverse network conditions and the fact
that chunks may arrive out of order, variations in chunk retrieval time result in differ-
ent playback time for different peers and introduce time lags among users. It has been
shown [25] that in pplive, one of the most popular IPTV deployments, the maximum time
lag among peers fluctuates around 150 seconds within a one hour time period. In this
scenario, every chunk has the same value, thus users will always request chunks closest
to their playback time. Assume that in the original structure, every user in the wireless
live-streaming social network only asks the original server in the Internet for the media
chunks, and two of them, u1 and u2, want to see if they can cooperate with each other
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to get a better-quality video. We model the interactions between u1 and u2 using the
following game:
• Players and player types:There are two players, u1 and u2, in this game. Each
player ui has a type θi ∈ {laptop, PDA, PDA2}. Users with different types will
have different cost of sharing chunks and gain of obtaining chunks. We assume
PDA2 carries weaker battery than PDA, thus the cost per unit energy for PDA2 is
higher than PDA.
• Strategies: In each round, the two players first exchange their buffer informa-
tion, and then send the chunk requests to each other. Upon receiving the chunk
requests, each player ui decides how many chunks he/she will send to the other
user in this round. We define the number of chunks ui agrees to send as his/her
strategy ai ∈Z. Note that the two users are using the same channel, so the bits to be
transmitted within a round can not be larger than the channel capacity, which equals













If (5.2) is not satisfied and the users are transmitting chunks above the channel
capacity, the probability of transmission would be high and neither will receive any
chunks successfully.
• Utility function: The utility function πi of ui is considered as the gain of receiving
chunks (with respect to the opponent’s action) minus the cost of sending chunks
(his/her own action). Since the members in the wireless live-streaming social net-
work are using mobile devices, the battery energy is the most limited resource.
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Hence the cost of cooperation is considered as the transmission energy, and each
type of player would give a different weight to the energy cost. For example, clients
running on tight energy budget bear a higher cost than those with powerful batteries.
Let ci be the cost per unit energy for ui, and gi be ui’s gain of completely receiving
one chunk. Every user in the P2P wireless live streaming social network defines
his/her own value of gi depending on how much he/she wants to watch the video.
For instance, assume that the NFL final is being broadcasted. An NFL fan would
want to try his/her best to receive a high quality video to enjoy the game better, and
he/she will set gi to 1. Another user is watching the game and a movie at the same
time. He/she is more interested in the movie, but wants to check the scores/result
of the NFL game from time to time. For this user, he/she may give a higher priority
to the movie channel, and uses a lower gi for the streaming of the NFL game.
Based on the above discussion, given the strategy profile (a1,a2), the players’ pay-










Let π(a1,a2)= (π1(a1,a2),π2(a1,a2)) be the payoff profile. Define K1 = MP1/Blog(1+P1Aµ12/
√
d12σ2n),
and K2 = MP2Aµ21(k)/
√
d12Blog(1+P2/σ2n). Ki can be considered as the power that user
i spends on transmitting a chunk. It is reasonable to assume that gi ≥ ciKi and there exists
a Cmax where ciKi ≤ Cmax. Here ci and gi are user i’s private information depending on
user i’s type, and are not known to others. We assume that users do not exchange their
private information, i.e., their types. Thus this is a game with incomplete information.
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We assume that users have the belief of the probability of the other users’ type, which
is independent of their own type. Let p1, p2, and p3 be the probability of a user being a
laptop, PDA, and PDA2, respectively.
5.2 Optimal Strategies Analysis For Two-Player Game
In this section, we first extend the one-stage game model in Section 5.1.2 into a infinitely
repeated game, then apply several optimization criteria such as Pareto optimality and
time-sensitive bargaining solution to refine the Bayesian-Nash equilibriums of the game.
Furthermore, we discuss the possible cheating behavior which all users may apply to
increase their own utility, and design cheat-proof cooperation strategy to stimulate coop-
eration between two users.
5.2.1 Repeated Game Model
It is easy to show that, if the above game will only be played for one time, the only
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is (0,0), which means no one will answer the other’s requests.
According to the backward induction principle [55], there will also be no cooperation be-
tween the two users when the repeated game will be played for finite times with game
termination time known to both players. Therefore, in both circumstances, the only opti-
mal strategy for both players is to always play noncooperatively.
However, in live streaming, these two players will interact many rounds and no
one can know exactly when the other player will quit the game. Thus we can model
the dynamics between u1 and u2 as an infinitely repeated game, and we will show in the
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following section that cooperative strategies can be obtained in this realistic model. Let si













denote the strategy profile till the T th round. Next, we consider the following utility









Now, we analyze the Bayesian-Nash equilibriums for the infinitely repeated game with
the above utility function Ui. According to the Folk theorem [55], there exists at least
one Bayesian-Nash equilibrium to achieve every feasible and enforceable payoff profile,
where the set of feasible payoff profiles for the above game is:
V0 = convex hull{v|∃ (a1,a2) with (π1(a1,a2),π2(a1,a2)) = (v1,v2)}
where a1,a2 satisfy (5.2) (5.5)
and the set of enforceable payoff, denoted by V1, can be easily derived:
V1 = {(v1,v2)|(v1,v2) ∈V0 and v1,v2 ≥ 0}. (5.6)
Figure 5.3 illustrates both the feasible region and the enforceable region: the feasi-
ble region is inside the triangle bounded by dashed lines, and the enforceable feasible set
V1 is the shaded region shown in Figure 5.3. It is clear that there exists an infinite number
of Bayesian-Nash equilibriums (BNE). To simplify our equations, in this chapter, we use
x = (x1,x2) to denote the set of BNE strategies corresponding to the enforceable payoff
profile (x2g1− x1c1K1,x1g2− x2c2K2).
From the above analysis, one can see that the infinitely repeated game has infinite





















Figure 5.3: Feasible and Enforceable payoff profiles
For example, the payoff profile (0,0) is not acceptable from both players’ point of view.
Therefore, in this section, we will discuss how to refine the equilibriums based on new
optimality criteria to eliminate those less rational and find which equilibrium is cheat-
proof.
5.2.2 Nash Equilibrium Refinement
The following optimality criteria will be considered in this section: Pareto optimality,
proportional fairness, and absolute fairness.
Pareto Optimality: A payoff profile v ∈ V0 is Pareto Optimal if and only if there
is no v′ ∈ V0 that v′i ≥ vi for all i ∈ N [7]. Pareto Optimality means no one can in-
crease his/her payoff without degrading other’s, which the rational players will always
go to. It is clear from Figure 5.3 that the solid segment between (−C2P2τ, g1τP2/K2) and
(g2τP1/K1,−C1P1τ) in the first quadrant is the Pareto Optimal set.
Time-sensitive bargaining solution: Since the players’ action pair (a1,a2) has to
satisfy (5.2), and both players are rational and greedy, they will try to maximize the quality
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of their live streaming by asking as many chunks as possible in each round. Every user
will request all the chunks that his/her opponent has and that he/she needs. However,
according to information theory, the total number of bits being transmitted in within a
round has to be less than the channel capacity times chunk duration τ to ensure that the
information can be transmitted without bit error. Here we adopt time division multiple
access (TDMA) scheme that divide a round time into several time slot, and within a time
slot, only one user is occupying the band. Thus users have to bargain for their chunk-
request quota for every round to ensure that the total number of bits to be transmitted is
not larger than the channel capacity. Also, the gain of receiving a chunk is time-sensitive.
For instance, if users cannot reach an agreement on time a user has no gain by receiving
that chunk after the playback time.
We model the time-sensitive process for round k as follows: one user offers an
action pair (a(1)1 ,a
(1)
2 ) first, and the other user can decide whether to accept this offer
or to reject and offer back another action pair (a(2)1 ,a
(2)
2 ). This process continues until
both players agree on the offer. If users reach agreement at the jth action pair, then gi
decreases to δ j−1i (LCk,i)gi for i = 1 or 2, where δi(LCk,i) is the discount factor for ui,
LCk,i = {I1, ..., Iq} denotes the indexes of chunks ui wants to ask in the kth round, and I(k)
denotes the index of the chunk playing at the beginning of kth round. Let t be the length
of a chunk (in seconds). Suppose the first q′ terms in LCk,i are smaller than I(k)+ τ/t,
which means that among all the chunks that user i needs, there are q′ of them have the
playback time within the same (kth) round. Therefore, for these q′ chunks, if users cannot
reach agreement within the kth round, user i gains nothing by receiving them since their
playback time has already passed. For the rest q−q′ chunks, which would be played after
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Figure 5.4: Example of a user’s buffer with length = 5 chunks
the kth round, user i still receives gain by receiving them still preserve even if bargaining
process does not end within a round duration. On the other hand, if one of these q− q′
chunks can be received in the kth round, its value is guaranteed to be gi. However, if
the bargaining process in round k takes more time, the number of chunks that can be
transmitted in the kth round would decrease. Consequently, a smaller portion of the q−q′
chunks can be received in the kth round, thus users receive a small gain. Therefore, even
for the chunks which would be played after the kth round, their value would have a higher
risk to be dropped if the bargaining time in the kth round is longer.
According to the above analysis, we define the discount factor of gain for user i at















where d<1 is the discount constant of the chunks that will be played after the k + 1th
round begins. For the q−q′ chunks that are scheduled to be played after the end of the kth
round, it is also better to receive them as soon as possible to prevent their value becomes
zero. From such aspect, the value of these q−q′ chunks is also decreasing with time and
should be counted in δ. However, the value of q− q′ does not decrease as fast as the q′
chunks that have to be played within this round, and these q−q′ chunks should not play
172
equal roles as the q′ chunks that have to be received within this round. So d is the factor
to evaluate the less-importance of these q−q′ chunks.
For each of the q′ chunks whose playback time is within the kth round, the later its
playback time, the higher chance that the gain of receiving it can be preserved. We use the
chunk index difference to model this phenomena. Thus the first term in the numerator of
(5.7) is the sum of the index difference between the requested chunks and the last chunk
that can be played in the kth round.
Figure 5.4 gives as an example to illustrate the time-sensitive property for the live-
streaming scenario: the white blocks are the chunks that u1 has in buffer, the grey ones
are the chunks he/she needs, and the buffer contains L = L f = 5 chunks. In this example,





t − (Ii− I(k)) = (4−1)+(4−2)+(4−3) = 6, and q−q
′ = 1. Let d = 0.8, then the
discount factor of gain for user i at round k, δi(LCk,i) = 0.37.
Since both players’ payoffs decrease as the time for bargaining increases, the first
mover would seek the equilibrium and offer at the first bargaining round for his/her max-
imum payoff. Let δ1 and δ2 be the averaged discount factor for u1 and u2 over all rounds.
Note that here we are discussing about the equilibrium of the infinite game, which is the
outcome when the game goes to infinity. So at each round, the users do not need to pre-
dict δi that is averaged over all rounds (including the future). Instead, for each round, the
users can calculate the averaged δi till the previous round, and find the equilibrium. Such








2 )) for the infinitely repeated game happens when
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g2 + c2K2 P2P1
δ2g2 + c2K2 P2P1
. (5.9)
It is clear that the bargaining solution in (5.9) depends on the knowledge of both
users’ types, i.e., the private information, which is unavailable. Both players know the
discount factors δ1,δ2 since the discount factors only depend on the chunks to be re-
quested, which is the information the two users have to exchange. Although at the be-
ginning, users do not know each other’s type, they can probe it during the bargaining
process using the following mechanism: Let T1 be u1’s type, which is only known to
u1, let T2 be u2’s type and T ( j) is the jth type. At the first bargaining stage, without
loss of generality, let u1 be the first mover. u1 calculates all the bargaining equilibriums
(a(1)1 (T1,T ( j)),a
(1)
2 (T1,T ( j))) for j = 1,2,3 corresponding to the three possible types of
u2. Then u1 chooses the the equilibrium j′ that gives highest p j′π1(a
(1)
1 (T1,T ( j
′)),a(1)2 (T1,T ( j
′))).
u2 will accept the offer if π2(a
(1)
1 (T1,T ( j)),a
(1)









2 (T1,T2)) and reach
the agreement. Since u1 calculates the offer based on the equilibrium in (5.9), which de-
pends on u1’s own type, u2 can probe u1’s type based on the offer he/she made. Thus
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after the first bargaining stage in the first chunk-requesting round, u2 knows u1’s type,
and since u2 will make the first move in next round, after 2 rounds, the both users have
the information of each other’s type.
5.2.3 Cheat-Proof Cooperation Strategy
Users in peer-to-peer wireless live streaming social networks would try to maximize their
own utility even by cheating. Therefore, to ensure fairness and to give incentives to
users, it is crucial that the cooperation strategy is cheat-proof. In this subsection, we
will first discuss possible cheating methods, and then propose the two-person cheat-proof
cooperation strategy in peer-to-peer wireless live streaming social networks.
5.2.3.1 Cheat On Private Information
Since users know each other’s private information (gi,ci) by the offers they made, users
can cheat by making different offers. First, let us exam whether the time-sensitive bargain-
ing solution in (5.9) is cheat-proof with respect to (gi,ci): π2 increases when x2 decreases,
which can be achieved by increasing x1 or decreasing P2.













which is always less than 0 since m≥ 1≥ δ1. Thus x1 is a monotonely decreasing function







δ2g2 + c2K2 P2P1
)2 ≤ 0 and ∂m∂c2 = (1−δ2)K2
P2
P1(
δ2g2 + c2K2 P2P1
)2 ≥ 0. (5.11)
Therefore, m is a monotonely decreasing function of g2 and is a monotonely increasing
function of c2 if δ2 < 0. Thus u2 can have a higher payoff by making the bargain offer
using lower g2, higher c2, and lower P2. Similarly, u1 can also achieve higher utility by
offering the equilibrium based on lower g1, higher c1, and lower P1.
As the consequence that both players cheat with respect to ci and gi, from the above
analysis, both players will bargain based on the minimum value of gi and maximum value
of ci. Since we have assumed that gi ≥ ciKi, and Pi ≥ Pmin, both players will make the











which implies that both players should always cooperate with each other. It is clear that
solution in (5.12) forms an Nash Equilibrium, is Pareto-Optimal, and is cheat-proof with
respect to private information gi and ci. Note that the user whose discount factor is closer
to 1 has an advantage, and if δ1 = δ2, then x∗1 = x
∗
2 = half number of chunks can be
transmitted in τ seconds.
5.2.3.2 Cheat On Buffer Information
The other way of cheating is to cheat on buffer information, that is, although player i
has chunk k in the buffer, he/she does not report it to its opponent. In order to reduce
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          Cheated buffer by hiding chunk 1 and 4 
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Figure 5.5: An example of how to cheat on buffer information
the number of requests from its opponent. However, hiding the chunk that the other user
needs might increase the other user’s discount factor based on (5.7).
Take Figure 5.5 as an example. The white blocks are the chunks in buffer, while
the grey blocks are the chunks that the user needs. Suppose user 1 always reports his/her
buffer information honestly and the time-sensitive bargaining solution gives two chunk-
request quota for user 1, and two chunk-request quota for user 2. Apparently, user 1 will
ask two of chunk 1, 4, 5 from user 2, and user 2 will ask chunk 2, 3 from user 1. Now
if user 2 wants to hide chunks in his/her buffer from user 1, so that the number of chunk
requests user 1 will send to user 2 will decrease, and increase user 2’s payoff in this round.
It is clear that user 2 has to hide at least 2 chunks to increase his/her payoff, since if user
2 only hides one chunk, there are still two chunks in user 2’s buffer that user 1 needs.
User 2 can choose two of chunk 1, 4, and 5 to hide, and hiding different chunk will lead
to different utility. For instance, if user 2 hides chunk 1 and 4, which means chunk 5 is
the only chunk that user 1 needs. However, user 2 would ask chunk 2 and 3 from user 1.
Since chunk 4 has a later playback time than that of chunk 2 and 3, the discount factor
of user 1’s gain will be larger than user 2. Thus, user 1 will have more advantage in
the time-sensitive bargaining process, and the bargaining solution might be changed to 3
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chunk-request quota for user 1 and 1 chunk-request quota for user 2. As a result, user 2’s
utility decreases because now he/she can only ask one chunk from user 1. Therefore, user
2 has no incentive to cheat on buffer information by hiding chunk 1 and 4.
Although user 2’s cheating on buffer information will always increase the the dis-
count factor of user 1’s gain (δ1), it does not necessarily lead to the decrease of chunk-
request quota. The reason is the chunk-request quota is always an integer since partial
chunk gives no gain for each user and the users would like to round the time-sensitive
solution to the closest integers. For instance, if before cheating, the time-sensitive bar-
gaining solution is (1.8, 2.2), and the solution changes to (2.4, 1.6) after cheating. Both
solutions round to (2, 2), which means if user 2 hides the chunks properly to keep δ1 low
so that the chunk-request quota does not change after cheating, cheating on buffer infor-
mation will increase user 2’s utility since user 2 can still ask two chunks from user 1, and
there is only one chunk in user 2’s buffer that user 1 needs.
Therefore, to prevent selfish users gain higher utility by cheating on buffer infor-
mation, each player should not send chunks more than the other one has sent.
5.2.3.3 Cheat On transmitted power
The power that user 1 and user 2 use for cooperation, P1 and P2, are declared in the
beginning of the game, and they directly influence the feasible region as in Figure 5.3
and the bargaining solution (5.12). As discussed in Section 5.2.3.1, user i can increase
his/her payoff by decreasing Pi, thus both users will declare that they use the minimum
power Pmin. However, if the user declares that he/she transmit the chunks using Pmin but
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the actual power used for transmission is less than Pmin, he/she can have higher utility by
paying less cost for cooperation.
Given the signal model in (5.1), the receiver has to estimate the attenuation term
Ai j(k)/
√
di j before estimating the transmitted power. Suppose user i wants to estimate
Ai j(k)/
√
di j. If user j is honest, user i can simply ask user j to transmit a probing signal
using P2 to estimate the attenuation. However, in the fully distributed system, user j might
be cheating and transmit the probing signal with power lower than P2, and the estimated
attenuation that user i estimated will be more serious than the real attenuation. To solve
this problem, we propose that user i sends the probing signal that user j cannot decode to
user j and ask user j to transmit back the received signal, and user i can investigate the
attenuation from the replied signal.
If user i send the probing signal X to user j, then the signal Yj that user j receives
is Z j + Ai j(k)/
√
di jX . Suppose the selfish user j wants to manipulate the signal, he/she
can secretly amplify Yj with a constant α < 1 and then send αYj back to user i. Then the
replied signal Yi that user i receive will be













can be estimated easily. From the above analysis, such probing
procedure is cheat-proof since no matter how user j manipulates the signal, the estimation




, the transmitted power can be easily to be estimated by calcu-
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lating the averaged power of the signal at the receiver’s side. Therefore, for user i, he/she













where y(t) is the received signal, tk is the beginning of user j’s transmission in the kth
round, and τ j is the duration of user j’s transmission in the kth round.
Thus we design a mechanism to prevent cheating on transmitted power based on
P′j(k) in (5.14):
• For each user i at each round k, he/she estimates the transmitted power of the other
user j by (5.14). If P′j(k) is less than Pmin, then at the round (the k + 1
th round),
user i transmit the chunks using P′j(k). If P
′
j(k) ≥ Pmin, user i uses Pmin power for
cooperation.
• Each user estimates the transmitted power at every round and follow the same de-
cision above.
Using the above mechanism, if user i decides to cheat by transmitting chunks with
power P′i ≤Pmin, then the other user j can estimate P′i and use P′i to transmit the chunks for
user i in the next round. Therefore, although user i increases his/her payoff in this current
round, his/her payoff will be decreased in the next round, thus the actual channel capacity
is less than the users’ estimation using Pmin. Therefore, the probability of successfully
receiving the request chunks for both users would decrease and lead to no gain since they
cannot receive the extra chunks by cooperation. Therefore, neither of the users has the
incentive to cheat on transmission power if both follow the above mechanism.
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5.2.3.4 Two-Player Cheat-Proof Cooperation Strategy
Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that, in the two-player wireless live-
streaming game, in order to maximize each user’s own payoff and resist possible cheating
behavior, for each player in each round, he/she should always agree to send the requested
chunks up to the bargained chunk-requesting quota as in (5.9) and should not send more
chunks than his/her opponent has sent to him/her. Also, each user should estimate the
transmitted power of the other user in every round, and use the estimated power for trans-
mission if it is less than Pmin. We refer to the above strategy as two-player cheat-proof
wireless live streaming cooperation strategy.
5.3 Multiuser P2P Wireless Live Streaming Game
In this section, we first introduce the multi-user game formulation to model the behavior
of all users in a peer-to-peer live streaming social network. Then we propose a cheat-proof
and attack-resistant cooperation strategy for the infinitely repeated game model, and show
that the cooperation strategy is a Pareto optimal and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
We further discuss the impact of handwash attack to the system and design the strategy to
against handwash attack.
First, we will try to extend the two-player cooperation strategy derived from the
previous section into the multiple-user scenario.
The two-player cooperation strategy suggests that users should be fully cooperative
and refuse to cooperate with a user who behaves uncooperatively before. However, trans-
mission errors are inevitable in fading and noisy wireless channels, and the errors can
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cause severe troubles. For the two-player cheat-proof cooperation strategy, there exists
a positive probability that one packet and a packet cannot be decoded successfully due
to transmission errors and has to be retransmitted. Retransmission may cause delay, and
some packets can not arrive within one round. In such scenario, the game will be termi-
nated immediately since the two-person cheat-proof cooperation strategy asks for equal
contribution between users, and the performance will be degraded drastically. Therefore,
the malicious users can claim it was due to the erroneous Internet traffic and pretend to
be non-malicious. Distinguishing misbehavior caused by bit errors and packet loss from
that caused by malicious intention is a challenging task.
Also, in the multi-user scenario, the repeated game model is not applicable. For ex-
ample, a peer may request chunks from different peers at different time slots to maximize
his/her utility. A direct consequence of such a non-repeated model is that favors cannot
be simultaneously granted. When favors cannot be granted simultaneously, players falls
into the dilemma of egoism or altruism, where egoism is an intuitive choice but will stop
others from giving favors. Meanwhile, altruism may not guarantee satisfactory future
payback, especially when future is unpredictable. Hence the two-player cheat-proof and
attack-resistant solution cannot be directly applied to the multi-user scenario.
5.3.1 Multi-user Game Model
Next, we will investigate how to stimulate cooperation for all users in peer-to-peer wire-
less live streaming over noisy channels, and analyze users’ behavior dynamics. We focus
on the scenario that video streaming will keep alive for a relatively long time, and there
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exist a finite number of users (for example, people watch live Super Bowl over the Inter-
net). Each user will stay in the social network for a reasonably long time (for instance,
from the beginning to the end of the game). They are allowed to leave and reconnect to
the network when necessary. Each user has an unique user ID registered at the first time
he/she joins this network for identification purpose, and he/she uses the same ID whenever
he/she reconnects to the same network. We consider an information-pull model, where
the streaming server has no duty to guarantee the successful delivery of chunks and it only
sends out chunks upon users’ demand.
For each user, uploading chunks to other users will incur cost, and successfully
receiving chunks can improve the quality of his/her video and thus brings some gain. To
simplify the analysis, in this section, we assume that the video stream is encoded using a
non-scalable video codec. Therefore, for each user i, each received chunk gives the same
gain gi, whose value is specified by the user individually and independently. As discussed
in Section 5.2, gi, the gain of receiving a chunk for the live video, is evaluated by user i
depending on how much he/she wants to watch the video.
In a real-world social network, some users may be malicious, whose goal is to
cause damages to other users. In this chapter, we focus on inside attackers, that is, the
attackers also have legitimate identities, and their goal is to prevent selfish users from
getting chunks. In P2P wireless live streaming social networks, there are three ways to
attack the system:
1. Handwash Attack: Since peer-to-peer system has a pure anonymous nature that
each user is identified by the ID they registered, if a malicious user is detected
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and cannot cause damage to the system anymore, he/she can delete his/her ID and
register for a new one to come back to the social network. By handwashing, the
attacker can keep causing damages to the system as a new comer.
2. Incomplete chunk attack: A malicious user agrees to send the entire requested
chunk to the peer, but sends only portions of it or no data at all. By doing so, the
requesting user wastes his/her request quota in this round, and has to request the
same chunk again in the next round.
3. Pollution attack: The other kind of attack in peer-to-peer wireless live streaming
is pollution [58]. In P2P wireless streaming system, a malicious user corrupts the
data chunks, renders the content unusable, and then makes this polluted content
available for sharing with other peers. Unable to distinguish polluted chunks from
unpolluted files, unsuspecting users download the polluted chunks into their own
buffers, from which others may then download the polluted data. In this manner,
polluted data chunks spread through the system.
Instead of forcing all users to act fully cooperatively, our goal is to stimulate cooper-
ation among selfish (non-malicious) users as much as possible and minimize the damages
caused by malicious users. In general, not all cooperation decisions can be perfectly ex-
ecuted. For example, when a user decides to send another peer the requested chunks,
packets of the chunk may not be correctly decoded at the receiver’s side. In this chapter,
we assume that the requesting peer gives up the chunk if it does not arrive in one round,
and we use Pi j to denote the probability of successful transmission of a chunk from peer
i to peer j in one round of τ second. At the beginning of every round, each user will first
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bargain the chunk-request quota, and then send chunk requests to others. We assume that
every chunk request can be received immediately and perfectly.
In order to formally analyze cooperation and security in such peer-to-peer live
streaming networks, we model the interactions among peers as the following game:
• Server: The video is originally stored at the original streaming server with upload
bandwidth Ws, and the server will send chunks in a round-robin fashion to its peers.
All players are connected via the same access point to the Internet. This backbone
connection has download bandwidth Wd .
• Players and player type: There are finite number of users in the peer-to-peer wire-
less live streaming social network, denoted by N. Each player i ∈ N has a type
θi ∈ {selfish,malicious}. Let Ns denote the set of all selfish players and Nm = N\Ns
is the set including all inside attackers. A selfish(non-malicious) user aims to max-
imize his/her own payoff, and may cheat to others if cheating can help increase
his/her payoff. A malicious user wishes to exhaust other peers’ resources and at-
tack the system.
• Chunk requesting: In each round, users bargain for chunk-request quota based on
the time-sensitive bargaining solution since the channel dedicated for user cooper-
ation has limited bandwidth B. For each chunk-request quota, the user can send
multiple chunk-request to one user. Users can use their chunk-request quota either
requests chunks from other users or does not request any chunks in this round. On
the other hand, since the user-cooperation channel is different from the channel be-
tween users and the access point, the users can ask the server for chunks at the same
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time.
• Request answering: For each player, after receiving a request, it can either accept
or refuse the requests.
• Cost: For any player i∈N, uploading a chunk to another player incurs cost ciMPi/Blog(1+
Pi
σ2n
), where ci is the user-defined cost per unit energy, Pi is the transmission power
that player i uses for cooperation and Pi ≥ Pmin, same as in Section 5.2.
• Gain: For each selfish user i∈Ns, if he/she requests a data chunk from another peer
j, and if a clean copy is successfully delivered to him/her, his/her gain is gi where
gi > ciMPi/Blog(1+ Piσ2n ).
• Utility function: We first define the following symbols: for each player i ∈ N,
– Cr(i)( j, t) is the total number of chunks that i has requested from j by time t.
Here, j can be either a peer ( j ∈ N) or j is the streaming server. Cr(i)(t) =
∑ j∈{N, source}Cr(i)( j, t) denotes the total number of chunks that i has re-
quested by time t.
– By time t, peer i has successfully received Cs(i)( j, t) chunks from peer j in
time (a chunk is received in time if and only if it is received within the same
round that it was requested). Cs(i)(t) = ∑ j∈{N,source}Cs(i)( j, t) is peer i’s
total number of successfully received chunks by time t.
– By time t, C(i)p ( j, t) is the total number of polluted chunks that peer i received
from peer j. The total number of successively received unpolluted data chunks
186
that peer i received from peer j is Cs(i)( j, t)−C(i)p ( j, t), and each successfully
received unpolluted chunk gives peer j a gain of gi.
– Cu(i)( j, t) denotes the number of chunks that i has uploaded to player j by
time t. Cu(i)(t) = ∑ j∈{N,source}Cu(i)(t). The cost of uploading each chunk is
ci for peer i.
Let t f be the lifetime of the peer-to-peer live streaming social network, and T (i)(t)
denotes the total time that peer i is in the network by time t. Then, we model the
player’s utility as follows:
1. For any selfish player i ∈ Ns, its utility U
(i)
s (t f ) is defined as
U (i)(t f ) =
[
Cs(i)(t f )−∑ j∈N C
(i)
p ( j, t f )
]
gi−Cu(i)(t f ) MPiBlog(1+Pi/σ2)
Cr(i)(t f )
, (5.15)
where the numerator denotes the net profit (i.e., the total gain minus the total
cost) that the selfish peer i obtained, and the denominator denotes the total
number of chunks that i has requested. This utility function represents the
average net profit that i can obtain per requested chunk, which i aims to max-
imize.
2. For any malicious player j ∈ Nm, its objective is to maximize its utility
U ( j)m =
∑i∈Ns Cu






Cr(i)( j, t f )−Cs(i)( j, t f )
]






T ( j)(t f )
.
(5.16)
The numerator in (5.16) represents the net damage caused by j: the first term
describes the total costs to other peers when sending the requested chunks to
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the malicious user j; the middle term evaluates other selfish peers’ potential
loss in gain due to the incomplete chunk attack by peer j; and the last term is
peer j’s cost by uploading chunks to other peers. We normalize it using the
lifetime of peer j, T ( j)(t f ). Now, this utility function represents the average
net damage that j causes to the other nodes per time unit.
5.3.2 Cheat-Proof and Attack-Resistant Cooperation Stimulation Strate-
gies
Based on the system description in Section 5.3.1, we can see that the multiple player
game is much more complicated than the two-person game in Section 5.2, and pose new
challenges. Thus, direct application of the two-player cooperation strategies to multiple
player scenarios may not work.
5.3.2.1 Challenges in Multiple User Scenario
For peer-to-peer live streaming networks in heterogeneous Internet traffic environments,
user cooperation stimulation has the following challenges: First, transmission errors are
inevitable in the wireless network and the repeated game model is not applicable as dis-
cussed int the previous subsection. Second, Malicious users make cooperation stimu-
lation extremely challenging. Misbehavior can result in the decrease of video quality
experienced by other peers, which may consequently decrease the quality of service pro-
vided by the affected peers. This quality degradation will then be propagated back to the
misbehaving peers. Therefore, selfish nodes have no incentives to intentionally behave
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maliciously in order to enjoy a high quality video. However, the malicious attackers’
goal is to degrade the live streaming network performance, and such quality degradation
is exactly what they want to see. Unfortunately, malicious behaviors have been heavily
overlooked when designing cooperation stimulation strategies.
5.3.2.2 Malicious User Detection
To distinguish “intentional” malicious behavior from “innocent” misbehavior caused by
packet delay, we adopt the credit mechanism and the statistical-based malicious user de-
tection in Chapter 4 and introduce trust modelling to resist handwash attack . In this
chapter, we incorporate the trust modelling into the attacker detection mechanism from
Chapter 4, and will prove by simulation result that the combined anti-attack mechanism
can resist handwash attack.
1. Credit mechanism for pollution attack: Addressing the pollution attack, for any
two peers i, j ∈ N,
Cc(i)( j, t) = Cu(i)( j, t)−C( j)p (i, t) (5.17)
calculates the total number of unpolluted chunks that user i has uploaded to user j
by round t, where C( j)p (i, t) is the number of polluted chunks that user i has uploaded
to user j.
Since peer i cannot identify a chunk as a polluted one until he/she starts decoding
and playing that chunk, it is possible that user i unintentionally forwards a polluted
chunk to other peers. Thus to distinguish the malicious behavior and the uninten-
tionally pollution by non-malicious users, we adapt the credit-line mechanism as in
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Chapter 4 that
D(i)( j, t)≤ D(i)max( j, t), ∀t ≥ 0,where
D(i)( j, t) = Cc(i)( j, t)−Cc( j)(i, t) =
(




Cu( j)(i, t)−C(i)p ( j, t)
)
.(5.18)
Here, D(i)max( j, t) is the ”credit line” that user i sets for user j at time t. The credit line
is set for two purposes: 1) to prevent egoism when favors cannot be simultaneously
granted and to stimulate cooperation between i and j, and 2) to limit the possible
damages that j can cause to i. By letting D(i)max( j, t) ≥ 0, i agrees to send some
extra, but at most D(i)max( j, t) chunks to j without getting instant payback. Mean-
while, unlike acting fully cooperatively, the extra number of chunks that i forwards
to j is bounded to limit the possible damages when j plays non-cooperatively or
maliciously.
To stimulate cooperation in the first few rounds, D(i)max( j, t) should be large enough
in the first few cooperating rounds between user i and j. On the other hand,
D(i)max( j, t)/[total number of rounds after time t] should be closed to 0 to prevent
decreasing the utility of user i. Therefore, when choosing D(i)max( j, t), user i should
first estimate the number of remaining rounds for the live streaming, and choose a
relatively small number Dtemp. Then make Dtemp with the reciprocal of the prob-
ability of successful transmitting a chunk from user j to user i to stimulate the
cooperation. A simple solution to this is to set the credit lines to be reasonably
large positive constants, as in our simulations in Section 5.5.
2. Statistical-based malicious user detection:
Since the users have to know the transmission protocol of each other to cooperate,
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given the signal to noise ratio in the kth round, PjAi j(k)/
√
di j(k)σ2, the probability
of user j successfully transmit a chunk to user i without retransmission in the kth
round, Pi j(k), can be estimated. We assume the users use TDMA to share the
wireless channel, so there is only one user occupying the band in one time slot with
no interference. Under such scenario, Pi j(k) can be calculated by the probability
successfully transmitting all symbols in a chunk. First, the symbol error rate es(k)
of each information block given the modulation type, channel coding scheme, and
the signal to noise ratio can be analytically calculated according to [65]. Assume
there are bs bits per symbol. Then the Pi j(k) can be estimated as (1− es(k))M
′/bs .
The other way of probing pi j(k) is user i sends probing request to ask user j send
the probing package. However, such method is not appropriate in wireless live
streaming social network since user j can also intentionally send the incomplete
probing package to reduce Pi j(k).
After Hence when player i decides to send a chunk to player j in round k, with
probability 1− Pi j(k), this chunk transmission cannot be completed without re-
transmission because of the fading channel. That is, we use a Bernoulli random
process to model the unsuccessful transmission of a chunk due to high traffic inter-
net connection. Let Pji(t) equals to the averaged Pji(k) within all the rounds that
user j has sent chunks to user i by time t. Given the Bernoulli random processes
and Pi j(k) being the probability of successfully receive a chunk in round k, then by
time t, user i is supposed to receive Pji×Cu( j)(i,t) chunks from user j, but the actual
number is C(i)s ( j, t). Hence if user j does not intentionally deploy the incomplete
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chunk attack, based on the Lyapunov’s Central Limit Theorem [59], if t goes to
infinity, then C(i)s ( j, t)−Pji(t)×Cu( j)(i,t) should follow normal distribution.












−t2/2dt is the Gauss tail function.
Therefore, based on (5.19), given a predetermined threshold h > 0, every self-
ish peer i can identify peer j as a malicious user by thresholding Cs(i)( j, t)−
Cu( j)(i, t)Pji(t) as follows:
j ∈ N(i)m (t) iff Cs(i)( j, t)−Cu( j)(i, t)Pji(t) ≤ −h
√
Cu( j)(i, t)Pji(t)(1−Pji(t)),
and j ∈ N(i)s (t) iff Cs(i)( j, t)−Cu( j)(i, t)Pji(t) > −h
√
Cu( j)(i, t)Pji(t)(1−Pji(t)).(5.20)
In (5.20), N(i)m (t) is the set of peers that are marked as malicious by peer i at time t,
and N(i)s (t) is the set of peers that are marked as selfish by peer i at time t.
3. Trust Modelling for handwash attack: In an environment where malicious users
might mount the hand-wash attack, selfish users suffer badly from the hand-wash
attack, thus the unknown risk of interacting with untrustworthy users will reduce
the incentive for cooperation in P2P wireless live streaming social networks. With
handwash, malicious users can pretend to be innocent until being detected again.
The malicious user detection method above is statistic-based, which means the self-
ish users have to wait for enough rounds to interact with the malicious user before
detection. This statistics collection process allows the handwashed malicious user
to cause extra damage to the system. Thus to reduce the influence of handwash
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attack, selfish users have to identify malicious users as soon as possible in order to
reduce their losses. A straightforward solution is to reduce the credit line D(i)max( j, t)
defined in (5.18) or adjust the threshold in (5.20). However, an arbitrary decrease of
the credit line or detection threshold will prevent users from cooperation, resulting
in the failure of the whole social network. For instance, if user j is not malicious but
just polluted by other malicious users, user i will loose the extra gain by cooperating
with user j if user i decreases D(i)max( j, t) arbitrarily.
Therefore, to provide a guideline of setting the credit line and calculating the de-
tection statistics for malicious users, we introduce the idea of trust among selfish
users. If a selfish user choose several trusted users to share the information of in-
teraction with other intrusted users, the malicious user detection can be faster thus
decrease the damage by handwash attack. Also, by taking the damage of the in-
trusted user j caused to other trusted users into credit line D(i)max( j, t) can also stop
cooperation with malicious users earlier. It is well known that trust is the driving
force for cooperation in social networks [66]. In the following we will discuss how
to utilize the trust model to against handwash attack.
A selfish user i establishes direct trust with another user j upon observations on
whether the previous interactions between user i and j are successful. We adopt the
beta-function-based method in [67], where user i trusts in user j at time t with value
Tr(i)( j, t), which is defined as
Tr(i)( j, t) =
Cs(i)( j, t)−Cp(i)( j, t)+1
Cr(i)( j, t)+2
. (5.21)
If user j is not malicious and also not serious polluted, based on the definition,
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Tr(i)( j, t) should be closed to Pi j. If user j mounts pollution attack, Cp(i)( j, t) will
increase and if he/she mounts incomplete-chunk attack, Cs(i)( j, t) will decrease.
Thus both types of attack decrease the numerator in (5.21), resulting in low trust
value for malicious users. Also, the trust is directional, which means user i trusts
user j does not imply that user j also trusts user i.
Since the trusted selfish users would like to identify the malicious users together, the
damage caused by intrusted users to the trusted users are considered collectively.
For example, if user i trusts another user j at round t, user i consider the damage that
malicious user k has caused to user j as his/her own damage. This scenario is equiv-
alent to reduce the credit line D(i)(k, t) in (5.18) to D(i)(k, t)−Tr(i)( j, t)×D( j)(k, t).
There is an effective bad-mouthing attack against the trust system, where malicious
users provide dishonest recommendations to frame up good parties and/or boost
trust values of malicious users [66]. To resist such bad-mouthing attack, selfish
users should only trust users who have sent them certain number of unpolluted
chunks. Assume that selfish user i will only trust user j at time t if user j has sent
i more than Ch(i)(t) useful chunks, that is, if Cs(i)( j, t) > Ch(i)(t). The idea for
setting Ch(i)(t) is that even the malicious user badmouthes on other selfish users,
he/she has to be cooperative and pay enough cost to be trusted, by which the mali-
cious user causes no damage, even contributes, to the system to be trusted. Another
advantage of a peer-to-peer cooperation in wireless network is, everyone can listen
to the chunk requests and chunk answering of all the users in the network, so the
malicious user cannot arbitrarily badmouth the users that he/she has no interaction
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with.
In summary, the credit line D(i)max( j, t) in (5.18) is updated in each round as follows:
D(i)max( j, t +1) = max
1,D(i)max( j, t)− ∑
k∈N(i)Tr (t)
Tr(i)(k, t)×D(k)( j, t)

where N(i)Tr (t) =
{
k|k ∈ N(i)s (t) and Cs(i)(k, t) > Ch(i)(t)
}
. (5.22)
And the malicious user detection is done at each round by
j ∈ N(i)m (t) iff Cs′(i)( j, t)−Cu′( j)(i, t)p ji ≤−h
√
Cu′( j)(i, t)p ji(1− p ji), and
j ∈ N(i)s (t) iff Cs′(i)( j, t)−Cu′( j)(i, t)p ji >−h
√
Cu′( j)(i, t)p ji(1− p ji), where
Cs′(i)( j, t) = ∑
k∈N(i)Tr (t)
Cs(k)( j, t),
Cu′(i)( j, t) = ∑
k∈N(i)Tr (t)
Cu(k)( j, t), and p ji =
1




if Cu′(i)( j, t) is large enough.
As will be demonstrated in Section 5.5, employing the trust model in (5.21) and
replacing the modified credit line as in (5.22) will help improve the system’s ro-
bustness against the handwash attack by malicious users and significantly increase
selfish users’ utility.
5.3.2.3 Multiuser cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation strat-
egy
In summary, the cheat-proof cooperation stimulation strategies in peer-to-peer wireless
live streaming social networks are:
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Multiuser cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation strategy: In the peer-to-
peer wireless live streaming game, for any selfish peer i ∈ Ns, he/she initially marks every
other user j ∈ N, j 6= i as selfish. Then, in each round t, i uses the following strategy:
• First bargain the chunk-request quota with other users in the network
• Update the credit line D(i)max( j, t) by (5.22) and identify malicious users by (5.23)
• If i has been requested by j to send chunks, i will accept this request if j has not
been marked as malicious by i and (5.18) holds; otherwise, i will reject the request.
• When i is requesting a chunk, he/she will send the request to peer j who satisfies
j = arg max
j∈N(i)s (t), j 6=i
P′ji, (5.24)
where P′ji = Pji ×Cc(i)( j, t)/Cs(i)( j, t) is the probability that user i successfully
receives an unpolluted chunk from user j
5.3.3 Strategy Analysis
Using the same analysis as in Chapter 4, the above multiuser cheat-proof cooperation
strategy can be proven to be a subgame-perfect and Pareto-Optimal Nash equilibrium of
the multiuser wireless live streaming game if there exists no attackers. It can also be
shown by the proof in [28] that the cooperation strategy is attack-resistant to pollution
attack and incomplete chunk attack.
Here we will analyze the optimal attacking strategy with handwash attack.
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5.3.3.1 Optimal attacking strategy:
As discussed in [28], the damage that each attacker by pollution attack and incomplete-
chunk attack can cause to selfish user i is bounded by D(i)max, which is negligible if the
P2P wireless network has infinite lifetime. In this scenario, peer i will still waste his/her
resource on the hand-washed malicious user j since i does not recognize j’s new iden-
tity and every user is marked as non-malicious at the beginning. Therefore, with the
hand-wash attack, malicious users can increase their payoff dramatically. To simplify the
analysis, we assume the attackers will only apply the hand-wash attack at the beginning
of each round. For every (selfish or malicious) user in P2P wireless live streaming, at the
beginning of each round, besides the strategies discussed in Section 5.3.1, he/she can also
choose to hand wash.
Theorem 1. In the P2P wireless live streaming game where every selfish user follows
the cheat-proof cooperation strategy proposed in Section 5.3.2.3, if a malicious user i is
not detected by any other users and if D( j)(i, t) < D( j)max(i, t) for all other users j ∈ N,
hand wash will not provide the malicious user i any further gain. If the malicious user
i is detected by another user j, or if there exists another user j ∈ N where D( j)(i, t) ≥
D( j)max(i, t), then the hand-wash attack will increase the malicious attacker i’s payoff.
Proof. If the malicious user i is not detected by any other user and (5.18) is satisfied for
all j ∈ N, then all the selfish users will still cooperate with the malicious user i. Using
the original identity, i receives the same utility as he/she mounts the hand-wash attack
and therefore, hand-wash will not bring the malicious user any extra gain. In the scenario
where i is detected by a selfish user j as malicious and j refuses to cooperate with i
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any longer, if i chooses to hand-wash and reenters the game with a new ID, then j will
cooperate with i until (5.18) is not satisfied or i is detected again. Therefore, in this case,
i’s payoff is increased by causing extra damage to the selfish user j.
From Theorem 1 and [28], the optimal attacking strategy for a malicious user is:
Upon receiving a request an attacker j ∈ Nm should always reject the requests; the at-
tackers should always send requests to selfish users, until they do not agree to help, and
hand-wash once he/she is identified malicious by one user in the social network. For a
malicious use i, to determine whether it has been detected, he/she observes other users’
behavior: a selfish user j will always reject the malicious user i’s request if and only if i
has been identified as malicious by j.
5.4 P2P wireless live video-sharing cooperation strategy
In this section, we consider two more issues for P2P wireless live video-sharing social net-
works: coding the live stream into different layers and giving extra chunk-request quota
to utilize the broadcast nature of wireless channels. In this chapter, we improve the effi-
ciency of cooperation by taking the advantage of the broadcasting nature of the wireless
network. Then we present the P2P wireless live video-sharing cooperation strategy.
5.4.1 Multiple Layered Coding
Since different users in the P2P wireless live streaming social network use different de-
vices, their demand of video quality is different. For instance, for devices with smaller
screen as PDA or cell phones, the spatial resolution of the video can be lower than lap-
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tops but still have the same visual quality. Under this circumstances, spatial video coding,
which encode the video into bitstreams with different priorities can provide better quality
of service. The base layer provide the most important information while the enhancement
layers gradually refine the reconstructed video at the decoder’s side. Higher layers cannot
be decoded without all the lower layers. Therefore, receiving chunks in different layers
gives the user different gains, depending on which video quality the user addresses most.
In addition, suppose that the video is encoded into VL layers, and based on user i’s
device, he/she is satisfied with the video with V (i) layers, then user i has no incentives to
ask for chunks in layer higher than V (i). The reason is that since chunks in layer higher
than V (i) do not increase visual quality for small-screen device, receiving those chunks
gives no gain for user i. Therefore, for each user i, upon deciding which chunks to ask in
the round, he/she will first determine how many layers he/she needs based on the device.
Then he/she requests chunks that give him/her the highest video quality depending on
which quality measure user i values most. For the later part of chunk-requesting, we
adopt the chunk-request algorithm with tradeoff in Chapter 4.
5.4.2 Over-Request For Broadcast Nature
According to the cooperation strategy in Section 5.3, users will first bargain for chunk-
request quota to ensure the total bits to be transmitted in one round does not exceed the
channel capacity. On the other hand, the bargained quota also ensures that every user
is capable of answering all the requests that he/she receives. Thus based on the above
analysis, selfish users have incentives to answer all the requests in every round.
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However, since all users in the peer-to-peer wireless live streaming social network
share the same wireless cooperation channel, which has the broadcasting nature that al-
lows the users to listen to others’ signals, every selfish user will tend to broadcast the
requested chunks to all the users that ask the same chunk to reduce the cost of coopera-
tion. As a result, the overall number of bits transmitted in one round will be much less
than the channel capacity since some chunk-requests are combined by one transmission.
Therefore, we propose the over-request mechanism to fully utilize the channel capacity:
• After bargaining for chunk-request quota, allow each user to send up to K times the
bargained quota. K > 1 ∈ N is is a pre-defined constant which is agreed by all the
users.
• During chunk-requesting stage, users mark the chunk requests with 1 (for the re-
quests use the bargained quota) or 0 (for the requests use the extra quota).
• Then in the request-answering stage, all the users first choose q = 1 chunk to be
transmitted, and exchange this information to confirm the total bits to be transmitted
do not exceed the channel capacity. Increase q until fully utilizing the channel
capacity. If when q = 1, the total bits to be transmitted exceed the channel capacity,
then all the selfish users answer the chunk requests marked with 1.
Although the over-request mechanism can increase the usage of the cooperation
channel, the users might not agree to all the chunk requests that are sent to them. There-
fore, an algorithm is needed for choosing which chunk requests to answer during cooper-
ation.
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Since the live streaming social network will last till the end of the video and has
finite life time, selfish users tend to consider the contributions from other peers when
choosing which request to answer. This situation will not only encourage the selfish users
to be always cooperative in the finite time model but also reduce the damage of handwash
attack. Let Ch(i)(t) be the set of chunk indexes that other users request from user i in
round t. The users who request chunks from user i must be not marked as malicious by
peer i, and also satisfy (5.18) to make their requested chunks included in Ch(i)(t). We
propose the following request-answering algorithm: for every selfish peer i, when he/she
receives multiple chunk requests from multiple users and has decided to send q chunks by
the above over-request mechanism. Then user i chooses q chunks based on the probability







where R(Ik, t) is the set of users that request chunk Ik from user i at round t and ε is a
small number that gives newcomers who have not sent any chunks to peer i a chance to
start cooperation. γi is a parameter that controls the sensitivity of user i to other peers’
contribution. If γi = 0, every peer sent a request to peer i has the same probability of being
answered. On the contrary, if γi → ∞, the request from user who has send most chunks to
peer i will definitely be answered.
5.4.3 P2P wireless live video-sharing Cooperation Strategy with Lay-
ered Video Coding and Over-Request
From the above discussion, the P2P wireless live video-sharing cooperation strategy
is as follows: for any selfish node i ∈ Ns, he/she initially i marks every other nodes j ∈
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N, j 6= i as selfish. Then, in round t, i uses the following strategy:
• Identify malicious users by (5.20) and update D(i)max(i, t) by (5.22).
• Bargain with other users and get the chunk-request quota which is K times the
time-sensitive bargaining solution
• In the chunk-requesting stage, i chooses its own maximum number of video layers
C(i) and desired video quality measure, applies the chunk-request algorithm (5.24),
and sends chunk requests to the users in N(i)s (t).
• Decide q, the number of chunks to transmit in this round by exchanging information
with other users in the social network
• In the request-answering stage, i first identifies the selfish users that satisfy (5.18).
Then, i chooses the chunks to transmit based on the probability distribution in
(5.25), and agrees to send the requested chunks to all the selfish users that ask
for the chunks and satisfy (5.18).
5.5 Simulation Results
5.5.1 Simulation Settings
We use ns2 and C as the simulation platform. In our simulation, we assume the users
communicate with the access point using IEEE 802.11 within the diameter of 15 meters,
and users build their own wireless network that uses a different band dedicated to co-
operation. ns2 is used to simulate the wired network from the live-streaming server to
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Under no attack without trust
Under no attack with trust
Under 25% attack, without handwash
Under 25% attack and handwash,without trust
Under 25% attack and handwash,  withtrust
Figure 5.6: Utility of selfish (non-malicious) users under attack versus the initial credit
line
the access point, and the communication between the access point and the users. The
cooperation among users are simulate by C simulator. ns2 and the C program exchange
the real-time simulated results by the log files. The link from the wireless router to the
Internet is a DSL link with 1.5Mbits download bandwidth. There are totally 30 users in
the network using live-streaming service, and another 5 users using Internet resources at
the same time. For the 5 Internet users, we assume the traffic generated from them is a
Poission process. The 30 live-streaming users will cooperate by sharing one channel, and
we assume every one in the network can connect with any other user in the network via
the dedicated cooperation channel. The location of users are randomly distributed within
the circle of 15-meter diameter. The users access the channel by TDMA, and users trans-
mit in a round sequence, which is, user 1 transmit first then user 2 and so on, and in the
next round, user 2 transmit first and user 1 transmit last.
We fix the ration between the laptop, PDA, and PDA2 users as 3:1:1. The video is
initially stored at the original streaming server with an upload bandwidth of 3 Mbps, and
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there are other 800 users in the Internet watching the same live stream. The request round
is 0.4 second and the buffer length is 10 seconds with L f = 20 and L = 20. We choose the
”Foreman” and ”Akiyo” video sequences with frame rate 30 frames/sec. We encode the
video into a 3-layer bitstream with 25 kbps per layer, and divide each layer into chunks
of 0.1 second. Thus the layered chunk size is M’= 2.5 kbits. In the wireless network,
the chunks are channel coded using BCH code with rate 15/31, thus the chunk size in the
wireless live video-sharing social network is M = 5.15 kbits. The 30 live-streaming users
in the wireless network can either follow the wireless live streaming cooperation strategy
in Section 5.4.3 if they are selfish users, and they follow the optimal attack strategy in
Section 5.3.3 if they are malicious attackers. We set gi = 1 = Cmax = 0.8ccell phone ∗Ki,
ccell phone : cPDA : claptop = 1:0.9:0.4, Pmin = 100mW , noise power = 20mW , and bandwidth
B = 200kHz. Discount measure d in (5.7) is set to be 0.7, γi in (5.25) is set to be 2 and
PDA2 and PDA users are satisfied with only receiving the quality of base layer of the
video.
The performance of the cooperation strategies is evaluated by the utilities of the
users and the PSNR of the video. The PSNR is calculated by first calculating the mean
square error between the original video (Foreman or Akiyo) and the received video, and
then divided by the peak pixel value. If a frame is not received or not decodable, it will
introduce the square error equals to the sum of all pixel-value square in the frame.
204
























No attack and 25% attacker
50% attacker
Figure 5.7: Utility of averaged selfish (non-malicious) users with or without attack versus
the amount of over-request quota
5.5.2 Performance Evaluations
We first study how different initial setting of credit lines can affect cooperation stimula-
tion. Figure 5.6 demonstrates the relationship between credit line and the averaged utility
of selfish peers under no attack or 25% of peers being attackers, where the attackers are
chosen randomly from all the 20 users. Compare the selfish user’s utility when there are
no attackers and 25% attackers. In Figure 5.6, the attackers do not mount hand-wash at-
tack, and the trust concept in Section 5.3.2.2 was not incorporated. In both cases, when
the credit line is over 50, the selfish nodes’ payoff is saturated, and as the credit line keeps
increasing, to more than 40s, selfish nodes’ utility starts to decrease very fast under at-
tacks, while the utility keeps the same if there are no attackers presented. It is clear that
the maximum damage attackers can cause is linearly proportional to the credit line, while
the total number of rounds is 9000. When credit line is larger than 400, the damages are
no longer negligible. Also, from this plot, it shows that a credit line of 50 is an optimal
choice and an arbitrary large credit line will only lower selfish users’ utilities is there are
attackers presented.
If the attackers mount the hand-wash attack, and the selfish users do not trust each
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other, the selfish users’ utility will be very small no matter which credit line they choose.
This case is shown as black circle dashed line in Figure 5.6. However, the star line in
Figure 5.6 shows the selfish users’ utility if they trust each other, which is much better
than without trust. Here we set the minimum number of successfully received chunks
Ch(i) from the trusted users as two times the initial credit line. An intuitive explanation of
choosing Ch(i) is that since the initial setting of credit line D(i)max( j,0) can be considered as
user i’s tolerance of the damage that others cause to him/her. On the other hand, D(i)max( j,0)
is the number of chunks that user i thinks an usual non-malicious user should interact with
him/her. Thus users who have sent more than two times D(i)max( j,0) chunks successfully
to him/her should be trusted. And if the credit line is chosen carefully between 50 and
200, the highest utility can be achieved even the attackers mount the hand-wash attack.
The performance of the cooperation strategy with trust when there are no attackers is also
presented as red triangle in Figure 5.6, showing that trust concept will not degrade selfish
users’ utility if every one is non malicious.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the averaged selfish users’ utility of the over-request algorithm
with or without attack. Here we choose the initial credit line as 50 from the observation
drawn in Figure 5.6, and set Ch(i) as 100. When there are 50% of attackers and the
users do not over request as in Section 5.4.2, then the utility for selfish users will drop
20% when there are 50% attackers. However, if the users over request to 3 times of the
bargained quota, then the utility of the selfish users when there are 50% and 25% attackers
will be the same. Thus it is clear that the over-request algorithm can effectively increase
the selfish users utility, and the contribution-based chunk-answering algorithm can also
help against attack to 50% malicious users.
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(b) versus number of rounds
Figure 5.8: PSNR of the selfish laptop users
Figure 5.8 shows the averaged PSNR of the selfish laptop users under different
parameter setting. Here the attackers will mount hand-wash attack and the selfish users
apply the cooperation strategy as in Section 5.4.3. The PSNR is calculated by the received
video given the maximal number of layers of different users. For instance, if the user’s
device is PDA, then the PSNR is calculated using 2-layer video only. Figure 5.8(a) shows
the robustness of different credit line setting versus the percentage of attackers. When
the percentage of attackers increases, higher credit line setting will give lower PSNR
for the selfish users since the credit line mechanism only ensures the maximal damage
of each attacker, and the total damage caused by the attackers can increase if there are
more malicious users in the system. Thus, this phenomenon again suggests the credit
line should be set as the minimal number that can stimulate cooperation, which is 50
in this case. Figure 5.8(b) shows the selfish user’s averaged PSNR under different trust
thresholds Ch in (5.22) versus the number of rounds. It is clear after 400 rounds that the
selfish user’s PSNR is saturated and Ch = 0.5D(i)max( j,0) or Ch = D
(i)
max( j,0) gives lower
PSNR than Ch = 2D(i)max( j,0). These results imply that setting trust threshold Ch too small
will cause damage to the system since the selfish users might trust the malicious users
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also. On the other hand, from Figure 5.8(b), higher Ch needs more number of rounds to
saturate the selfish user’s PSNR, which means the selfish users need to wait more rounds
to trust other users.
Furthermore, we compare our cooperation strategy with the payment-based incen-
tive schemes [26] and the resource chain trust model for P2P security [68]. The credit
line is set to 100, and the users over request the chunk by 3 times. We first compare
the attack-resistance of the three algorithm as shown in Figure 5.9(a). It is clear that our
cooperation strategy is attack-resistant when the percentage of attackers is less than 60%,
and the resource chain trust model can resist up to 30% of attackers. The payment-based
method is not resistant to the attack, while under no attack the payment-based method can
achieve 35 dB but still lower than the proposed cooperation strategy since the payment-
based method does not consider the issues of wireless channels.
We also compare the utility for the PDA user versus number of rounds for the
three algorithms without attack in Figure 5.9(b). First, the proposed algorithm converge
to steady payoff as quick as the payment-based method, while the resource chain trust
modelling takes longer time. On the other hand, our proposed scheme gives the PDA
users higher utility by taking into account the desired resolution of the user. The PDA
user will not request higher-layer chunks and thus he/she will dedicate his/her chunk-
request quota to the base-layer chunks and get higher utility.
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(a) PSNR of laptop users versus percentage of
attackers





















Resource chain trust model
(b) Utility of PDA users versus number of
rounds
Figure 5.9: Performance comparison of the proposed cheat-proof and attack-resistant
cooperation strategies and the payment-based cooperation strategy and the resource chain
trust model
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we investigate cooperation stimulation in wireless live-streaming social
networks under a game theoretic framework. An illustrating two-player Bayesian game
is studied, and different optimality criteria, including Pareto-Optimal and time-sensitive
bargaining solution is performed to refine the obtained equilibriums. Finally, a cheat-
proof cooperation strategy is derived which provides the users in wireless live streaming
social network an secured inventive to cooperate.
The results are then extended to stimulate multiuser live streaming, and comb-
ing with the chunk-request and request-answering algorithm, a fully-distributed attack-
resistant and cheat-proof cooperation stimulation strategy has been devised for peer-to-
peer wireless live streaming social networks. Simulation results have illustrated that the
proposed strategies can effectively stimulate cooperation among selfish peers in a wireless
network, and the incentive-based cooperation strategies are attack-resistant to pollution
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attack and handwash attack when the percentage of attackers is less than 25%.
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Chapter 6
Optimal Price Setting for Mobile Live
Video Service
With the explosive advance of communication technologies and multimedia signal pro-
cessing, nowadays users can watch live tv program over mobile phones legally by sub-
scribing to the data plans. A recent study [69] shows that there are 97 cellphone users per
100 inhabitants at the end of year 2007 in developed countries. Since almost every per-
son has at least one cellphone, and the phone-to-phone communication is available, some
users who have subscribed to the live tv program can try to pirate the live video and sell
to the non-subscribers by lower price. Due to the high mobility, high time-sensitiveness,
and small transmission range of the mobile devices, each pirate action only exists for a
short time. Thus, such pirating market is very difficult to track. Consequently, the better
way to prevent the pirating action and protect the copyright of the content owner is to set
a price that no subscribers will have incentives to pirate the live video.
The pirates and the non-subscribers who are interested in the live video interact
with each other and form a live-video marketing social network. Users influence each
others’ decisions and performance and both groups of users will reach agreement at the
equilibrium price that all users have no incentive to deviate. Hence, such equilibrium
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price will serve as the upper bound for the price set by the original service provider. Due
to the small coverage of each mobile device, a pirate can only sell the content to the non-
subscribers within his/her transmission range. On the other hand, the non-subscribers can
only buy the content from the close pirate. If there are multiple non-subscribers within
a pirate’s transmission range, they have to bid for the live video since one pirate can
only transmit to one non-subscriber at a time to avoid interference. If there is only one
non-subscriber that the pirate can sell to, then the dynamics between them is a traditional
seller-buyer game. To solve this hybrid user dynamics in the live-video marketing social
network, we propose a Auction-Stackelburg game to solve the problem.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the system model
and define the problem and the utility functions for the pirate and the non-subscriber in
Section 6.1. We then analyze the optimal strategies for all users and provide the solutions
in Section 6.2. Simulation results are shown in Section 6.3 and conclusions are drawn in
Section 6.4.
6.1 System Model and Problem Formulations
In this section, we first introduce the channel, transmission, and rate-distortion model for
the video transmission. Then, we formulate the optimization problem of pirate and power
selection using an Auction-Stackelberg game.
212
6.1.1 System Model
The system diagram is shown in Figure 6.1. Suppose the ith pirate Si is transmitting
the video chunks to the jth non-subscriber B j using power Pi, the channel between them
is slow fading channel with channel gain Gi j, the distance between them is di j and the
variance of the additive white gaussian noise at the receiver side is σ2i j, then the signal-to-





thus bit rate of the video stream, which is the the channel capacity is







where W is the bandwidth of the for transmission, and γ is the capacity gap.
For a video streaming service, a common objective quality measure is the video’s
peak signal-to-noise-ratio (PSNR). The PSNR of the video stream between Si and B j is




where MSEi j is the mean square error which is the distortion of the video. Without loss
of generality, in this paper, we use a simple two-parameter distortion-rate model, which is
widely employed in a medium or high bit-rate situation, and other models can be similarly
analyzed. Since the video bit rate is formulated in (6.2), MSEi j can be expressed by








where α and β are two positive parameters determined by the characteristics of the video
content. If the pirates available to sell the live video to the non-subscriber B j at a certain
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Figure 6.1: An example of a live-streaming marketing social network
time constitute a set, denoted by L = S1,S2, ...,SN , then the distortion of the video MSE j
is
MSE j = αe







where N′ is the number of pirates that the non-subscriber buy the video stream from.
6.1.2 Problem Formulation
Since the live-video marketing social network is with high mobility, it is very difficult to
control the user behavior by a centralized authority. Since each user can only commu-
nicate to the users within a certain distance, local information is enough for the users
to make decision. Hence, we propose a fully distributed Auction-Stackelburg-game-
theoretical model to analyze how the non-subscribers provide incentives for the pirates to
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sell the video content, and what is the optimal price and quantity that the non-subscribers
should offer. The goal of this analysis is to help the original content owner set the price
such that the equilibrium of the game between pirates and the non-subscribers leads to
negative payoff, which means the users have no incentive to pirate the video. We start the
analysis by the defining the stages of the game and the utility functions of both types of
users in the social network.
• Game Stages Before the game starts, the pirate and the non-subscribers will declare
their existence to let all user within their transmission range know their coverage
areas.
The first stage for the game is the pirates’ (auctioneers’/sellers’) move. For each
pirate who has only one non-subscriber within their coverage areas, the pirate will
set the unit price p′i for his/her transmission power as well as the maximal power
that he/she can use for transmission. For every pirate who has more than one non-
subscribers within the transmission diameter, he/she will declare the reserve price
p′i per unit power as well as the maximal power. Since there are multiple non-
subscribers, they have to bid for the video, and the reserve price is the minimal
price for bidding.
Then in the second stage of the game, the non-subscribers (bidders/buyers) will
decide whom to buy the video from and how much power they want the pirate to
transmit. The subscriber will offer each pirate the price per unit power pi and the
quantity of power Pi. If a pirate receives more than one offer, he/she will choose
the one that maximize his/her utility.
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• Actions of non-subscribers/bidder/buyer We first discuss the utility function and
the optimal action for the non-subscribers. A non-subscriber B j gain the reward by
successfully receiving the live video with a certain quality. On the other hand, Bi
has to pay for the power that the pirates use for transmission. Therefore, given the
rate-distortion model, the utility function of a non-subscriber Bi can be defined as
πB j = a× ( f (PSNR j)− f (PSNRmax))− ∑
Si∈L
pi jPi + po, (6.6)
where f (PSNR j) is the reward, PSNRmax is the maximal PSNR of the video which
can be obtained by buying the video from the original content owner, po is the price
set by the content owner, Pi is the power that pirate i used for transmission, pi j is the
price per unity power paid from non-subscriber j to pirate i, and a is a parameter
controlling the balance between the gain and cost. According to the human visual
system (HVS) model, the quality difference in the low PSNR region is easier to
be distinguished than that in the high PSNR region. Therefore, we define the f (.)
function as:
f (PSNR) = ln(PSNR). (6.7)
According to the rate distortion model in (6.4) and PSNR formulation in (6.3), the
reward term can be formulated as a function of the video bit rate as










where η = 2ln255− lnα.
Combining (6.1) and (6.6) with the above equation, we can formulate the utility
function of Bi as a function of {Pi, pi ∀i ∈ L}. Note that pi is the price that Bi paid
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for S j, not the price p′i that pirate i asks for. Hence, pi ≥ p′i and the optimal action











)− (ln(η+βRmax))− ( ∑
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≤ Rmax,Si ∈ L. (6.9)
The choice of the optimal auction price pi j and the power quantity Pi not only
influenced by the channel conditions between Si and B j, but also depends on how
many non-subscribers are auctioning for the same pirate and how many pirates that
the non-subscriber B j can buy the video from. For instance, if B j is the only non-
subscriber within the transmission range of Si, B j has no incentive to offer pi j > p′i.
On the other hand, if B j has to increase the offer pi j in order to compete with other
non-subscribers, B j might buy more power from other pirates instead.
• Actions of pirates/auctioneers/seller
Each pirate S j can be seen as a seller or auctioneer and aims to not only earn the
payment that covers his/her transmission cost but also gain as many extra rewards
as possible. We introduce a parameter ci, the cost of power for relaying data, in our
formulation. ci is determined by the characteristics of the device that pirate Si uses.
Hence, the utility of Si can be defined as
πSi = maxj
(pi j− ci)Pi, (6.10)
where Pi is the power that pirate i used for transmission and pi jl ≤ p′i ∀ j. Thus, the
pirate i will choose the reverse price p′i such that
max
pi j≤p′i
πSi = (pi j− ci)Pi ∀i. (6.11)
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The choice of the optimal reserve price p′i is affected not only by each pirate’s
own channel conditions to each non-subscriber but also by the other pirates’ prices. This
is because the seller-level game is noncooperative, and the relay nodes compete to get
selected by source node s. If a certain pirate Si asks such a high price that makes it less
beneficial than the other pirate to the non-subscriber, then non-subscriber will buy less
from pirate S j or even discard it. It is worth noticing that the only signaling required to
exchange between the source node and the relay nodes are the price pi and the information
about how much power Pi to buy. Consequently, the proposed two-level gametheoretical
approach can be implemented in a distributed way. The outcome of the proposed games
will be shown in detail in the following section.
6.2 Equilibrium Analysis
First, we obtain closed-form solutions to the outcomes of the proposed games. Then, we
prove that these solutions are the global optima.
6.2.1 Analysis of the non-subscribers’ actions
We analyze the game from the backward manner by analyzing the optimal strategy for the
non-subscribers first. The goal of each non-subscriber B j is to find the optimal bidding
price pi j to bid for the video from pirates who can offer the live video service for multiple
non-subscribers and also determine the optimal bit rate that B j should buy from each
pirate in L. Let Lc be the set of pirates that have multiple non-subscribers within their
coverage areas. We will answer these two questions by first investigating the maximal
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utility π∗B j(L\Lc) by excluding all pirates in Lc and then compare with the maximal utility
π∗B j(L\Lc + Si) with the pirate set L\Lc + Si, in which Si ∈ Lc to find the distribution of
the bidding function. Then based on the bidding function, we can solve the optimal bid
for the pirates in Lc.
• Solving π∗B j(L\Lc): For the pirates in L\Lc, we can solve the optimal power Pi by











− pi j = 0 ∀Si ∈ L\Lc (6.12)
Let C = BW/ ln2, and Ai =
√
di jσ2γ/Gi j then
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The above equation can be solved by numerical method and the unique solution is
denoted as P∗i .
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• Private valuation of the non-subscribers: Private valuation is the value of the
resource that each bidder evaluates by himself/herslf. In the live-video marketing
social network, the resource that the non-subscribers are competing for is the live
video stored in a pirate Si. Hence, the valuation of such video is a function of the
biding price pi j and can be defined as
v(pi j) = π∗B j(L\Lc +Si, pi j)−π
∗
B j(L\Lc), (6.18)
where pi j ≥ p′i, and p′i is the reserve price of the pirate Si. Since {L\Lc}⊂ {L\Lc +
Si}, v(pi j) is always positive for any pi j ≥ p′i. On the other hand, v(pi j) is upper
bounded by the optimal price p∗i j which is the maximizer of π
∗
B j(L\Lc +Si, pi j) and
can be sound by solving
∂∂πB j
∂pi j∂Pi
|pi j=p∗i j= 0. (6.19)
Hence, v(pi j) takes value between 0 and v∗(pi j) and is a function of pi j. Since
pi j can take any value greater or equal to pi, and the bidder B j only has local
information which is the number of competitors but does not have the information
about the channel condition between his/her competitor and the pirate Si, the best
choice of B j is to uniformly randomize the bidding price pi j, such that pi j takes
value in [p j, p∗i j]. As a result, the private valuation v(pi j) is also a random variable.




F(pbi j) = v(p
b
i j)× f (pbi j), (6.20)
where f (pbi j) is the probability distribution function of pi j, and F(p
b
i j) is the cumu-
lative distribution function.
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Hence, the bidder B j will bid the price pbi j and use pi j = p
b
i j to calculate the optimal
P∗i in (6.17).
6.2.2 Analysis of the pirates’ actions
Given the solution P∗i of (6.13), each pirate S j ∈ L \Lc seek to maximize their utility by
setting the optimal price p′i that
max{p′i}πSi(p
′
i− ci)P∗i . (6.21)










Now we will prove that (6.22), (6.17), and form the equilibrium of the Auction-Stackelburg
game.
First, Pi and p j = {pi j∀ j ∈ L} form an Auction-Stackelburg equilibrium if
1. For every pirate Si ∈ Lc, (pi j∀ j) forms an auction equilibrium.
2. When p j is fixed, for every non-subscriber B j, πB j(Pi) = suppi j≥0 πB j .
3. For every pirate Si ∈ L\Lc when Pi is fixed, πSi(p j) = suppi j≥0 πSi
Then we will discuss the existence of the equilibrium which are the solutions in
(6.22) and (6.17). Let v be the infimum of the private valuation v and v be the supremum
of v.
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Property 1: f (v) > 0 on (v,v]
Proof: According the the definition of v(pi j) in (6.18) and given pi j is uniformly dis-
tributed in which f (pi j) > 0∀pi jthatv(pi j) ∈ [v,v]. Therefore, f (v(pi j)) > 0 on (v,v].
Property 2: The payoff of every bidder is less than 0 if the bidding value is less than the
reserve value of the auctioneer.
Proof: The payoff of bidder B j by joining the bid is πB j(L \Lc + Si,Pi)−πB j(L \Lc,Pi)
with optimal power vectors P( j)i and Pi, respectively. If the bidder offers a bid pi j <
p′i where p
′
i is the reserve price of the auctioneer Si, then Si will reject the offer and
P( j)i = 0 which is the power that Si sells to B j. Let P
( j)
i be optimal the power vector
of π∗B j(L \Lc + Si, pi j), and Pi be the optimal power vector ofP
( j)
i = 0, πB j(L \Lc,P
( j)
i )
= πB j(L\Lc +Si,Pi) < πB j(L\Lc,Pi) since Pi is the optimizer.
According to [70], any auction satisfies property 1 and property 2 has a unique
equilibrium which is composed of the optimal auction of each bidder. Hence, the solution
in (6.20) exists and satisfy the definition of the Auction-Stackelburg equilibrium.
6.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we will show the equilibrium of the Auction-Stackelburg game under
different scenario as well as the optimal price for the content owner.
6.3.1 Single non-subscriber with multiple pirates
We first set up multiple-pirate single non-subscriber simulations to test the proposed
game. We set the coordinate of the non-subscriber as (0 m, 0m), and the pirates are
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uniformly located within the range of [50 m, -50 m] in both x-axis and y-axis. The maxi-
mal transmit power Pmax is 100 mW, the noise level is 10−8 W, and we select the capacity
gap γ =1, bandwidth W = 1 MHz, the gain per lnPSNR a=0.01 , and the cost per unit of
power for each pirate is ci = 0.1. We use the video sequence ”Akiyo” in QCIF format and
H.264 vodeio codec. The resulted rate-distortion parameter β = 0.0416, and α = 6.8449.
We set the maximal PSNR which is provided by the original content owner be 40dB, and
the corresponding maximal bit-rate for Akiyo is 84 kB/sec. The subscription price Po for
the video sequence is set to be 0.
In Fig. 6.2, we can observe that as the total number of the available pirates increases,
the competitions among the pirates become more severe, so the average payment per
pirate decreases. Although the total payment for the non-subscriber increases slowly with
the number of pirates, the utility keeps increasing since the video quality is better. This
is the nature of free market with more sellers. The optimal price for the content owner,
which equals to the negative value of the non-subscriber’s utility is also decreasing with
the number of pirates.
6.3.2 Multiple non-subscriber with multiple pirates
We then set up multiple-non-subscriber with multiple-pirates simulations to test the pro-
posed game. We will discuss two factors that influence the optimal price Po. One is
the number of non-subscribers in the network, the other is the distance between the non-
subscribers.
For the first simulation, we let both pirates and non-subscribers be uniformly lo-
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Utility of the non−subscriber
Optimal price for original content
Figure 6.2: Single non-subscriber case with different number of pirates
cated within the range of [40 m, -40 m] in both x-axis and y-axis. The number of pirates
is fixed to be 10. Other settings are the same as the previous section, and the subscription
price Po for the video sequence is set to be 0. Fig. 6.3 shows the average payment each
non-subscriber pays, the averaged utility of the non-subscribers and the optimal subscrip-
tion price Po. We can observe that as the total number of the non-subscriber increases, the
higher the number of pirates that can sell the video to multiple non-subscribers. So the
competitions among the non-subscribers become more severe, so the average payment
per non-subscriber increases. Note that when there are less non-subscribers, say less than
3, the utility and the payment keeps the same. But as the number of non-subscribers
increases, the non-subscribers’ utilities decrease dramatically, which means the conges-
tion influence the performance of the system a lot. The optimal price for the content
owner, which equals to the negative value of the non-subscriber’s utility is also increasing
with the number of non-subscribers. Such phenomenon implies if there is no cooperation
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Utility of the non−subscriber
Optimal price for original content
Figure 6.3: Multiple non-subscriber case with different numbers of non-subscribers
among non-subscribers, the live-video marketing social networks can only serve small
number of users.
Then we will examine the relationship between the averaged distance among the
non-subscribers and the optimal content price. We let the pirates be uniformly located
within the range of [50 m, -50 m] in both x-axis and y-axis. The two non-subscribers
are located at [40m, 0m] and [-40m, 0m] at the beginning, and gradually move toward
each other. The number of pirates is fixed to be 10. Other settings are the same as the
previous simulation and the subscription price Po for the video sequence is set to be 0.
Fig. 6.4 shows the optimal subscription price Po versus the distance between the two non-
subscribers. We can observe that as the distance between the non-subscribers increases,
the higher the number of pirates that can sell the video to multiple non-subscribers. So
the competitions among the non-subscribers become more severe, so the average payment
per non-subscriber increases. The optimal price is almost doubled when the two non-
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Figure 6.4: Multiple non-subscriber case versus distance between non-subscribers
subscribers are at the same position. Such phenomenons is because when the two non-
subscribers are at the same position, they are completely competing over all resources.
6.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a game-theoretical approach for the optimal price setting over
mobile live-video streaming social networks. We target to find the optimal price of the
mobile live tv service by answering two questions: Which non-subscriber which buy buy
the video from which pirate, and how much power should the pirates use for transmission?
We propose a Auction-Stackelberg game to jointly consider the benefits of the pirates and
the non-subscribers. The proposed scheme not only helps the non-subscribers optimally
choose the pirates at better locations but also helps the competing pirate nodes ask optimal
prices to maximize their utilities. Consequently, the results provide a guideline for the
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content owner to set the price of the video content and prevent the pirate behavior. From
the simulation results, the non-subscriber will tend to buy more power from the closer
pirates to increase the his/her utility, and if the total number of the pirate increases, the
non-subscriber can obtain a larger utility value, and the average payment to the pirates
shrinks, due to more severe competitions among the sellers. On the other hand, if there




Conclusions and Future Research
In this thesis, we have modelled and analyzed human behavior for multimedia social
networks which involve a large number of users of different types with different objec-
tives. Such an analysis helps to understand the impact and importance of human behavior
factors on multimedia security and communications. Our study aims to stimulate user
cooperation, facilitates the implementation of misbehavior monitoring mechanisms, and
provides important guidelines on the design of cheat-proof and attack-resistant strategies.
All these are essential factors to maximize the overall system performance and minimize
the damage caused by malicious users.
We first took the multimedia fingerprinting social network as an example to study
the behavior forensics and user dynamics. We answered the question of when and how
will the collusion happen by analyzing the colluder social network. We defined a general
utility function for the colluders and investigated the necessary conditions for multi-user
collusion. Then, by modelling the colluders’ behavior as a non-cooperative game, we
found the fair collusion under different types of bargaining model, either the market value
of the multimedia content is time-sensitive or not, to further reduce the possible collusion
set and improved the traitor-tracing performance.
We then investigated the side information about the mean values of the detection
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statistics can help the detector significantly improve the collusion resistance and proposed
the self-probing detector to utilize such side information for detection. The simulation re-
sults demonstrate that the self-probing detector has approximately the same performance
as the optimal fingerprint detector, and the difference between these two can be ignored.
Since the self-probing detector can be considered optimal, it breaks the collective fairness
equilibrium between the colluders and the fingerprint detector, and the colluders have to
choose different strategies to achieve fairness. We model the colluder-detector dynam-
ics with side information as a Stackelburg game and show that under the assumption
that colluders demand absolute fairness of the attack, the min-max solution achieves the
equilibrium which is the optimal strategy of all users in the multimedia fingerprint social
network.
We also studied how to stimulate cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation that
can ensure the efficiency under various traffic network and hostile environments in P2P
live streaming social networks. An illustrating two-player game was studied, and dif-
ferent optimality criteria, including Pareto-Optimal, proportional fairness and absolute
fairness is performed to refine the obtained Nash Equilibriums. Finally, a unique Nash
equilibrium solution is derived, which states that, in the two-person live streaming game,
a node should not help its opponent more than its opponent has helped it. Then the results
were extended to stimulate multiuser live streaming, and combing with the chunk-request
and request-answering algorithm, a fully-distributed attack-resistant and cheat-proof co-
operation stimulation strategy has been devised for P2P live streaming social networks.
Simulation results have illustrated that the proposed strategies can effectively stimulate
cooperation among selfish peers in internet with various traffic and hostile environments.
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We then analyzed the user dynamics in wireless P2P live video sharing systems.
The trust modelling was incorporated to against hand-wash attack and the wireless fading
channel. Both simulation and analytical results demonstrated that the trust modelling
significantly reduced the damage caused by malicious attack, and did not influence the
non-malicious users’ utility when there are no attackers in the system.
In this thesis, we also addressed the optimal price setting for wireless video stream-
ing to prevent users from reselling the video content on mobile devices. We proposed a
mixed Auction-Stackelburg game and proved the equilibrium price between the re-sellers
and the non-subscribers.
We hope that the frameworks presented in this thesis will encourage and stimu-
late researchers from different areas to further explore behavior modeling and forensics
for multimedia social networks and beyond. It is an emerging research field with much
uncharted territory remains unexplored. We envision that insights from a wide range of
disciplines, such as signal processing, game theory, sociology, networking, communica-
tions and economics, will help improve our understanding of human dynamics and its
impact on multimedia social networks, and ultimately lead to systems with more secure,
efficient and personalized services.
Behavior analysis is at its young age, and there are many more interesting research
directions that need to be further investigated.
First, our current work on wireless peer-to-peer live video sharing social networks
consider a simple scenario that all users are watching the one and only one video, and each
user can connect to all other users in the network directly. As we pointed out in Chapter 5,
users in a wireless network are using different types of devices. Hence, the more powerful
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nodes, such as laptops, can serve as supernodes to work as a small access point to help
connect users that are far away from each other and increase the social warefare. Utilizing
supernodes has been proven to significantly increase the system performance, therefore,
it is important to stimulate powerful devices to serve as supernodes and investigate the
optimal strategies for these users. Furthermore, due to the limitation of transmission
power, the mobile devices has much smaller coverage than the access point. Therefore,
in some cases, not all users within a wireless live video social network can communicate
with all users in the network directly. In such scenario, some users must serve as relays
or routers to complete the transmission. Consequently, designing incentives and optimal
strategies for users to forward other users’ packets as well as exchanging video chunks is
of ample importance.
Also, our current work on live-video marketing social networks assume all users
are honest and rational. Which means the pirate will transmit the live video to the non-
subscribers using the power that he/she has agreed with. However, the pirate can increase
his/her payoff by transmitting the video using less energy. Also, some attackers can ma-
liciously bidding the live video for arbitrarily high price but refuse to pay the money by
pretending not receiving the video. Such cheating or malicious behavior will definitely
influence the system performance and the equilibrium price. Consequently, the original
content owner’s profit will also be influenced. Furthermore, the results showed if there are
no cooperation among the non-subscribers, the live-video marketing social networks can
only serve small number of users. Such phenomenon will stimulate cooperation among
the non-subscribers to pay less for the pirated live video.
Finally, the online social networks such as youtube, wikipedia, and facebook are
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becoming very popular and have millions of users worldwide. Users upload articles or
videos to gain the reputation of the society as well as the attention of entertainment indus-
tries. However, the reputation is rated by other users in the network and the cheating and
malicious behavior is very common in the online societies. It will be fruitful to investigate
the user dynamics for online social networks and design the strategies to against attack
and cheating. This investigation will lead to a more secured personal service, and provide
a basis for the design of online platforms.
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